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Summary
Electricity consumption is highly correlated with the level of human development,
which alongside electrification is expected to significantly increase global demand
for electricity in the coming decades. In current electricity systems, most of the elec-
tricity is generated by large fossil-fuel power plants on-demand and it is distributed
by centrally-managed electricity grids. The increasing demand for electricity, how-
ever, should not go hand in hand with the simultaneous intensification of fossil-fuel
mine and use, which is a driving cause of rising average temperatures on Earth’s
surface. Natural sources such as the sun and wind are expected to replace conven-
tional sources of electricity, such as coal and gas power plants, in the near future,
providing a key measure to address climate change and abate the effects of global
warming. However, the intermittent and distributed nature of renewable electricity
sources requires a redesign of conventional electricity grids that were originally de-
signed following a top-down approach.
The smart grid is an electricity grid innovation that uses digital communication,
measuring, and distributed control to facilitate efficient electricity usage and utiliza-
tion of renewable electricity sources. Next to adopting more and more renewable
electricity sources, users have an active role in the smart grid, both of which pose
new and significant challenges. One key challenge is the design of economic mecha-
nisms that encourage active participation of users, and at the same time can deal with
the increasing uncertainty of both demand and supply. It is also crucial to analyze the
behavior of future electricity systems since the collective efficiency of such systems
may be influenced by the decision-making of self-interested users (agents).
In this thesis we focus on fundamental multi-agent systems that are motivated by
the transition in electricity systems and relevant settings of the smart grid. In such
systems we study strategic interactions and derive optimal strategies for agents in
the presence of uncertainty; we further design economic mechanisms for resource
allocation that yield efficient outcomes for all participating agents; and last, using
tools from game theory, we analyze the behavior of these systems in both micro-
and macro-levels. The contributions of this thesis advance state-of-the-art methods
that: incentivize uncertainty reduction in the demand of customers (Chapter 2),
generalize demand response mechanisms under uncertainty (Chapter 3), facilitate
electricity trading under uncertainty in the supply (Chapter 4), and last, analyze the
behavior of retail markets under different economic decision-making behavior of
buyers (Chapter 5).
In both current and future electricity systems there is a need for continuously
balancing supply and demand. To this end, in Chapter 2 we study the design of
an innovative electricity tariff to incentivize customers to reduce the uncertainty
of their demand, the risk-sharing tariff : a two-step parameterized payment scheme
that provides the customer the choice to assume a fraction of the retailer’s costs
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associated with balancing supply and demand. More specifically, this chapter studies
a multi-agent system in which a customer wants to purchase a continuously divisible
good from a retailer and has a direct influence on the balancing costs of the retailer.
Within a game-theoretical analysis, we show that the risk-sharing tariff provides the
customer incentives to assume a fraction of the balancing costs. We also show that
our proposed tariff is acceptable for both the retailer and the customer, i.e., both have
economic incentives to adopt such tariff scheme. In this chapter we further study
the influence of the customer’s stochastic decision-making on the design of the risk-
sharing tariff, since the latter provides the customer with the choice of how much
risk to assume from the retailer. Overall, we show that novel tariff schemes, such as
the risk-sharing tariff, can enable indirect control of customers’ demand and tackle
demand uncertainty for retailers in future smart grid systems.
In similar settings, Chapter 3 studies mechanisms to incentivize small-scale users
to resolve last-minute imbalances between the available supply and the realization
of the demand. More specifically, in this chapter we consider small-scale flexible
assets that can alter their demand or generation behavior, e.g., electric vehicles, if
they prepare ahead of the realization of the demand. Such flexible assets can be used
by retailers on-demand to minimize over-generation and demand peaks that often
cause excessive balancing costs to retailers. Building upon previous work, this chap-
ter advances state-of-the-art economic mechanisms to incentivize a number of flexi-
ble users to prepare ahead and respond (last-minute) if requested by the retailer. The
proposed mechanisms guarantee that both demand response agents and the retailer
benefit in expectation, which alongside their simplicity and low computational com-
plexity provide a promising avenue for using the available flexibility of small-scale
users and complement existing demand response programs.
In contrast to previous technical chapters that study mechanisms to deal with the
problem of balancing supply and demand, Chapter 4 presents a contracting frame-
work to facilitate electricity trading in settings where supply depends on volatile
sources, and thus delivery cannot be guaranteed. More specifically, we propose the
adoption of service-level agreements (SLAs) that comprise the following features:
quantity, reliability, and price. In this chapter, first, we define a family of utility func-
tions for customers with regards to the probability of satisfying their demand, thus
extending the concept of the value of lost load (VoLL) with the extra costs associ-
ated to the risk of failed delivery. Next, we study the design of economic mechanisms
in order to specify and allocate these contracts (SLAs) to different customers, each
of which has a different utility function. We demonstrate that the proposed mecha-
nisms dominate alternative allocations that use only the VoLL, and vastly improve
the efficiency of the studied system. Overall, the proposed mechanisms can facilitate
distributed electricity trading under uncertainty in the supply, adding an essential
component to future smart grid systems.
In the last technical chapter of this thesis, Chapter 5, we consider retail markets
that enable automated software agents to participate instead of human buyers. The
discrepancy between the non-perfect decision-making of human buyers due to in-
formation or time limitations and software agents that act optimally with regards to
individual interactions may have adverse effects in such settings. In this chapter we
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investigate the effects of different economic decision-making of buyers on retail mar-
kets with regards to the resulting market dynamics and prices. By modeling buyers’
different levels of rationality and the competition between sellers, we derive analyti-
cally best response strategies for the sellers and we analyze the evolutionary behavior
of retail markets under different degrees of buyers’ rationality. The theoretical and
empirical results of this chapter suggest that perfect rationality have undesirable ef-
fects on market competition, which raises the need to revisit design objectives for
software agents in future retail markets.
Overall, in this thesis we study agent-based interactions and propose novel eco-
nomic mechanisms within fundamental models that comprise strategic situations and
are motivated by the transition towards the smart grid. Our findings can be used as
innovative components of future smart grid systems, which are characterized by the
increasing uncertainty on both demand and supply and actively participating users.
In addition, our technical contributions provide insights that transfer to the design
and analysis of multi-agent systems with similar characteristics of uncertainty in re-
source allocation.

Samenvatting
Het verbruik van elektriciteit hangt sterk samen met de mate van menselijke ont-
wikkeling. Naar verwachting zal dit, samen met toenemende elektrificatie, in de
komende decennia een aanzienlijke toename in de wereldwijde vraag naar elek-
triciteit teweeg brengen. In de elektriciteitssytemen van vandaag wordt de meeste
elektriciteit geproduceerd door ‘grijze’ energiecentrales die op fossiele brandstof-
fen draaien. Deze grijze centrales volgen de elektriciteitsvraag en de opgewekte
elektriciteit wordt gedistribueerd door centraal geregelde elektriciteitsnetwerken. De
groeiende vraag naar elektriciteit zou echter niet hand in hand moeten gaan met een
toename in winning en verbruik van fossiele brandstoffen; deze zijn immers een
belangrijke oorzaak voor wereldwijd stijgende temperatuurgemiddelden. Naar ver-
wachting zullen hernieuwbare elektriciteitsbronnen, zoals zon- en windcentrales, in
de nabije toekomst conventionele elektriciteitsbronnen, zoals kolen- en gascentrales,
vervangen. Deze transformatie zal een sleutelrol spelen in de inspanningen om kli-
maatverandering het hoofd te bieden en de effecten van de opwarming van de aarde
te verminderen. De onregelmatige en gedistribueerde aard van hernieuwbare elektri-
citeitsbronnen vraagt echter om een hernieuwd ontwerp van conventionele elektrici-
teitsnetwerken, die oorspronkelijk een top-down ontwerp volgen.
Het smart grid is een innovatie van het elektriciteitsnet. Het smart grid elektri-
citeitsnet faciliteert het efficiënte gebruik van elektriciteit en hernieuwbare elektrici-
teitsbronnen, door gebruik te maken van digitale communicatie, meting en gedistri-
bueerde controle. Naast het in gebruik nemen van steeds meer hernieuwbare bron-
nen, krijgen gebruikers een actieve rol in het smart grid. Allebei deze ontwikkelingen
stellen ons voor nieuwe en betekenisvolle uitdagingen. Één belangrijke uitdaging is
het ontwerp van economische mechanismen die de actieve deelname van gebruikers
aanmoedigen en tegelijkertijd om kunnen gaan met de toenemende onzekerheid van
zowel vraag als aanbod. Daarnaast is het cruciaal om het gedrag van toekomstige
elektriciteitssystemen te analyseren, omdat de effectiviteit van het gehele system be-
ïnvloed zou kunnen worden door de beslissingen van individuele gebruikers (agen-
ten), die uit eigenbelang handelen.
In dit proefschrift richten we ons op fundamentele multi-agentsystemen, gemoti-
veerd door de transitie in elektriciteitssystemen naar het smart grid. In zulke syste-
men bestuderen we strategische interacties en leiden hieruit optimale strategieën af
voor agenten, in de aanwezigheid van onzekerheid. Bovendien ontwerpen we econo-
mische mechanismen voor de toewijzing van middelen die efficiënte resultaten ge-
ven voor alle deelnemers. Ten slotte analyseren we het gedrag van deze systemen op
zowel micro- als macroniveau, waarbij we gebruikmaken van resultaten uit de spel-
theorie. De bijdragen van dit proefschrift breiden de stand van de nieuwste methoden
uit op vier manieren: het stimuleren van het verminderen van de onzekerheid in de
vraag van afnemers (Hoofdstuk 2), het generaliseren van vraagresponsmechanismen
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onder onzekerheid (Hoofdstuk 3), het faciliteren van elektriciteitshandel onder on-
zekerheid in het aanbod (Hoofdstuk 4) en ten slotte, het analyseren van het gedrag
van retail-markten onder verschillende economische besluitvormingsprocessen van
kopers (Hoofdstuk 5).
In zowel huidige als toekomstige elektriciteitssystemen is het noodzakelijk om
continu vraag en aanbod te balanceren. Daarom bestuderen we in Hoofdstuk 2 het
ontwerp van een innovatief elektriciteitstarief, dat afnemers stimuleert om de onze-
kerheid in hun vraag te verkleinen. Dit tarief noemen we het risico-delingstarief:
een twee-staps geparameteriseerde betalingsregeling die de afnemers de keuze biedt
om een deel van de kosten, die de leverancier maakt voor het balanceren van
vraag en aanbod, op zich te nemen. In het bijzonder behandelt dit hoofdstuk multi-
agentsystemen, waarin een afnemer een continu deelbaar goed van een leverancier
wil kopen en zelf een directe invloed heeft op de balanceerkosten van de leverancier.
In een speltheoretische analyse laten we zien dat het risico-delingstarief de afnemer
stimuleert om een deel van de balanceerkosten op zich te nemen. Daarnaast laten
we zien dat het door ons voorgestelde tarief acceptabel is voor zowel de leverancier
als de afnemer. Dat wil zeggen, beiden hebben economishe reden om een derge-
lijke tarievenregeling in te voeren. In dit hoofdstuk gaan we verder in op de invloed
van de stochastische besluitvorming van de afnemer op het ontwerp van het risico-
delingstarief. Het risico-delingstarief biedt de afnemer namelijk de keuze hoeveel
risico deze over wil nemen van de leverancier. Uiteindelijk laten we zien dat nieuwe
tariefregelingen, zoals het risico-delingstarief, indirecte controle over de vraag van
afnemers kan uitoefenen en de onzekerheid in de vraag aan leveranciers kan aanpak-
ken in de smart grid-systemen van de toekomst.
In vergelijkbare omstandigheden bestudeert Hoofdstuk 3 mechanismen die klein-
schalige gebruikers stimuleren om onbalans tussen het beschikbare aanbod en de rea-
lisaties van de vraag, die op het laatste moment ontstaat, op te lossen. In het bijzonder
behandelen we in dit hoofdstuk kleinschalige flexibele deelnemers die hun vraag of
productie kunnen aanpassen, zoals bijvoorbeeld elektrische voertuigen, wanneer die
zich voorbereiden op de realisatie van de vraag. Zulke flexibele deelnemers kunnen
door leveranciers op aanvraag gebruikt worden om overproductie en pieken in de
vraag, die vaak hoge balanceringskosten voor leveranciers tot gevolg hebben, te mi-
nimaliseren. Voortbouwend op voorgaand werk, vordert dit hoofdstuk de nieuwste
economische mechanismen door een aantal flexibele gebruikers te stimuleren zich
voor te bereiden en (op het laatste moment) te reageren, indien gevraagd door de le-
verancier. De voorgestelde mechanismen garanderen dat zowel vraagrespons agenten
als de leverancier hier in verwachting baat bij hebben. Samen met hun simpliciteit
en lage computationele complexiteit biedt dit een veelbelovende weg naar het ge-
bruik van de beschikbare flexibiliteit van kleinschalige gebruikers en het aanvullen
van bestaande vraagresponsprogramma’s.
In contrast met voorgaande technische hoofdstukken, die mechanismen voor het
balanceren van vraag en aanbod bestudeerden, behandelt Hoofdstuk 4 een contrac-
tenkader voor het faciliteren van energiehandel in omstandigheden waar de vraag af-
hangt van onzekere bronnen en waar levering dus niet gegarandeerd kan worden. In
het bijzonder stellen we het gebruik van service-level agreements (SLAs) voor, die de
xiii
volgende kenmerken hebben: kwantiteit, betrouwbaarheid en prijs. In dit hoofdstuk
stellen we eerst een familie van nutsfuncties voor afnemers voor. Deze nutsfuncties
hebben betrekking tot de kans dat de vraag van de afnemer vervuld wordt. Hiermee
wordt het concept van de waarde van verloren lading (value of lost load of VoLL) uit-
gebreid met de extra kosten die het risico van mislukte levering met zich meebrengt.
Vervolgens bestuderen we het ontwerp van economische mechanismen, met als doel
het specificeren en toewijzen van deze contracten (SLAs) aan verschillende afne-
mers, waarvan elk een andere nutsfunctie heeft. We laten zien dat de voorgestelde
mechanismen alternatieve toewijzingen, die alleen de VoLL gebruiken, domineren
en dat ze de efficiëntie van het bestudeerde systeem ruim verbeteren. Zo zien we
dat de voorgestelde mechanismen de gedistribueerde energiehandel kunnen facilite-
ren onder onzekerheid in het aanbod en zo een essentiele component toevoegen aan
smart grid-systemen van de toekomst.
In het laatste technische hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift, Hoofdstuk 5, bekijken
we toekomstige retail markten die geautomatiseerde software-agenten als deelne-
mers hebben, in plaats van menselijke kopers. In dergelijke situaties kan de dis-
crepantie, met betrekking tot individuele acties, tussen imperfecte beslissingen van
menselijke kopers ten gevolge van beperkingen in informatie of tijd enerzijds en
software-agenten die optimaal acteren anderzijds, tegengestelde effecten hebben. In
dit hoofdstuk onderzoeken we de effecten van verschillende economische besluit-
vormingsprocessen van kopers in retail markten, met betrekking tot de resulterende
marktdynamieken en -prijzen. Door het modelleren van verschillende niveaus van
rationaliteit van kopers en de competitie tussen verkopers, leiden we analytisch stra-
tegieën met beste antwoorden voor de verkopers af. Daarnaast analyseren we het
evolutionaire gedrag van retail markten onder verschillende niveaus van rationaliteit
van kopers. De theoretische en empirische resultaten van dit hoofdstuk suggereren
dat perfecte rationaliteit ongewilde effecten heeft op marktcompetitie. Dit betekent
dat ontwerpdoelen moeten worden herzien voor software-agenten in retail markten
van de toekomst.
Al met al bestuderen we in dit proefschrift agent-gebaseerde interacties en stellen
we nieuwe economische mechanismen voor. Dit doen we in de context van funda-
mentele modellen die strategische situaties omvatten en gemotiveerd zijn door de
transitie naar het smart grid. Onze bevindingen kunnen gebruikt worden als inno-
vatieve componenten voor smart grid-systemen van de toekomst, die gekarakteri-
seerd worden door de toenemende onzekerheid in zowel vraag en aanbod als actief
deelnemende gebruikers. Daarnaast bieden onze technische bijdragen inzichten die
toepasbaar zijn op het ontwerp en de analyse van multi-agentsystemen, wanneer die
gelijksoortige karakteristieken van onzekerheid op het gebied van toewijzing van
middelen hebben.
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1 Introduction
Electricity consumption is highly correlated with the level of human development,
and it is therefore evident that electricity demand will dramatically increase in the
following decades (Niu et al., 2013). More specifically, both the development of
our societies and the increasing electrification are expected to triple demand for
electricity by 2050 (Farhangi, 2010). Currently, most of electricity supply comes
from traditional fossil fuel power sources, such as coal, oil and natural gas; these
are mined and mainly used as burning fuels for electricity generation, heating, and
transportation. However, fossil fuels are responsible for most of the CO2 emissions
that are related to human-activity (Raupach et al., 2007). The increasing levels of
greenhouse gases, such as CO2, in the atmosphere is the major reason for the
significant increase of the average temperature on Earth’s surface and the effects
of global warming (Lashof and Ahuja, 1990; Meinshausen et al., 2009).
The vast increase of electricity demand should not go hand in hand with the
simultaneous increase in fossil fuel mining and use. Natural sources such as the
sun and wind are expected to replace conventional fossil fuel sources in the future,
which alongside other technological advances in electrification of transportation
(e.g., railways, electric vehicles), and heating (Moraga-González and Mulder, 2018)
have the potential to reduce CO2 emissions and thus abate the effects of global
warming (Jenkinson et al., 1991; Mora et al., 2017).
Current electricity grids have been originally designed following a top-down
approach: electricity supply is provided by few centrally located large fossil-fuel
power plants on-demand (Ramchurn et al., 2011), the supply of which is pooled
and traded in electricity markets. The increasing penetration of renewable electricity
generation, on the contrary to conventional centralized power plants, is distributed
and it can further be adopted by consumers on a local level, i.e., making them
prosumers.1 In addition, consumers are expected to take an active role in future
electricity systems by being able to control their own net demand with the use
of energy storage technologies. The above reasons induce higher uncertainty on
both supply and demand-sides, and therefore pose many challenges with regards
to the balancing requirements (i.e., supply and demand should be equal) of future
electricity systems. However, they also introduce an opportunity for the transition
towards fully sustainable electricity systems without greenhouse emissions, in which
active demand will follow the available supply of renewable electricity sources.
1 Prosumers are entities that not only consume but actively participate in the production of goods (Toffler,
1990).
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The increasing uncertainty in future electricity systems raises the need for the
redesign of current electricity grids and the corresponding markets that facilitate
electricity trading between producers and consumers. To this end, the smart grid is an
electricity grid innovation away from the traditional paradigm of passive distribution
and consumption (see Section 1.2.3). More specifically, in the smart grid, generation
is decentralized and thus can be closely located to the demand load it serves. In
addition, the presence of sensors and two-way communication between aggregators
and electricity consumers enable active participation of consumption or generation
entities (e.g., households, electric vehicles, solar PVs), direct or indirect control of
loads, and high-resolution pricing schemes for electricity customers based on real-
time consumption data. Real-time communication within the smart grid can further
enable monitoring electrical characteristics of the network, and therefore not only
optimize its function, but also enable fully autonomous operation of small parts of
the grid (micro-grids) to mitigate wider system disturbances if necessary.
The smart grid innovation changes the way conventional electricity grids operate.
Communication, coordination and economic mechanisms that go beyond centralized
conventional systems and traditional flat electricity tariffs need to ensure that the
smart grid is an efficient system design. More specifically, economic mechanisms
need to ensure that:
• Demand follows the available renewable electricity supply and thus economic
risks that are associated to balancing are alleviated.
• Costs and risks that are connected to balancing and the demand behavior of
users are allocated in an acceptable manner and charged directly on those who
cause them.
• The efficiency of future electricity markets is not affected by the increasing
uncertainty of both supply and demand, or the strategic behavior of participating
agents.
To this end, in this thesis we consider fundamental situations that are motivated
by the transition in electricity systems and some settings of the smart grid. We then
propose economic mechanisms to tackle the uncertainty in the demand or supply,
and we further analyze the interactions between multiple decision-makers. For in-
stance, we study the strategic interaction of producers and consumers when there is
uncertainty about either the demand of consumers or the supply (renewable supply)
of producers (see Chapters 2, 3 and 4). To analytically study such situations, each
individual decision-maker (e.g., retailer, customer) is modeled as a self-interested
agent that chooses its actions in order to maximize its utility. In addition, we study
the effects of different economic decision-making of consumers on the design of
electricity retail tariffs (see Chapters 2) and the resulting prices of competitive sell-
ers in electricity retail markets (see Chapter 5). Overall, the contributions of this
thesis are primarily connected to the field of computer science and economics with
an application domain of current and future electricity markets.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 1.1 we provide a
thorough discussion on fundamental concepts of multi-agent systems which we use
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Agent Environment
Action
Observation
Figure 1.1 An agent acts upon incoming observations within an environment in an ongoing
process.
to formalize different situations in envisioned electricity markets.2 In Section 1.2
we elaborate on our motivations, which are aligned to the transition of electricity
systems towards generation portfolios that heavily depend on natural sources such as
the sun and wind, alongside the solution concept of the smart grid. In Section 1.3 we
formalize our problem statement and we outline the main research questions of this
thesis. We conclude this chapter by providing an outline of the research topics and
the overall structure of this thesis in Section 1.4, and present the research output of
this thesis in Section 1.5.
1.1 Multi-Agent Systems
Throughout this thesis, we model situations that arise in the context of the smart
grid, in which multiple decision-makers (e.g., retailer, customers) seek to maximize
their utility and collectively influence the efficiency of such systems. Multi-agent
systems are well-suited to study these complex settings of envisioned smart grid
systems; not only do they model the decisions of independent and self-interested
agents, but also provide the solution framework for problems that may be beyond
the capabilities of single agents (Coelho et al., 2017; Kantamneni et al., 2015). In
addition, the application of theoretical solution concepts of game theory, such as the
Nash equilibrium, provide the means to study strategic situations that arise between
multiple self-interested decision-makers (Fadlullah et al., 2011; Saad et al., 2012).
In this section we provide a thorough discussion on fundamental concepts of
agents and multi-agent systems which we use throughout this thesis to analyze
different scenarios of envisioned electricity systems.
2 Readers that are familiar with concepts of multi-agent systems, such as game theory, mechanism design,
and auctions, may skip Section 1.1.
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1.1.1 Intelligent agents
Any social interaction environment, such as the smart grid, comprise autonomous
decision-makers that observe the dynamics of the environment and act in order
to have the best possible outcomes. For instance, buyers participate in electricity
markets in order to purchase electricity at the minimum possible price, and sellers
to maximize their profits. In artificial intelligence research, an autonomous decision-
maker is described with the term intelligent agent (Russell and Norvig, 2009).
Definition 1.1 (Intelligent agent). An intelligent agent is an entity that senses the
environment through sensors and acts upon the environment using actuators.
The above definition is not limited to computer software (e.g., automated trading
software) or hardware that exhibits intelligent behavior; it also applies to human
agents, where a central aspect of the definition includes the notion of agency (i.e.,
ability to act).
Figure 1.1 illustrates an abstract model of an intelligent agent that acts upon its
environment and is influenced by incoming observations. By explicitly modeling
and analyzing the behavior (actions) of individual agents offers a bottom-up (micro-
scale) approach to study the emerging behavior of complex systems that comprise
multiple agents (Macal and North, 2010).
Throughout this thesis, we consider utility-based agents that try to maximize a
performance metric, which is described by its utility function (Russell and Norvig,
2009).
Definition 1.2 (Utility). Utility of agent i is the output of a utility function ui that
measures the desirability of an outcome x from the set of possible outcomes X , such
that ui : X → R.
Intuitively, utility is a measure of satisfaction and can be used to determine the
decision of an agent with regards to multiple available actions it can choose from. In
this case, each action yields a utility, or an expected utility in uncertain environments,
to the agent.
On the rationality of agents
One fundamental notion of intelligent agents is rationality. Based on the ethical
theory of utilitarianism (Mill, 2014), we have the following definition:
Definition 1.3 (Rational agent). Given a set of possible outcomes, a rational agent
chooses the outcome that maximizes its utility, or, when there is uncertainty, its
expected utility.
Given two possible outcomes x, y ∈ X , a rational agent would always choose
outcome x if ui(x) > ui(y). Fundamental models that study interactions between
agents (see Section 1.1.3) usually assume the presence of rational agents (Nisan et al.,
2007). The notion of rational agents is also related to economic agents that participate
in free markets (Blume and Easley, 2016): a rational agent would always choose the
item at the cheapest price given a set of heterogeneously priced identical items.
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However, rationality comes with the precondition of perfect information and un-
limited computational capacity. Motivated by the fact that perfect information and
unlimited computational capacity of agents are not realistic assumptions in practice,
Simon (1972) introduced the concept of bounded rationality:
Definition 1.4 (Bounded rationality). Bounded rationality models the imperfect
decision-making of otherwise rational agents due to: imperfect information, limited
computational capacity or decision time constraints.
The concept of bounded rationality is further supported by several works that
study the economic decisions of human buyers in markets (Conlisk, 1996; Rubin-
stein, 1998). However, the following question emerges: How can we analytically
model the imperfect choice of bounded rational agents? The answer is based on
diverse scientific fields, such as psychology, economics and mathematics (Ortega
and Braun, 2011; Ortega et al., 2015; Puranam et al., 2015). The first mathematical
model proposed to express the stochastic decision-making of an agent over a finite
set of choices was the Luce’s axiom (Luce, 1959). Consider x as a vector of avail-
able choices; xi is the i-th choice that an agent can choose and u(xi) is the utility of
choice i. Following the Luce’s axiom, the probability of choosing i is proportional
to the utility it brings to the agent.
Pi(x) =
u(xi)∑
j u(xj)
(1.1)
The vast majority of models proposed after Luce’s axiom (Mattsson and Weibull,
2002; McFadden, 1973; Meginniss, 1976), are logit choice models based on the
Boltzmann distribution. In Chapters 2 and 5 we use the Softmax rule (Sutton and
Barto, 1998), which is also based on the Boltzmann distribution, to model the
imperfect decision making of agents in electricity markets.3
Pi(x) =
eu(xi)/τ∑
j e
u(xj)/τ
, ∀τ ∈ (0,∞), (1.2)
where τ is called the irrationality parameter. For τ → 0, Softmax approximates the
decision-making of a rational agent that chooses the best option with probability
one; for τ → ∞, an agent that chooses each of its options with equal probability
(random).
1.1.2 Multi-agent interactions
So far, we have discussed the notion of a single agent that interacts within an
environment and makes decisions with regards to possible outcomes rationally or
under limited information (bounded rationality). However, there are only limited
instances of real-world situations that involve a single intelligent agent that can
alone influence all outcomes. In most scenarios, there are multiple agents that
3 Softmax is primarily used in Reinforcement Learning to determine the probability of actions given their
expected reward.
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interact with each other and influence each other. Such systems are called multi-
agent systems (Weiss, 2013; Wooldridge, 2001).
Definition 1.5 (Multi-agent systems). Multi-agent systems are composed of multiple
intelligent agents that interact in order to coordinate, solve complex problems, or
determine the division of a common-pool resource.
Some of the main research topics in the field of multi-agent systems include but
are not limited to: learning (Tuyls and Weiss, 2012), communication (Foerster et al.,
2016), cooperation (Olfati-Saber et al., 2007), and negotiation (Baarslag et al., 2017).
The following two sections, however, discuss fundamental fields of research that are
used throughout this thesis. Section 1.1.3 introduces game theory which is used to
study interactions between self-interested agents, and Section 1.1.4 provides a brief
overview of mechanism design which is used to allocate resources in multi-agent
systems.
1.1.3 Game theory
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction between
rational decision-makers (Myerson, 2013).4 In game theory a strategic interaction
is formalized as a game, in which each player (agent) can choose from a set of
actions. A payoff (utility) matrix determines the utility of each player for any
possible outcome. In general, there exist many types of games, e.g., cooperative/non-
cooperative, zero-sum/general-sum, symmetric/asymmetric, see Myerson (2013) for
more details. In this thesis we consider non-cooperative games (see Chapters 2 and
5), in which there is no cooperation while agents want to maximize their own utility.
Non-cooperative games can be represented as extensive or normal form games,
where the time sequencing of players’ actions in the former distinguish it from the
latter, in which players choose their actions simultaneously. In Chapter 2 we consider
an extensive-form game between a retailer and a customer, while in Chapter 5 we
study a Bertrand market model which comprises a normal-form game.
Consider the following two-player normal form game which is known as the
prisoners’ dilemma (Rapoport et al., 1965):
Example 1.1 (Prisoners’ dilemma). Two suspects, player A and player B, are
accused of a crime. Both suspects are placed in confinement. However, they are
placed in separate rooms and they cannot communicate with each other. Suspects
have two choices: either to cooperate and confess their crime, or defect and betray
the other suspect. Due to lack of strong evidence with regards to the investigated
crime, the prosecution is willing to convict them with a minor infraction (1 year) if
both cooperate and confess. If no suspect cooperates they will face a jail time of 2
years. However, if one player cooperates while the other defects, the defector walks
away free while the cooperator will face the maximum conviction of 3 years.
Table 1.1 shows the payoff matrix of the Prisoners’ dilemma game. Players A and B
have two possible actions: Cooperate and Defect. For each combination of actions
4 Foundational work in game theory was developed in the 1950s (Nash, 1950, 1951; von Neumann et al.,
1944).
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Player B
Cooperate Defect
Player A Cooperate −1,−1 −3, 0
Defect 0,−3 −2,−2
Table 1.1 Payoff matrix for the prisoners’ dilemma game: player A chooses the row and player
B chooses the column while each entry of the matrix indicates the utility for players
A and B respectively.
chosen by the two players, the utility matrix gives the utility pairs for both players
(note that the first entry of each utility pair corresponds to the utility of player A).
Nash equilibrium The most important solution concept when studying games
between two or more players is the Nash equlibrium (NE). Given an N -player game
and a payoff matrix (e.g., see Table 1.1):
Definition 1.6 (Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile (i.e., a set of strategies that
are used by the players) is a Nash equilibrium if no player can gain by unilaterally
deviating from its strategy (Nash, 1950).
Revisiting the Prisoners’ dilemma (see Example 1.1) and its corresponding payoff
matrix in Table 1.1. First, note that in case both players choose to cooperate both get
utility −1, which is the best possible outcome with regards to the social welfare, i.e.,
sum of players’ utilities. Consider player A, if player A cooperates, the best move for
player B is to defect. If player A defects, the best move for B is again to defect. With
this rationale, defection is the optimal strategy for both players. It is also the Nash
equilibrium since no player can yield a better outcome deviating from this strategy
given that the opponent chooses defection.
The solution concept of the Nash equilibrium is used in Chapter 2 of this thesis
to determine stable strategy pairs in a two-player extensive-form game between a
retailer and a customer in an electricity market setting.
1.1.4 Mechanism design
In the previous section we discussed basic concepts of game theory and the notion of
the Nash equilibrium. In this section we provide a discussion on the basic theory of
mechanism design (Myerson, 2013). On the contrary to game theory that attempts to
analyze given games, mechanism design is considered as the reverse of game theory;
its goal is to design games (e.g., on how to cooperate, divide a common-resource
pool, reach mutually beneficial agreements) that have some desired properties in
competitive settings where there exist no common goals.
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What is a mechanism? Many real-world situations involve self-interested
agents that wish to divide a common pool of items. However, agents usually have
conflicting interests that cannot be resolved without some common-ground rules that
can be provided by some protocol. For instance, consider the following scenario: a
common-resource pool (e.g., the electricity generation of a wind-power turbine for
the next hour) should be divided among n agents. Each agent has a type θi ∈ Θi that
is private information (i.e., only agent i knows its type), where Θi is the space of
types of agent i. θi is also called the true type of agent i. Let θ = {θ0, θ1, . . . , θn−1}
denote the vector of agents’ types, and Θ = Θ0 × Θ1 × . . . × Θn−1 the space of
all possible type vectors. We define x as an allocation out of the set of all possible
allocationsX , where each entry xi is the allocation of agent i (e.g., xi is the quantity
of electricity that agent i gets under allocation x).
Definition 1.7 (Mechanism). A mechanism is a function of the agents’ reported
types, y(θˆ), that maps the space of reports Θ to an outcome space X , i.e., y(θˆ) :
Θ→ X (Nisan et al., 2007).5
Intuitively, a mechanism takes as input the types of agents θˆ and outputs an allocation
x, where θˆ = {θˆ0, θˆ1, . . . , θˆn−1} is the vector of the reported types of agents (i.e.,
agents communicate their types to the mechanism). Note that θˆ = θ hold only if
agents report their true types.
The reported type of agent i can also be a reported valuation function that maps
the allocation xi to a real value, i.e., vi : (θˆi, xi) → R, and depends on the type θˆi.
The reported valuation function states the desirability of the allocation xi to agent i
and it can also be written as vˆi(xi). Now consider that the allocation xi also includes
the price pi ∈ R that agent i has to reimburse the mechanism. The utility of agent
i can be written as ui = vi(θi, xi) − pi and depends on the true type θi. Since the
mechanism has limited information with regards to the true types of agents, agent i
can misreport its type to the mechanism in order to maximize its utility.
A mechanism is called incentive compatible (IC) if agents achieve the best
outcome for themselves (with regards to the allocation of the mechanism) if they
report their true types, thus when θˆ = θ. We proceed to illustrate the strongest
incentive compatibility property that a mechanism can satisfy.
Definition 1.8 (Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatible). A mechanism is called
Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) if no agent can gain a better al-
location outcome by misreporting its type to the mechanism regardless the reports
of other agents. Such mechanisms are also called Truthful or Strategy proof (Nisan
et al., 2007).6
The aforementioned truthful implementation property (DSIC) is the most funda-
mental in mechanism design. However, as we see later in this section, there exist
5 y is also known as the social choice function, a theoretical framework for analyzing the combination of
individual opinions and preferences to decide collective outcomes (Arrow, 1951).
6 A weaker property for incentive compatibility is the Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility (BNIC): a
mechanism satisfies BNIC if no agent can gain a better allocation outcome given that all other agents
report truthfully (Nisan et al., 2007).
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non-truthful implementations of mechanisms that are used in practice. Another fun-
damental property in mechanism design is Individual Rationality.
Definition 1.9 (Individually Rational). A mechanism is called Individually Rational
(IR) if a truthful agent gets non-negative utility in expectation for participating in the
mechanism.
Intuitively, a rational agent would choose to participate only if the mechanism
satisfies the property of individual rationality.
In the following two sections we outline the fundamental, in mechanism design,
Groves family of mechanisms, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
which is an instance of Groves mechanisms; VCG satisfies both DSIC and IR
properties and is used in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
Groves mechanisms Following (Weiss, 2013) we proceed to the following
definition:
Definition 1.10 (Groves mechanisms). Groves mechanisms are direct mechanisms
for which
xopt(θˆ) = argmax
x∈X
∑
i
vˆi(xi), (1.3)
pi(θˆ) = h(vˆ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
vˆj(x
opt(θˆ)), (1.4)
where xopt(θˆ) is the allocation that maximizes the summation of agents’ reported
valuations, and h(vˆ−i) is an arbitrary function that depends only on the reported
valuations of agents other than i. The price that agent i pays to the mechanism, pi(θˆ),
is determined by the difference between the quantity h(vˆ−i) and the sum of all other
agents’ reported valuations:
∑
j 6=i vˆj(x(θˆ)). Note that the price pi is independent of
agent’s i own report, and therefore Groves mechanisms satisfy DSIC: the dominant
strategy for agents is to report their true valuation function.7
VCG mechanism Every choice of the function h(vˆ−i) yields a different mecha-
nism in the Groves family. The Clarke pivot rule,
h(vˆ−i) =
∑
j 6=i
vˆj(x
opt(θˆ−i)), (1.5)
yields the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973;
Vickrey, 1961):
Definition 1.11 (VCG mechanism). VCG is a direct mechanism for which
xopt(θˆ) = argmax
x∈X
∑
i
vˆi(xi), (1.6)
pi(θˆ) =
∑
j 6=i
vˆj(x
opt(θˆ−i))−
∑
j 6=i
vˆj(x
opt(θˆ)), (1.7)
7 For more details, see proof of Theorem 7.3 in (Weiss, 2013).
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where the payment of agent i to the mechanism, pi(θˆ), depends on the Clarke pivot
rule (see equation 1.5), which computes the valuation of agents other than i under
the optimal allocation without agent i present, xopt(θˆ−i). Intuitively, the payment of
agent i to the mechanism is equal to the loss that is incurred to the rest of the society
by its presence, which is formally called the externality of agent i. As an instance
of Groves mechanisms’ family, VCG is DSIC: agents maximize their utilities by
reporting truthfully to the mechanism. Furthermore, if the following mild conditions
apply: (i) no negative externalities, i.e., agents have non-negative utility for any
outcome of the mechanism in which they are not included in the allocation, and
(ii) the set of possible outcomes X never increases by removing an agent (choice-set
monotonicity), VCG further satisfies IR (Weiss, 2013).
Auctions
Auctions are an important part of mechanism design since they define protocols for
the allocation of resources among self-interested agents (McAfee and McMillan,
1987; Parsons et al., 2011). Agents participating in auctions can indicate their interest
through bids for the available resources, bids are then used by the auctioneer to
determine both the allocation and the payments. Auctions are commonly used in
many recourse-allocation problems, e.g., bandwidth allocation (Zhang et al., 2013),
public assets (Janssen and Janssen, 2004), and competitive electricity markets that
are discussed throughout this thesis (Contreras et al., 2001).
In this section we provide a brief introduction in auction theory and some funda-
mental types of auctions, some of which are used in later chapters of this thesis. We
proceed to provide a classification of auction types as these are described in (Parsons
et al., 2011). Auctions can be:
• Single or double-sided. In single-sided auctions, one seller receives bids from
n buyers (demand auction), or one buyers receives bids (asks in this case) from
n sellers (supply auction). In double-sided auctions there are n sellers and m
buyers both bidding for supply or demand.
• Single or multi-dimensional. In single-dimensional auctions the bids are only
determined by the price, while in multi-dimensional auctions, bids can include
several characteristics (e.g., price and quality).
• Open or sealed-bid. In open-bid auctions, bidders place their bids openly to
other bidders and can participate further in the auction process. In sealed-bid
auctions, bidders place sealed bids such that no other bidder knows their bid.
• First price or k-th price. In first price auctions, the winner (i.e., the one with the
highest bid) pays its own bid. In k-th price auctions, the winner pays the price
of the k-th highest bid.
• Single-unit or multi-unit. In single-unit auctions, bidders can place their bids for
a single unit at a time, and for multiple units of the same type at the same time
in multi-unit auctions.
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• Single-item or multi-item. In single-item auctions, homogeneous items are auc-
tioned off. In multi-item auctions, items can differ and bidders can have valua-
tions for a bundle of items.
Open-bid auctions The most well-known family of auctions is the English
auction. In an English auction, the auctioneer auctions off an item (this can also be a
bundle of items that are auctioned as one) by announcing a starting price (also known
as the reserve price) to the buyers. Then, the auctioneer accepts increasing bids from
the buyers usually in pre-specified minimum increments. In any given moment of the
auction the last bidder is considered the winning bidder of the auction. The auction
ends when no bidder is willing to bid higher than the last placed bid. The winner pays
a price that is equal to the highest bid. An English auction is therefore an open, single-
sided, single-item, single-dimensional, first-price auction. Other open-bid auctions
include the Japanese and the Dutch auctions (Parsons et al., 2011).
Sealed-bid & Vickrey auctions In open-bid auctions bidders have some
knowledge of the competition since they can observe the behavior of other bidders.
In this section we discuss sealed-bid auctions.
The most used type of sealed-bid auction is the first-price sealed-bid auc-
tion (McAfee and McMillan, 1987). The auctioneer collects sealed bids from the
participating bidders, where each bid represent the price the bidder is willing to pay
to acquire the item that is auctioned off. The winner is determined as the bidder with
the highest valuation for the item, and the price that is paid is equal to that highest
bid. An auction is called k-th price sealed-bid auction, when the price that the winner
pays is determined by the k-th highest bid.
A second-price (k = 2) sealed-bid auction is also called Vickrey. It was first
discussed and proposed by the 1996 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
winner William Vickrey (Vickrey, 1961). A Vickrey auction is incentive compatible:
a bidder maximizes its utility by bidding its true valuation. In a Vickrey auction, the
winner cannot increase its utility by increasing its bid since the price is determined
by the second highest bid, while bidding lower can result in losing the auction. Any
other bidder can increase the probability of winning the auction by increasing its bid,
in this case however, the bidder bids higher than its valuation and thus gets negative
utility in case of winning.
Combinatorial auctions In combinatorial auctions, multiple items are auc-
tioned off by the auctioneer at the same time while bidders are allowed to specify
the price they are willing to pay for combinations (bundles) of items (de Vries and
Vohra, 2003). It is easy to understand that combinatorial auctions are hard for both
bidders and the auctioneer. For bidders because it is difficult to place a valuation over
all possible bundles of items, where the number of bundles grows exponentially in
the number of items. For the auctioneer because computing an optimal allocation
(with regards to its potential revenue) has often intractable computational complex-
ity. This is known as the Winner Determination Problem (WDP) and it lies in the
complexity space of NP-hard problems (Lehmann et al., 2006). A VCG mechanism
(see Definition 1.11) can be used in combinatorial auctions and it holds both DSIC
and IR properties. However, unless specific instances of the WDP problem that can
12 Chapter 1 Introduction
be solved in polynomial time are considered, the VCG auction faces the computa-
tional complexity barrier of the WDP.
Sequential auctions So far we have discussed auctions where items are all
auctioned at the same time (simultaneous auctions). In sequential auctions, multiple
items are auctioned off one after the other to the same group of bidders (Boutilier
et al., 1999; Leme et al., 2012). For example, in a sequential first-price auction a first-
price auction is held for each item one after the other. In practice, sequential auctions
are more adopted than combinatorial auctions since they are easier to implement,
e.g., internet advertising, wireless spectrum (Bae et al., 2008). In sequential auctions,
strategic considerations may arise for the bidders given that: (i) a bidder can choose
to wait and therefore choose the other bidders with which it competes (Parkes,
2007), (ii) externalities (i.e., propagated information) induced by previous auction
outcomes to future auctions, e.g., a bidder can have different expected utilities for
future auctions depending on who wins the current auction (Jehiel et al., 1999; Leme
et al., 2012). In Chapters 3 and 4 we study practical settings of future smart grid
systems in which sequential auctions can be used without strategic implications
between consecutive rounds.
1.1.5 Markets
Markets are substantial components of human societies as they facilitate the ex-
change of goods, e.g,. food, electricity, water, information and services, between
different parties. Markets comprise buyers and sellers; both participate in markets
to obtain information and exchange goods under pre-specified set of rules that are
determined both by the nature of the product to be exchanged and the market. In this
thesis, we study markets with commodities.
Definition 1.12 (Commodity). A commodity is an economic good or service of which
each instance of a particular quantity holds the same value with no regards to who
produced it (Geman, 2005; Smith, 1817).
In electricity markets, a unit of electricity is an example of a commodity. Commodi-
ties are exchanged in commodity markets, which are responsible to transfer com-
modities from producers to consumers. However, commodities are usually not ex-
changed in a single market, instead they flow within a market chain and different
types of markets on their way from the production site to the end consumer (Gereffi
and Korzeniewicz, 1994). For most commodities, there exist multiple levels of mar-
kets; The most important types of commodity markets are the retail and wholesale
markets. In retail markets, retailers (sellers), buy and stock bulk quantities of goods
from producers or other intermediate sellers (mediators) to satisfy the demand of
consumers. On the other hand, wholesale markets facilitate the distribution of goods
from producers to retailers.
Markets can be modeled as multi-agent systems since they comprise interactions
of multiple self-interested economic entities. For instance, buyers and sellers try to
maximize their profits or minimize the price respectively. Most strategic interactions
in markets regard the price determination. The price that commodities are exchanged
for in markets is determined by the two most fundamental concepts in economics,
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Figure 1.2 Demand (D) and supply (S) curves that determine the quantity q∗ to be exchanged
at price p∗.
namely, the supply and the demand. Supply refers to the quantity and the price that a
market can offer, e.g., the aggregated inventory of all suppliers in a market. Demand
is the quantity that is desired by buyers at certain price levels.
Figure 1.2 presents supply and demand curves: the continuous line presents the
quantity of the demand at a respective price, the dashed line shows the offered
supply at different price points. Demand and supply curves follow opposite gradients
according to the laws of demand (i.e., less buyers are willing to buy items at a high
price) and supply (i.e., supply increases if the price that buyers are willing to pay
increases) (Henderson, 1922; Landsburg, 2013; Nicholson and Snyder, 2011). We
have a market equilibrium where supply and demand curves meet, at which point
the price and the quantity to be exchanged are determined by the market (Marshall,
2005), e.g., see price p∗ and quantity q∗ in Figure 1.2. In practice, supply and demand
curves can be constructed out of sellers’ and buyers’ bids in double-sided auctions
(that are commonly used in electricity wholesale markets) (Parsons et al., 2011).
In Chapter 5 of this thesis we consider retail markets where sellers compete by
offering prices for identical items to buyers (e.g., electricity retail markets). In re-
tail markets, each participating seller has a private cost for the items (e.g., produc-
tion cost, procurement cost) and an infinite inventory. Sellers decide only on the
price of each unit of the items, while buyers choose the seller with the lowest price
from whom they will buy their demand. This is known as the Bertrand competi-
tion (Bertrand, 1988). A similar model in which sellers decide on the quantity of
items to produce is the Cournot competition (Allaz and Vila, 1993). Both market
models are commonly used in the economics literature to study interactions between
sellers in retail markets (Singh and Vives, 1984).
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Figure 1.3 Model of electricity commerce between producers, large consumers and retailers
that pool customers into larger portfolios.
1.2 Transition in Electricity Systems
Electricity systems are in transition towards sustainable and distributed generation
portfolios that primarily depend on natural sources such as the sun and wind. At
the same time, in envisioned electricity systems the demand-side is expected to take
a more active role: consumers will be able to control their own net demand with
the use of energy storage technologies alongside the adoption of privately owned
renewable electricity generation (i.e., prosumers). Both the increasing uncertainty
on the supply-side and active demand-side management, which decreases the overall
predictability of consumers’ demand behavior, pose many challenges with regards
to balancing requirements of future systems. The transition in electricity systems
thus requires the redesign of current electricity systems and markets that electricity
is traded in, and novel market mechanisms that need to facilitate the integration
and utilization of intermittent electricity sources. Throughout this thesis we study
fundamental problems that are motivated by challenges that come with the transition
in electricity systems.
In the remainder of this section we provide an overview on basic concepts of
current electricity markets that comprise the main application domain of this thesis.
We further discuss the role and characteristics of renewable electricity generation in
future electricity systems, we outline the solution concept of the smart grid, and last,
we present an extensive literature review where we discuss recent methodologies that
have been proposed in order to tackle challenges of envisioned electricity systems.
1.2.1 Electricity markets & balancing requirements
In current electricity grids, centrally located large fossil power plants provide elec-
tricity supply on-demand; this supply is pooled and traded in electricity wholesale
markets (Ramchurn et al., 2011). Due to high capacity requirements of these mar-
kets, only large consumers (e.g., industrial sites) can participate there to satisfy their
demand; large-capacity consumers can further rely on bilateral agreements with pro-
ducers. On the other hand, smaller-scale consumers (customers), such as households
1.2 Transition in Electricity Systems 15
or other service-sector demand entities, purchase their electricity demand in elec-
tricity retail markets. In retail markets, customers usually subscribe to long-term
flat-rate tariff schemes with retailers.8 Retailers act therefore as aggregators pooling
customers into larger portfolios to satisfy their demand with electricity purchased in
electricity wholesale markets. Figure 1.3 illustrates the relation between producers,
large consumers, retailers and customers.
Day-ahead and balancing markets (also known as reserve capacity markets)
are the main markets to facilitate commerce of electricity between retailers, large
consumers and producers of electricity. Current electricity markets in Europe also
include several adjustment markets (Conejo et al., 2010). For generality, however,
electricity market models we consider throughout this thesis include the day-ahead
and balancing markets. In addition, we focus on electricity retailers since the demand
of their customers is generally not as predictable as the demand of large consumers
that usually are big industrial sites with very specific demand loads. Electricity retail
markets thus serve as fundamental market setting in later chapters of this thesis
since on the contrary to heavily regulated wholesale markets, liberalization of retail
markets can enable innovative economic mechanisms that facilitate the propagation
of incentives to the demand-side (Stagnaro, 2017).
Retailers not only pool customers into larger portfolios to satisfy their demand,
but also act as balancing responsible parties (BRPs): retailers procure electricity
in day-ahead markets based on demand forecasts of their portfolios of customers
(typically based on weather patterns, historical demand data, etc.), and balance
supply with demand in balancing markets, i.e., the difference between the procured
quantity in day-ahead market and the actual demand of customers. In practice,
imbalances are moderated either by the use of high-cost storage or fast-ramping
conventional supply, e.g., gas-turbines, the balancing power of which is traded
in balancing markets. However, the increasing peak and general volatility of the
demand result in increasing balancing costs for retailers (Kirschen and Strbac,
2018; Palensky and Dietrich, 2011), and are further associated with increasing CO2
emissions (Hintermann, 2016).
In current electricity systems, the main strategy for retailers to control balancing
costs is to reduce deviations from electricity demand predictions, and thus improve
demand forecasting techniques. However, the presence of prosumers (i.e., consumers
with privately owned generation that can also feed excess electricity generation in the
grid) and more unpredictable sources of demand (e.g., EVs) in future electricity sys-
tems make demand forecasting challenging. In addition, the increasing dependency
of electricity supply on natural sources may have a significant impact on wholesale
market prices (of day-ahead and balancing markets), especially during shortages of
renewable supply (Ketterer, 2014). All above reasons can potentially magnify bal-
ancing costs for retailers in future electricity systems.
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Figure 1.4 Estimated share of renewable electricity production, end-2017. Image source:
REN21’s Renewables 2018 Global Status Report.
1.2.2 Renewable electricity sources
Currently, renewable electricity sources take up approximately a quarter of the total
global electricity supply, where approximately 8% are from natural and volatile
sources, such as the sun and wind. An estimated share of the current renewable
electricity production globally is shown in Figure 1.4. According to the REN21’s
Renewables 2018 Global Status Report (GSR), renewable electricity generation
accounted for 70% of net additions to global electricity capacity in 2017, which
is the largest increase in renewable electricity capacity in recent years.9 In addition,
2018’s Bloomberg New Energy Outlook expects that renewable electricity generation
specifically from natural sources (solar and wind) will take up 50% of the total
electricity generation by 2050.10 Some of the most important characteristics of
renewable electricity from natural sources are the following:
• Renewable electricity generation is not dispatchable (it cannot be used on-
demand) or can be deferred (it cannot be shifted in time). Also, its output cannot
be regulated to meet the demand.
• Renewable supply is not fully predictable since it is subject to stochastic condi-
tions (weather conditions).
8 In Europe, most retail contracts have a set price per consumption unit and typically have one year
duration.
9 http://www.ren21.net/gsr-2018/
10 https://about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/
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• Renewable electricity supply cannot be centralized, the placement of renewable
generators (e.g., wind turbines, solar photovoltaic systems) is subject to spatial
constraints.
The easier availability of electricity from natural renewable sources further en-
ables small-scale consumers to produce their own electricity (prosumers), which
consequently implies higher risks of shortages or overproduction since generation
is volatile and locally highly-correlated. At the same time, this adds extra forecast-
ing complexity with regards to the net electricity demand of prosumers that may
actively control their demand loads based on their privately owned renewable gen-
eration (Pepermans et al., 2005). Therefore, in future electricity systems, demand
needs to follow the available supply.
Overall, the introduction of more sustainable generation portfolios involves the re-
development of conventional electricity grids, not only with regards to the infrastruc-
ture and control, but also the markets that facilitate electricity trading (Phuangporn-
pitak and Tia, 2013). The characteristics of renewable sources of electricity require
more flexibility11 on the demand-side, and at the same time decentralized approaches,
since renewable generation is distributed and therefore cannot be centrally monitored
and managed (Alanne and Saari, 2006; Goldthau, 2014).
1.2.3 Smart grid
The smart grid is an electricity grid innovation away from the traditional paradigm
of passive distribution and consumption (Amin, 2015; Ellabban et al., 2014; Fang
et al., 2012; Farhangi, 2010):
Definition 1.13 (Smart grid). Smart grid is an interconnected electricity network that
uses digital communication, measuring, and control to facilitate efficient electricity
usage and renewable electricity generation.
On the contrary to conventional electricity networks, the smart grid enables active
participation of generation and consumption entities, e.g., households, distributed
small-scale generation, electric vehicles (EVs), since these are interconnected and
can share local information to system operators. Active participation and control
of such consumption entities can therefore facilitate the utilization of supply from
renewable electricity sources. Some of the most important ambitions of the future
smart grid, as these are outlined in (Farhangi, 2010), are:
• Sensors and two-way communication. Sensors (e.g., smart-meters) as well as
intelligent home devices enable remote sensing, control, and two-way com-
munication between aggregators of electricity and customers in the smart
grid (Depuru et al., 2011).
• Distributed generation and control. In contrast to conventional power plants,
smart grid assumes decentralized generation that is located close to the demand
load it serves; this enables more local control but requires efficient management
and coordination.
11 Demand or supply flexibility is a term to denote the ability of electrical loads to be deferred or curtailed.
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• Demand-side management and customer choices. Two-way communication and
active participation of demand and consumption entities (e.g., households, EVs)
enables direct or indirect control of local loads. In the smart grid, electricity
customers are also able to choose different plans of electricity billing based on
their consumption patterns.
• Self-monitoring and self-healing. Real-time communication within the smart
grid enables monitoring electrical characteristics of the network, and thus en-
hances the ability to discover small changes that can trigger bigger systems
disturbances and isolate them, and furthermore optimize the overall system op-
eration.
• Adaptivity and islanding. To help mitigate wider system disturbances the smart
grid has the ability to disconnect parts of it from the centralized grid (i.e., is-
landing mode) and operate autonomously depending solely on local generation,
management, and control (self-sufficient).
Overall, the smart grid innovation changes the way electricity grid operates; it as-
sumes the technological framework to utilize the increasing adoption of renewable
electricity generation, and thus aims to make electricity cheaper, more accessible
(addressing electricity poverty), and further facilitate self-sufficient and autonomous
electricity grids that depend their electricity supply only on local generation and
control. Two-way communication and sensors in the smart grid also enable active
participation of end-users opening up the opportunity for novel economic mecha-
nisms that go beyond current flat-tariffs towards meeting balancing requirements of
future electricity networks.
1.2.4 Smart grid challenges & solutions
Towards the implementation of the smart grid there exist many challenges with
regards to regulations, privacy, and security issues (McDaniel and McLaughlin,
2009; Yan et al., 2013). However, some of the most important challenges of future
smart grid systems are associated with:
• The seamless integration of renewable electricity generation, which comes at
the expense of higher uncertainty, alongside the increasing peak and volatility
of active demand (e.g., prosumers, EVs).
• The design of mechanisms to incentivize demand-side management with re-
gards to balancing requirements and the efficient operation of smart grid sys-
tems.
• The analysis of smart grid systems’ complex dynamics in which strategic
decision-making of multiple stakeholders may decrease the collective effi-
ciency.
All the above challenges comprise situations that require multiple stakeholders
making decisions under the presence of different sources of uncertainty. To this end,
multi-agent systems and its sub-fields (see Section 1.1) provide the main theoretical
tools to study the design and implementation of future electricity systems (Jun
et al., 2011; Pipattanasomporn et al., 2009). Within multi-agent systems, agent-
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based modeling enables the analysis of complex dynamics in electricity markets
under the presence of uncertainty (Karnouskos and De Holanda, 2009; Weidlich
and Veit, 2008), market implementations that facilitate active participation of end-
users (Ilic et al., 2012), agent-based markets for supply and demand matching (Kok
et al., 2005), and last, the design of simulation platforms to evaluate new regulations
and different market behaviors in electricity markets (Praca et al., 2003).
In addition, mechanism design (see Section 1.1.4) and the application of theo-
retical solution concepts of game theory (see Section 1.1.3) provide the means for
the implementation of distributed economic protocols (Alibhai et al., 2004) and the
analysis of strategic interactions between self-interested agents in future smart grid
systems (Fadlullah et al., 2011; Pettersen et al., 2005; Saad et al., 2012). For instance,
non-cooperative games are commonly used in the literature to model competitive in-
stances between individual agents and analyze the resulting efficiency (Perrault and
Boutilier, 2014), or to provide solution concepts (e.g., Nash equilibria) within sys-
tems where privately owned assets, such as storage, are individually controlled by
strategic agents (Vytelingum et al., 2010).
In the following sections we present an extended review of research literature that
is motivated by challenges of envisioned electricity systems and aligned to the topics
of this thesis; this is organized as follows:
Demand-side management introduces the concept of demand-side management
and presents relevant research studies.
Tackling demand uncertainty presents recent methodologies to incentivize uncer-
tainty reduction in the demand-side.
Utilization of renewable sources outlines related work that studies the integration
of renewable generation into future electricity systems.
Electric vehicles as flexible assets discusses the role of electric vehicles in future
electricity systems.
Demand-side management
In current electricity grids most of the demand is passive: customers are usually not
concerned about their electricity usage patterns and the underlying complexities of
electricity systems, instead they want on-demand electricity availability and under-
standable tariffs. Current retail tariffs for electricity provide flat or day-night rates
that do not depend (by design) on the demand patterns of customers, except for total
demand volume. Such tariffs, however, do not directly represent the actual costs for
the supply (e.g., last-minute balancing costs, network loses) and thus customers nei-
ther sense peaks in the demand and the resulting prices in balancing markets nor have
economic incentives to change their demand behavior. Advancements in communi-
cation, sensing (smart meters), and affordable autonomous and intelligent control,
within the smart grid innovation, enable novel pricing schemes that can utilize the
potential flexibility of electricity users (i.e., making demand active) assisting in bal-
ancing requirements and the efficient functioning of envisioned electricity systems.
To this end, demand-side management, which is one of the most prominent
research topics in the smart grid literature, assumes flexible customers or assets
20 Chapter 1 Introduction
that can alter their demand or generation behavior given economic incentives, and
therefore contribute to the balancing problem extensively described earlier in this
thesis (see Section 1.2). Demand response is yet another term used to denote the
ability of customers to reduce their demand. Both demand response and demand-
side management describe methods to influence the electricity usage patterns of
customers. Han and Piette (2008) distinguish two types of demand response, namely
time-based and incentive-based.
Time-based demand response is a means to encourage favorable changes in de-
mand patterns of customers by dynamically changing the price (dynamic pricing) of
electricity (Borenstein et al., 2002; Roozbehani et al., 2010). For instance, retailers
can forward wholesale market prices to customers, where peaks in demand directly
influence the balancing market prices and consequently customers. Time-of-use, crit-
ical peak pricing, and real-time pricing are some types of dynamic pricing schemes
that have been used in practice to stimulate favorable customer behavior (Owen and
Ward, 2010), e.g., in Ontario and California, and have also been studied in more
fundamental settings (Chakraborty and Khargonekar, 2014; Meng and Zeng, 2013;
Oruc et al., 2012). For instance, Agarwal and Cui (2012) study equilibrium strategies
for autonomous load balancing under real-time pricing schemes as non-cooperative
games between consumers. Similarly, Ramchurn et al. (2011) propose agent-based
control for decentralized demand-side management in the smart grid under time-of-
use and real-time pricing schemes. Real-time pricing can also be based solely on the
local grid frequency (i.e., frequency measurements can be used to sense imbalances
between supply and demand), which provides all the necessary information to match
supply and demand (Schäfer et al., 2015).
However, dynamic pricing approaches are no substitute for planning and can
only resolve residual imbalances. Furthermore, they may result in disruptive and
chaotic market behavior, power outages, uncertain availability of electricity, and un-
expected/unfair high prices for electricity customers (Herter and Wayland, 2010;
Roozbehani et al., 2012). All these affect the stability and predictability of electricity
systems, and thus planning and ahead pricing are required (Braithwait et al., 2007). In
addition, defining mathematical relations between the exact costs of imbalances and
the maximum prices that customers would find acceptable is challenging (Roozbe-
hani et al., 2010).
On the contrary to time-based demand response, in Chapters 2 and 3 we propose
incentive-based demand response models in which customers do not react to incom-
ing price signals; instead, they decide whether to provide their flexibility based on
economic terms that are agreed prior to the time that flexibility is needed (Han and
Piette, 2008). Incentive-based demand response can be achieved in various ways,
such as direct control of the demand loads by the grid operator in exchange for pre-
defined payments, or voluntary participation in demand response programs based on
discounts or financial rewards to curtail (reduce) excess demand, but also penalties
for not contributing.
In practice, retailers currently use long-term bilateral contracts to incentivize
large-capacity consumers to reduce their demand if necessary for the system (Kim
and Shcherbakova, 2011). However, He et al. (2013) show that shorter-term agree-
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ments can also enable smaller-scale user to participate in demand response programs,
and further discuss the issue from a policy point of view. Haring and Andersson
(2014) study the design of such contracts that provide economic incentives to con-
sumers in order for system operators to directly control their demand loads. Similarly,
the work by Ma et al. (2016, 2017) is one of the first to study the problem of incen-
tivizing small-scale demand response agents from a mechanism design perspective:
it contributes truthful mechanisms that select a set of flexible users and determine the
rewards and penalties such that the selected customers reduce a fixed demand reduc-
tion target with high reliability. Similarly to (Ma et al., 2016, 2017), Meir et al. (2017)
propose the design of demand response contracts tailored towards more practical ap-
plications. Last, Muthirayan et al. (2017) studies the problem of a demand response
aggregator, which calls on a subset of its recruited demand response users to reduce
their electricity consumption during a demand response event, and computes the re-
wards (for reducing their demand) based on users’ reported baseline consumption.
Last, different demand response methods include but are not limited to: au-
tonomous and distributed mechanisms that optimally schedule the consumption pat-
terns of consumers based on incentive-based pricing schemes (Chen et al., 2010;
Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010), pricing schemes that are based on consumers’ reported
utility functions for electricity consumption and incentivize consumers to reduce or
shift their loads to off-peak hours (Samadi et al., 2012), or the formation of con-
sumer groups that can collectively shift their consumption in time (Akasiadis and
Chalkiadakis, 2017).
Tackling demand uncertainty
Demand response can not only be used to steer the demand behavior of customers,
but also to reduce the inherent uncertainty of the demand, since demand is locally
highly-correlated causing imbalances that result in excessive balancing costs for
retailers. For instance, Rose et al. (2012) propose an incentive compatible mechanism
using scoring rules to incentivize customers report their true anticipated demand and
consequently improve retailers’ demand forecast. Similarly to scoring rules, Vinyals
et al. (2014) introduce a prediction-of-use (POU) tariff that requires consumers to
predict their future baseline consumption and then charge them based on their actual
consumption. Based on these earlier results, Perrault and Boutilier (2017) extend
POU tariffs for customers that may report multiple consumption profiles, while in
another follow-up work, Robu et al. (2018) study group formation strategies for
consumers under POU tariffs.
Similarly to related work that is discussed in this section, Chapter 2 proposes a
novel electricity tariff that uses the demand prediction of a customer to charge a price
that is determined by the actual demand outcome.
Utilization of renewable sources
Apart from uncertainty in the demand, another line of research studies solutions for
the integration and utilization of intermittent electricity sources by explicitly mod-
eling their uncertainty. For instance, Maity and Rao (2010) propose pricing mecha-
nisms for microgrids that solely depend on electricity supply from renewable genera-
tion. In addition, Dash et al. (2007) study both centralized (based on the VCG mech-
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anism) and decentralized (double auction) market mechanisms to utilize the supply
of distributed and limited-capacity renewable generators by incentivizing them re-
porting their true predicted output. Scoring rules can also be used to incentivize
the formation of virtual power plants and provide an alternative to feed-in tariffs
for small-scale renewable producers (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011; Robu et al., 2012).
Other related works have studied selection strategies for optimal renewable gener-
ation portfolios (Gärttner et al., 2018) and online market mechanisms for matching
uncertain supply with flexible demand-loads (Ströhle and Flath, 2016).
An interesting aspect, especially when considering systems with no balancing
capabilities (e.g., islanding grids where excess demand cannot be satisfied), is elec-
tricity trading under uncertain supply of renewable generators, such as wind turbines.
The first work to propose an alternative to traditional trading of electricity that as-
sumes guaranteed delivery was by Bitar et al. (2012), where the authors proposed to
package random wind power into electricity with different levels of reliability and
sell them at different prices. Service-level agreements (SLAs) have also been used
in related literature as a contracting framework to facilitate electricity trading under
intermittent electricity supply; for intance, Hussain et al. (2018) study the viability of
using service-level agreements between consumers and prosumers with wind elec-
tricity generation in the smart grid. In line with previous works, in Chapter 4 we
study the adoption of SLAs as a direct extension of current electricity tariffs to facil-
itate trading under uncertain supply, we further propose mechanisms to allocate the
available electricity supply to consumers with heterogeneous demand requirements.
The utilization of intermittent sources can also be treated as a scheduling problem,
in which deferrable demand loads can be shifted in time to match the output of
renewable generators. He et al. (2011) investigates both day-ahead and real-time
scheduling of deferrable loads under volatile wind generation as a Markov decision
process. In addition, Neely et al. (2010) use the Lyapunov optimization method to
schedule demand loads of consumers that can tolerate some delay in their service.
Last, other works use scenarios over the output of wind turbines to schedule demand
loads based on the likelihood of each scenario (Ströhle et al., 2014; Walraven and
Spaan, 2015a,b).
Electric vehicles as exible assets
Another emerging line of the research within the smart grid literature is dedicated
to the role of electric vehicles (EVs) in current and future electricity networks.
The mass adoption of electric vehicles, despite its environmental benefits (Stephan
and Sullivan, 2008), poses many challenges: EVs are equipped with large capacity
batteries that require high load charging, and thus resulting increasing peak-demand
given that charging takes place at similar times in a day (i.e., due to correlated human
behavior).
The adoption of electric vehicles poses not only challenges to future electricity
systems but also provides additional flexibility that can be used to alleviate the in-
creasing uncertainty of renewable electricity sources or the volatility of the demand.
When parked and plugged into charging infrastructure, EVs can provide flexibil-
ity to smart grid systems, in a concept that is known in the smart grid literature as
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vehicle-to-grid (feeding electricity into the grid) or grid-to-vehicle (storing excess
generation) (Kempton and Tomic´, 2005; Lopes et al., 2011).
Demand response methods can also rely on the use of EVs as flexible demand
response agents to reduce imbalances between supply and demand (Vandael et al.,
2013). For instance, Hayakawa et al. (2015); Vandael et al. (2011) propose mech-
anisms and scheduling strategies for EV charging at times when there is enough
renewable electricity generation that cannot be deferred. Similarly, Gerding et al.
(2016) propose online mechanisms for optimizing the charging schedules and the
revenue of an electric vehicle parking lot that can exchange any electricity excess or
shortage with the main grid. Last, Saad et al. (2011) analyze the Nash equilibrium of
a non-cooperative game between groups of electric vehicles that are willing to sell
(feed-in) a maximum amount of electricity to the grid with regards to their associated
costs. In Chapter 3, we study demand response mechanisms that instantiate EVs as
flexibile assets, which can be incentivized to reduce imbalances between supply and
demand.
1.3 Research Questions
So far in this chapter, we have outlined essential theoretical concepts of multi-agent
systems (see Section 1.1) that are used throughout this thesis, and we have further
introduced the main research domain and one of the main motivations of this thesis,
which is related to the transition in electricity systems and the solution concept of
the smart grid (see Section 1.2). In this section, we delve deeper into specific issues
that arise in settings of future electricity systems, and we outline the main research
questions of this thesis that are arranged in the following two sections.
1.3.1 Demand & supply uncertainty
The design and implementation of future electricity systems, such as the smart grid,
are shaped by the increasing introduction of renewable electricity generation. In such
settings, the induced uncertainty of the supply can increase costs for retailers since
they hold the responsibility to balance demand with the available or procured supply
in balancing markets (Meibom et al., 2009). In addition, current flat-rate tariffs for
electricity do not represent high balancing prices during peaks in the demand, and
thus customers do not have economic incentives to reduce their demand during these
peaks.
Research Question 1. Can we design electricity tariffs that explicitly incorporate
the balancing responsibility of the retailer and incentivize heterogeneous customers
to reduce the uncertainty of their demand?
This research question is addressed in Chapter 2.
In line with the above research question, previous works have proposed novel
tariff schemes that incentivize customers to provide accurate predictions of their
future demand improving retailers’ demand forecasts, and thus reducing excessive
costs related to balancing supply and demand (Rose et al., 2012; Vinyals et al., 2014).
Our first research question further considers the actual balancing costs resulting
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from the demand uncertainty of electricity customers and seeks to incorporate those
explicitly in the design of electricity tariffs. Furthermore, we consider heterogeneous
customers with regards to their ability to reduce the uncertainty of their demand,
and thus such electricity tariffs need to elicit uncertainty reduction regardless of the
specific ability of customers.
Similarly to related works by Rose et al. (2012) and Vinyals et al. (2014),
Research Question 1 considers incentives towards the demand-side in order to reduce
the uncertainty related to the actual demand of customers. Such tariff schemes,
however, cannot guarantee to diminish last-minute imbalances between supply and
demand, since demand is privately controlled and supply may not depend solely
on planned electricity generation and thus be uncertain. In current systems, last-
minute imbalances are resolved either in balancing markets with high prices or
by large-capacity consumers (e.g., industrial sites) that can reduce their demand
when needed (Kim and Shcherbakova, 2011). The presence of smaller-scale flexible
assets in the form of EVs or smart home devices in future smart grid systems
introduces additional flexibility in the demand-side, and may comprise the only
source of demand flexibility in small-scale electricity grids. For instance, EVs can
feed electricity into the grid out of their charged batteries when parked at times
where there is supply shortage in the grid (Kempton and Tomic´, 2005). To this end,
the following research question considers demand response programs for small-scale
flexible assets, e.g., EVs, the availability of which is not certain.
Research Question 2. Based on the demand forecast of a retailer, can we design
economic mechanisms that incentivize small-scale and unreliable demand response
agents to prepare and reduce imbalances between supply and demand if necessary?
This research question is addressed in Chapter 3.
Similarly to the above research question, previous work studies mechanisms to
incentivize demand response of uncertain availability in the smart grid (Ma et al.,
2016, 2017). However, as outlined in Chapter 3, our research question differentiates
substantially by also considering the demand forecast, which may influence the
selection of demand response agents and the requirements of agents to alter their
demand. In addition, we further consider the resulting balancing cost of the retailer
under such demand response mechanisms.
The above two research questions consider either the design of novel electricity
tariff schemes that aim to reduce the uncertainty in the demand-side, or the design
of mechanisms to incentivize small-scale flexible assets to reduce last-minute imbal-
ances between supply and demand.
We proceed to a different scenario, in which we consider the uncertainty on the
supply-side. More specifically, we consider electricity systems that depend their
supply on local renewable generation (e.g., islanding microgrids). In such settings, on
the contrary to current systems where demand is always satisfied, supply is uncertain,
and thus the delivery of electricity cannot be guaranteed. In the research question that
follows we consider that these uncertain quantities of electricity can be traded ahead
of time while the corresponding demand can only be satisfied if supply is sufficient.
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Intuitively, consumers can agree to satisfy their future demand with some probability
that depends on the forecasted renewable electricity supply.
Research Question 3a. How can we model the utility function of consumers to
include the uncertainty of electricity delivery and consequently the probability of
having their demand satisfied?
Research Question 3b. Can service-level agreements provide the contracting
framework for the allocation and trading of uncertain quantities of electricity be-
tween renewable generators and consumers?
These research questions are addressed in Chapter 4.
A relevant scenario has been addressed by previous work that considers a mar-
ket setting where electricity can be traded at different levels of reliability and
prices (Bitar et al., 2012). However, in the above research questions we further con-
sider the viability of using service-level agreements in place of current electricity
retail tariffs. We additionally consider the allocation of service-level agreements to
consumers as a mechanism design problem, and last, we aim to characterize con-
sumers (through utility functions) with regards to the uncertainty of satisfying their
demand in the above setting.
1.3.2 Agent-based decision making
Research questions outlined in the previous section are motivated by challenges
that arise in future electricity systems, and consider the design of mechanisms to
cope with the increasing uncertainty in the demand or supply. Research questions
presented in this section focus on the decision-making of agents participating in
future electricity markets.
In envisioned smart grid systems, two-way communication between retailers
(sellers) and customers (buyers) enables higher-resolution pricing schemes in which
customers may need to choose over different tariffs in very short time intervals. In
such markets, however, software agents will need to participate in place of human
customers and assist or represent them in making multiple decisions within the
course of a day. The research questions outlined in the remainder of this section
consider the implications of replacing human customers with software agents in
future (electricity) markets.
Research Question 4a. What are the effects of representing buyers with autonomous
(economic) decision-making agents in retail markets on the competitive dynamics
and the resulting prices?
This research question is addressed in Chapter 5.
Related to the above research question, previous works have investigated the ef-
fects of buyers’ decision-making on markets focusing more on the sellers’ perspec-
tive (Ait Omar et al., 2017; Basov and Danilkina, 2015; Zhang et al., 2009). In con-
trast, we focus on buyers’ market behavior and the effect it has on retail markets with
regards to the competition between sellers and on the resulting prices buyers face.
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We proceed to outline our last research question, which is related to Research
Question 1 that examines the viability of designing tariffs to incentivize uncertainty
reduction in the demand of customers. For the design of an electricity tariff or any
other general pricing mechanism, it is crucial to consider the economic decision-
making of customers, since this can influence the efficiency of a pricing mechanism.
Research Question 4b. What are the implications of considering the economic
decision-making of customers when designing tariffs?
This research question is addressed in Chapter 2.
1.3.3 Summary of research questions
Within Section 1.3 we have outlined the main research questions of this thesis.
These are motivated by future and current challenges of electricity systems and
related to: tariffs to tackle the increasing peak and general volatility of demand,
demand response mechanisms to incentivize last-minute balancing through flexible
assets, SLAs for electricity trading under uncertain supply from renewable electricity
generation, and last, the effects of different economic decision-making of customers
on the design of retail tariffs and the behavior of retail markets.
1.4 Thesis Outline
In this section we provide an outline of the remaining five chapters of this thesis
(Chapters 2− 6):
Chapter 2 studies the design of an innovative electricity tariff to incentivize
uncertainty reduction in the demand-side. More specifically, in this chapter we
analyze a multi-agent system in which a buyer agent (customer) wants to purchase
a continuously divisible good from a seller agent (retailer). We further consider that
the customer has a direct or a representative influence on the balancing costs of the
retailer. The main contribution of this chapter is the risk-sharing tariff, which is a
two-step parameterized payment scheme that provides the customer the choice to
assume and alleviate a fraction of the balancing risk from the retailer. It consists of
a prepayment based on the expected demand of the customer, and a supplementary
payment for any observed deviation from the anticipated demand. Last, this chapter
investigates the influence of the customer’s stochastic decision-making on the design
of the risk-sharing tariff.
The contents of this chapter are based on (Methenitis et al., 2016).
Chapter 3 studies mechanisms to incentivize small-scale flexible users to resolve
last-minute imbalances between supply and demand and thus reduce balancing costs
for retailers. In this chapter we build upon previous work assuming demand response
agents that can respond (alter their demand) with some probability if they prepare
prior to the realization of the demand (Ma et al., 2016). We additionally consider the
balancing responsibility of a retailer under a given demand forecast and imbalance
price: the retailer is responsible to purchase additional reserve capacity at a high
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imbalance price to cover any excess in the demand. In this chapter we propose and
evaluate two market mechanisms to incentivize demand respond agents to prepare
and respond if requested by the retailer. Both of the proposed mechanisms guarantee
non-negative utility for both demand response agents and the retailer, and can further
be used for simultaneous downward and upward flexibility, i.e., when both demand
reduction and demand increase may be necessary to reduce balancing costs.
The contents of this chapter are based on (Methenitis et al., 2019b).
Chapter 4 studies electricity trading in settings of envisioned smart grid systems,
where electricity supply may solely depend on renewable electricity sources. In these
settings, uncertain electricity quantities may be available, the delivery of which
cannot be guaranteed. However, if not traded, the electricity might need to be
curtailed, foregoing potential benefits for both supply and demand-sides. To this end,
this chapter proposes the adoption of service-level agreements (SLAs) that comprise
the following features: quantity, reliability, and price. The proposed SLAs can be
used instead of current flat-rate electricity tariffs in settings where electricity delivery
cannot be guaranteed. In this chapter, first, we characterize buyers’ varying degrees
of criticality with regards to the probability of satisfying their demand, and next,
we study the design of mechanisms in order to specify and allocate these contracts
(SLAs) to buyers.
The contents of this chapter are based on (Methenitis et al., 2017, 2018).
Chapter 5 investigates the effects of different economic decision-making of buy-
ers on the competitive dynamics and the resulting prices in retail markets. More
specifically, this chapter considers retail markets with identical items (e.g., electric-
ity retail markets) using the Bertrand competition model. The collective decision-
making of the participating buyers is modeled with a parameterized function such
that it can approximate different levels of rationality (i.e., from random to perfectly
rational buyers). At the same time, sellers have heterogeneous beliefs with regards to
the competition they are facing (prices that are offered by other sellers). In this chap-
ter we first derive interesting analytical results for the optimal pricing strategy of a
reasoning seller with regards to the competition and the degree of buyers’ rational-
ity. Lastly, using concepts from evolutionary game theory, we show some counter-
intuitive results with regards to the resulting market dynamics under perfect buyers’
rationality that provide insights for the design of future retail markets.
The contents of this chapter are based on (Methenitis et al., 2019a).
Chapter 6 serves as an epilogue of this thesis. In this chapter we connect the
contributions of each technical chapter to the research questions posed in Section 1.3
and we discuss potential directions of our research.
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Preface In this chapter we propose a novel electricity tariff to incentivize uncer-
tainty reduction on the demand-side, the risk-sharing tariff : a two-step parameterized
payment scheme, in which the customer can choose a portion of the balancing risk
to assume from the retailer. It consists of a prepayment based on the expected de-
mand of a customer, and a supplementary payment for any observed deviation from
the anticipated demand. We present a game-theoretical analysis of the risk-sharing
tariff, which captures the strategic conflict of interest between the retailer and the
customer, and we present optimal strategies for both players. Last, we show analyt-
ically that the proposed tariff provides a customer of varying ability to reduce its
demand uncertainty with incentives to assume and alleviate a fraction of the balanc-
ing risk, contributing in this way to the uncertainty reduction in the envisioned smart
grid.
 This chapter presents work that was published in the proceedings of the In-
ternational Joint Conference of Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) 2016 in New York,
US (Methenitis et al., 2016). This work was also published as an extended abstract
in the proceedings of the Belenux conference on Artificial Intelligence (BNAIC) 2016
in Amsterdam, Netherlands.
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2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we provided an extensive discussion with regards to the
challenges of future electricity systems, which include more sustainable generation
portfolios (see Section 1.2). In particular, we argued that many potential and existing
challenges that electricity grids are facing are mainly connected to the continuous
need for balancing supply and demand, as well as the increasing demand-peaks.
Maintaining balance becomes even more challenging in face of generation from
natural resources, such as the sun and wind, that are subject to stochastic availability,
and the increasing uncertainty of privately controlled demand in the smart grid.
Balancing supply and demand is a major factor with regards to the efficiency of
electricity systems and markets. Stochastic fluctuations and deviations from predic-
tions on both demand and supply sides should be matched with reserve electric-
ity generation coming from fast-ramping conventional generators, e.g., gas turbines,
which is traded in balancing markets. Imbalances between supply and demand have
therefore a direct impact on the balancing prices and the increasing CO2 emissions.
In current electricity systems, retailers pool customers into larger portfolios and
are responsible for balancing the demand of their customers with supply in balancing
markets. Consequently, imbalances between supply and demand can result in high
economic risks for retailers due to the volatility of reserve prices for balancing. One
strategy to control costs is to avoid the need to purchase balancing power by actively
reducing deviations from estimated demand, and thus reduce the uncertainty of the
demand. However, existing flat-rate electricity tariffs by retailers, especially in Eu-
rope, cannot be used to provide incentives for uncertainty reduction on the demand-
side. This precludes flexible customers from assuming some of the high costs related
to the participation in the balancing markets (Oualmakran et al., 2017), and conse-
quently customers may use their flexibility, e.g., from storage, primarily to their own
interest rather than the interest of the retailers’ balancing requirements (Vytelingum
et al., 2010).
One way to encourage favorable changes in demand patterns by the customers
is dynamic pricing (Borenstein et al., 2002; Roozbehani et al., 2010). Time-of-use,
critical peak, and real-time pricing are some of the pricing schemes used to stimulate
favorable customer behavior in practice (Owen and Ward, 2010). However, as it was
also outlined in Section 1.2, dynamic pricing approaches may introduce disruptive
and unfavorable market behavior (Herter and Wayland, 2010; Roozbehani et al.,
2012), and thus planning and ahead pricing are required (Braithwait et al., 2007).
In this chapter, we present the risk-sharing tariff, a novel approach to incentivize
uncertainty reduction on the demand-side by giving customer the choice of assuming
balancing risk by the retailer. We consider a multi-agent system in which a buyer
agent wants to purchase an uncertain quantity of a continuously divisible good from
a seller agent. We refer to the buyer and the seller as the retailer and the customer
respectively. Based on the forecasted demand of the customer, the retailer procures
a fixed quantity of electricity in the day-ahead market at a low rate. After the actual
demand of the customer is observed, the retailer holds the responsibility to balance
any deviation between its procured quantity and the actual demand of the customer
in the balancing market at a higher rate than the day-ahead price. In line with related
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literature, which studies optimal procurement strategies for the retailer under the
presence of either uncertain demand (Nair et al., 2014) or uncertain prices (Hoogland
et al., 2015), we consider a two-step market setting, where the prices are fixed but
the demand is uncertain. We further assume that the customer has a direct or a
representative (see cases i and ii below) influence on the balancing requirements
of the retailer, this is the case in:
i. Service-level agreements (SLAs) formally define an agreement between a ser-
vice provider and the service user, specifying the service and its characteristics,
e.g., quality, risk. In the context of electricity markets we interpret SLAs as a di-
rect extension of conventional electricity tariffs: While current electricity tariffs
ensure delivery (100% quality) and a fixed kWh price (0% risk), SLAs may pro-
vide customer further choices, such as assuming parts of the balancing risk, as
discussed in this chapter. Such SLAs may further enable decentralized trading
of electricity between small-scale producers and individual customers.
ii. Highly correlated demand can be the result of similar demand behavior of cus-
tomers, influenced for instance by weather conditions in specific locations. The
higher the correlation, the closer the deviations of one customer to the devia-
tions of other customers, i.e., changes in the demand behavior of one customer
predicts the same change in the behavior of other customers. Therefore, the port-
folio distribution may closely resemble the demand distribution of an individual
customer for any specific location.
iii. Local balancing, current market-based balancing strategies do not consider
spatial characteristics of customers. However, it is in the retailer’s own interest
to balance customers locally. This can lower the costs corresponding to energy
losses, transportation costs, network load, and congestion.
In this setting, we propose a two-step parameterized payment: the customer
precommits and prepays for its expected demand and later pays for any deviation
between the observed and the anticipated load. In addition, the customer has the
choice to select the portion of risk that it is willing to assume from the retailer. For
instance, in case the customer chooses to assume all the risk from the retailer, it is
exposed to the full balancing cost that is determined by the difference between its
predicted and actual demand.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We formalize the interaction between the retailer and the customer as a two-
player game.
• We define a two-step payment scheme, where the customer first pays for its
expected demand, and later pays for any imbalances.
• We study optimal strategies for both players.
• We show that the proposed tariff provides variable incentives and elicits intelli-
gent behavior by the customer.
• We further demonstrate the existence of Nash equilibria in this game, consider-
ing that the retailer has access to the private costs of the customer.
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Figure 2.1 Extensive form representation of the risk-sharing game. The retailer’s (r), customer’s
(c) and nature’s (n) moves set the respective decision variables, that together
determine the utilities.
• Last, we discuss the concept of bounded rationality and show that the retailer
may provide higher incentives to customers that choose over different risk-
levels stochastically.
To the best of our knowledge, the work presented in this chapter is the first game-
theoretical study that considers incentives for intelligent customer behavior where
the customer has the choice of how much risk to assume from the retailer. In the
closest state-of-the-art work, Vinyals et al. (2014) propose a prediction-of-use (POU)
tariff that requires customers to predict their future baseline consumption and then
charges them based on their actual consumption. However, the POU tariff does not
model the balancing responsibility of the retailer based on the demand forecast and
the prices for ahead and balancing markets as we do in this chapter.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: First, in Section 2.2 we formalize
the game-theoretical model of our problem setting, upon which we study the pro-
posed risk-sharing tariff and the strategies of both players participating, the retailer
and the customer. In Section 2.3 we study Nash equilibrium strategy pairs for the
risk-sharing game as well as the effects of stochastic tariff selection from the cus-
tomer. Last, in Section 2.4 we conclude this chapter and outline research directions
that future work may investigate further.
2.2 The Risk-Sharing Game
To formalize the setting described in the previous section, we capture the strategic
interactions between the retailer and the customer in a two-player game. Figure 2.1
illustrates the extensive-form representation of the risk-sharing game, showing the
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time sequencing of the actions. We consider a two-step market model: the retailer
first procures electricity in the ahead market with the unit price p and later pays
for any absolute1 deviation between the observed demand of the customer and the
procured quantity with the unit price p′ > p in the balancing market. We assume that
the prices p, p′ are determined by an exogenous process and cannot be influenced by
the retailer (i.e., price-taker).
LetX denote the random variable of the customer’s demand, and fX the probabil-
ity density function (PDF) of the specified random variable. We denote with x ∈ R+
the realization of the demand. We also consider the distribution fX as the default
behavior by the customer. The distribution fX is known to both players, since it can
be observed in practice, e.g., through smart-meters, and can be approximated given
enough observations. The proposed tariff requires the customer to precommit to and
prepay its anticipated demand bc = EfX [x], where EfX [x] is the expected value of
the random variable X under the distribution fX . For ease of reading, in the remain-
der of this chapter we use the following simplified notation: Ef [x] , EfX [x].
The retailer, based on the customer’s demand distribution fX , procures the quan-
tity br in the ahead market. Any absolute deviation between the quantity br and
the observed demand x of the customer is balanced by the retailer in the balanc-
ing market. We consider the expected balancing costs as the balancing risk for the
retailer (Ferguson, 1967), which is equal to: Ef [|br − x|]p′. Recall that we assume
a direct influence of the customer’s demand to the balancing requirements of the
retailer.
In current electricity systems retailers holds all the risk of balancing supply and
demand. However, in the risk-sharing tariff, the balancing risk can be shared between
the retailer and the customer. Let λ ∈ [0, 1] denote the share of risk that remains with
the retailer and (1 − λ) the share of risk that is assumed by the customer. The risk-
sharing tariff comprises two price functions:
i. The precommitment price pc(λ) for the quantity bc, which we assume is equal
to the anticipated load, i.e., bc = Ef [x],
ii. and the imbalance price p′c(λ), which is the price that is paid for any absolute
deviation between the anticipated and the observed demand |bc − x|.
The retailer decides the price functions pc(λ) and p′c(λ) based on its procurement
decision br, and the probability density function of the demand fX . The customer
then chooses the risk share λ to be covered by the retailer. The utilities ur and uc for
the retailer and the customer respectively are determined after the realized demand x
is observed.
Let T denote the payment from the customer to the retailer and M the market
costs of the retailer. The utilities can be written as: ur = T −M and uc = −T .
Analytically,
uc = −bcpc(λ)− |bc − x|p′c(λ) (2.1)
1 In practice, both power excess and shortages can result in the increase of balancing costs for the retailers,
since they may be charged for the deployment of upwards or downwards regulation power by the TSO.
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is the utility of the customer, including the cost for the precommitted quantity bc and
the cost for any absolute deviation from the anticipated load. Similarly,
ur = bcpc(λ) + |bc − x|p′c(λ)− brp− |br − x|p′ (2.2)
is the utility of the retailer, which is equal to the payment by the customer deducting
the market costs of the retailer.
So far we have described the risk-sharing game between the retailer and the
customer, further defining the utilities for both players. We can generalize and say
that the risk-sharing tariff approximates the current retail flat tariff situation when no
risk is assumed by the customer (i.e., λ = 1). Let x be the demand of the customer
and N the number of payments during one year from the customer to the retailer
under the current flat tariff market. Given the law of large numbers we know that for
large N ,
∑
N x ≈ N × Ef [x] holds. Therefore, the total payment of the customer
approximates the payment under the risk-sharing tariff when the retailer holds all the
risk, for λ = 1.
2.2.1 Optimal quantity of procurement
After the prices p, p′ and the distribution fX are determined, the retailer procures the
quantity br in the ahead market. In this section we compute the optimal procurement
b∗r that maximizes the expected utility of the retailer in equation (2.2). Let U
f
r denote
the expected utility of the retailer with respect to the random variable of the demand
X under the distribution fX .
Ufr = bcpc(λ) + Ef [|bc − x|]p′c(λ)− brp− Ef [|br − x|]p′ (2.3)
The price functions pc(λ) and p′c(λ) are free parameters, since they determine the
profit. We treat the price functions as independent of br and therefore we minimize
the market costs M of the retailer.
Lemma 2.1. The first derivative of the expected utility of the retailer in equation
(2.3) with respect to br is:
d
dbr
Ufr = −p− 2p′FX(br) + p′, (2.4)
where FX is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random variable X .
Proof. We compute the derivative of the expected utility of the retailer (with regards
to the random variable of the demandX) with respect to the procurement quantity br.
d
dbr
Ufr = −
d
dbr
(brp+ Ef [|br − x|]p′)
= −br − p′
(
d
dbr
(∫ br
0
(br − x)fX(x)dx
)
+
d
dbr
(∫ ∞
br
(x− br)fX(x)dx
))
(2.5)
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Given the following equalities:
d
da
(∫ a
0
(a− x)fX(x)da
)
= FX(a)
and
d
da
(∫ ∞
a
(x− a)fX(x)da
)
= −(1− FX(a)),
equation (2.5) becomes:
d
dbr
Ufr = −br − p′ (FX(br)− (1− FX(br)))
= p+ 2p′FX(br)− p′.
We proceed to compute the procurement quantity br that maximizes the expected
utility of the retailer.
Theorem 2.1. The quantity b∗r maximizes the expected utility of the retailer.
b∗r = F
−1
X
(
p′ − p
2p′
)
, (2.6)
where F−1x is the inverse cumulative distribution (ICDF) function.
Proof. Equation (2.6) follows from ddbr U
f
r = 0. The expected utility of the retailer
is a strictly concave function, and thus b∗r is a unique optimum since the following
holds:
d2
db2r
Ufr = −2p′fX(br) < 0.
For any given p′ > p, the quantity b∗r is lower than the expected demand due to the
absolute imbalance quantity.
2.2.2 Determining the price for risk-sharing
In this section we define the requirements and the properties of the risk-sharing tariff
and we propose how to choose the price functions. An important requirement for the
price functions pc(λ), p′c(λ) is that the expected utility of the retailer for any given
λ ∈ [0, 1) should be greater or equal to the expected utility when λ = 1. More
specifically,
Ufr (λ) ≥ Ufr (λ = 1) ≥ bcϕ, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1), ϕ ∈ R+, (2.7)
where ϕ denotes an extra profit for the retailer per expected unit of demand. The
quantity ϕ approaches business costs in a perfect competition and arbitrarily large
values in a monopoly.
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Given the requirement in equation (2.7) and using equation (2.3), we derive the
following inequality:
pc(λ) ≥ 1
bc
(b∗rp+ Ef [|b∗r − x|]p′ − Ef [|bc − x|]p′c(λ)) + ϕ. (2.8)
To find functions pc(λ) and p′c(λ) that satisfy the above inequality, we define the
minimum imbalance price function:
%′c(λ) , (1− λ)p′, (2.9)
which is equal to the price the customer would pay by participating in the balancing
market for its share (1−λ) of balancing risk. Since pc(λ) is a free choice, we propose
the minimum ahead price function that satisfies the inequality in equation (2.8) when
replacing p′c(λ) with equation (2.9):
pc(λ) ,
1
bc
(b∗rp+ Ef [|b∗r − x|+ (λ− 1)|bc − x|]p′) + ϕ. (2.10)
We proceed to show that this proposed price function guarantees the minimum
profit margin ϕ for the retailer.
Theorem 2.2. Any tariff (pc(λ), p′c(λ)), using pc(λ) as defined in equation (2.10)
and satisfying p′c(λ) ≥ %′c(λ),∀λ ∈ [0, 1], and p′c(1) = 0, satisfies the requirement
in equation (2.7).
Proof. For simplicity, let Up
′
r (λ) denote the expected utility of the retailer with
regards to the probability density function fX and imbalance price p′(λ). First note
that pc(λ) is defined such that U%r (λ) = Ur(1) when p
′
c(λ) = %
′(λ). For any
function p′c(λ) that satisfies p
′
c(λ) ≥ %′(λ) ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], Up
′
r (λ) ≥ U%
′
r (λ) holds,
since only the profit from the term p′c(λ)EX [|bc− x|] increases while all other terms
are fixed.
The function p′c(λ) refers to the price per unit for any absolute deviation of
the customer’s demand given the choice of λ. We propose p′c(λ) to embrace some
additional desired properties with regards to the ability of the customer to reduce its
demand uncertainty.
Consider a customer that can alter the probability distribution of the random
variable X , fX → gX , such that Eg[|bc − x|] ≤ Ef [|bc − x|] (i.e., the expected
absolute deviation of the random variable X under the distribution gX is lower than
the default demand behavior fX ). Note that Ef [|bc − x|] denotes the expected value
of |bc − x| with regards to the random variable X under the distribution fX , and
Eg[|bc−x|] denotes the expected value of |bc−x|with regards to the random variable
X under the distribution gX . We define gX as the demand response of the customer.
We propose a tariff that additionally imposes the constraint Eg[x] = Ef [x]. Let
λ∗(gX) denote the risk that maximizes the utility of the customer with regards to
the distribution gX . The following two properties are common sense conditions for
demand response tariffs:
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Figure 2.2 The precommitment pc(λ) and imbalance p′c(λ) price functions for all values of λ.
i. No demand response, no risk incentive: If Eg[|bc − x|] = Ef [|bc − x|] then
λ∗(gX) = 1.
ii. Demand response proportional risk: Consider the distribution zX , if Eg[|bc −
x|] < Ez[|bc − x|] < Ef [|bc − x|] then 0 ≤ λ∗(gX) < λ∗(zX) < 1.
We propose the following imbalance price function that satisfies the above properties
(see Section 2.2.3) under ϑ > 0.
p′c(λ) = (1− λ)(p′ + ϑΦ(λ)), (2.11)
where Φ(λ) denotes the penalty that is equal to the discount in the precommitment
price the retailer offers,
Φ(λ) = pc(1)− pc(λ). (2.12)
The parameter ϑ ∈ R+ scales the penalty term Φ(λ). Figure 2.2 illustrates
the shape of the price functions pc(λ) and p′c(λ) that are computed for fX =
N (0.15, 0.1), truncated to x ∈ [0, 0.79], p = 0.1, p′ = 0.5, ϕ = 0.02, and ϑ = 1.
The tariff composed of pc(λ) and p′c(λ) guarantees a minimum acceptable utility
for the retailer, which is equal to the current flat tariff situation (λ = 1). The
imbalance price function p′c(λ) proposed in equation (2.11) also satisfies desirable
properties with respect to the upcoming discussion, associated with the strategy of a
customer that can reduce the uncertainty of its demand.
2.2.3 Optimal strategies for exible customers
Demand response in electricity systems refers to the ability of customers to adjust
their demand behavior in response to financial incentives provided by electricity
providers. In this chapter we interpret demand response as the ability of the customer
to reduce the uncertainty of its demand. Let ∆ denote the action of the customer,
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which affects the distribution of the demand fX , such that the observed demand x
is sampled from the new distribution gX . Recall that the expected demand remains
the same Eg[x] = Ef [x] and the expected absolute deviations may become lower
Eg[|bc − x|] ≤ Ef [|bc − x|]. Let C∆(gX) , C∆(fX → gX) denote the costs
associated with reducing the uncertainty, e.g., capturing customer’s discomfort or
costs of smart devices and batteries.
We show that for any distribution gX there is a unique λ∗ ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes
the expected utility of the customer. Let Ugc denote the expected utility of the
customer with demand response ∆ and resulting demand distribution function gX .
Ugc = −bcpc(λ)− Eg[|bc − x|]p′c(λ)− C∆(gX) (2.13)
where the expected absolute imbalance is computed given the distribution gX . Note
that the prices pc(λ) and p′c(λ) are computed by the retailer given the distribution
fX , since the retailer does not hold information about the demand response action of
the customer ∆.
Lemma 2.2. The first derivative of the expected utility of the customer in equa-
tion (2.13) with respect to λ is:
d
dλ
Ugc = agp
′ − afp′ − 2(λ− 1) ϑ
bc
agafp
′, (2.14)
where af = Ef [|bc − x|], and ag = Eg[|bc − x|].
Proof. We compute the derivative of the quantity in equation (2.13) with respect to
λ.
d
dλ
Ugc =
d
dλ
(−bcpc(λ)− Eg[|bc − x|]p′c(λ)− C∆(gX))
=
d
dλ
(−bcpc(λ)− Eg[|bc − x|]p′c(λ)) (2.15)
By using equation (2.15) and ag = Eg[|bc − x|],
d
dλ
Ugc = bc
dpc(λ)
dλ
+ ag
dp′c(λ)
dλ
. (2.16)
We first consider the first term of equation (2.16).
bc
dpc(λ)
dλ
= bc
d
dλ
(
1
bc
(b∗rp+ Ef [|b∗r − x|+ (λ− 1)|bc − x|]p′)+ϕ
)
=
d
dλ
((λ− 1)Ef [|bc − x|]p′)
= afp
′, (2.17)
where af = Ef [|bc − x|].
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We proceed to the second term of equation (2.16).
ag
dp′c(λ)
dλ
= ag
d
dλ
((1− λ)(p′ + ϑΦ(λ)))
= −agp′ + ag
d
dλ
((1− λ)ϑΦ(λ)) , (2.18)
where Φ(λ) can be written as follows (using equation 2.12):
Φ(λ) = pc(1)− pc(λ)
=
1
bc
(b∗rp+ Ef [|bc − x|]p′) + ϕ
− 1
bc
(b∗rp+ Ef [|b∗r − x|+ (λ− 1)|bc − x|]) + ϕ
=
1
bc
((1− λ)Ef [|bc − x|]p′)
=
1
bc
(1− λ)afp′. (2.19)
By replacing equation (2.19) in equation (2.18) the second term of equation (2.16)
becomes
ag
dp′c(λ)
dλ
= −agp′ + ag
d
dλ
(
(1− λ)ϑ 1
bc
(1− λ)afp′
)
= −agp′ +
ϑ
bc
ag
d
dλ
(
(1− λ)2afp′
)
= −agp′ + 2(λ− 1)
ϑ
bc
agafp
′. (2.20)
Last, by replacing equations (2.20) and (2.17) in equation (2.16) we get:
d
dλ
Ugc = agp
′ − afp′ − 2(λ− 1) ϑ
bc
agafp
′.
Theorem 2.3. The quantity λ∗ maximizes the expected utility of the customer for
any given gX and C∆.
λ∗(gX) =
[
ag − af
2 ϑbc agaf
+ 1
]1
0
, (2.21)
where [x]hl = max(l,min(h, x)).
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Figure 2.3 The mapping between σg and the optimal share λ∗ that maximizes in expectation
the utility of the customer.
Proof. Equation (2.21) follows from ddλU
g
c = 0. The utility function of the customer
with regards to the risk choice λ is strictly concave, since
d2
dλ2
Ugc = −2
ϑ
bc
agafp
′ < 0.
Therefore, λ∗ is the unique optimum.
Under the assumption of a cost-free demand response model, i.e., C∆(·) = 0,
we proceed to show that a customer with uncertain demand response has incentives
to participate in the risk-sharing tariff contributing its maximum available demand
response. Consider the distribution zX such that:
Eg[|bc − x|] < Ez[|bc − x|] < Ef [|bc − x|], (2.22)
where zX provides a threshold ability of the customer to reduce the expected absolute
deviation of the demand.
Theorem 2.4. For a customer with uncertain demand response gX that can at least
reduce the uncertainty of its demand to the level of zX such that equation (2.22) is
satisfied, it holds that:
Ugc (λ
∗(zX)) > Uzc (λ
∗(zX)) > Ufc (1),
and
Ugc (λ) ≥ Ufc (1), ∀λ ≥ λ∗(zX).
Proof. The inequality in equation (2.22) indicates that the imbalance payment in
equation (2.13) follows the same ranking, as it is a product of unequal expectations
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with the identical imbalance price pc(λ∗(zX)). Since all other terms remain the
same, this directly induces the inequalities of the resulting utilities stated in the
theorem.
Theorem 2.4 implies that a customer with uncertain demand response gX , which
is however bounded by zX , can only benefit by contributing all available demand
response. Furthermore, any choice of λ ≥ λ∗(zX) ensures a lower bound for the
utility of the customer.
For the remainder of this chapter we assume that both gX and fX are normal
distributions with mean µg = µf and standard deviation σf and σg ∈ (0, σf ],
respectively. For this restricted case we apply a simplified notation: λ∗(σg) denotes
the optimal strategy for the customer, similarly C∆(σg) denotes the cost. Figure 2.3
presents the function λ∗(σg) for different values of ϑ in equation (2.11). For ϑ ∼ 0,
the utility of the customer becomes a linear function that is monotonically increasing
in λ when σg = σf . Therefore, the optimal choice of the customer becomes
λ∗(σf ) = 1, and λ∗(σg < σf ) = 0. For ϑ ∼ ∞, the optimal choice of the customer
is to assume no risk (λ∗(σg) = 1, ∀σg ∈ (0, σf ]), since the penalty term Φ in
equation (2.11) is infinitely scaled.
In this section we derived the optimal strategy λ∗(gx) of the customer. We fur-
ther illustrated how the choice of the parameter ϑ by the retailer can influence the
optimal strategy of the customer. Furthermore, Theorem 2.4 demonstrated that the
risk-sharing tariff is attractive to customers with uncertain demand response (elic-
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iting the maximum available uncertainty reduction), who can apply a safe strategy
corresponding to their minimum ability.2
2.2.4 Comparison of the utilities
We compare the expected utilities of both players, again under the assumption of
a cost-free demand response model, i.e., C∆(σg) = 0, ∀σg ∈ (0, σf ]. Figure 2.4
illustrates the expected utilities of both players. Let the tuple (U ′c, U
′
r) illustrate
the point in the utility space that represents the current flat tariff situation, i.e.,
σg = σf and λ = 1. Each line segment in the figure represents the utility tuples
given a specific demand response σg and varying λ. The empty circles represent the
utility tuples when the customer chooses to assume no risk (λ = 1). In this case
demand response only yields a benefit to the retailer. On the contrary, filled circles
represent the utility tuples when the customer chooses to assume the full share of
risk. Increasing the risk assumption (moving across the line segments from λ = 1 to
λ = 0) requires a certain level of demand response to be profitable for the customer.
For high demand response (low σg), it results in the utility increase for the customer.
For low demand response (high σg), only the retailer benefits from the decreasing
uncertainty of the demand. Reduced uncertainty on the demand side can therefore
contribute to the improved social welfare (sum of the players’ utilities) through the
risk-sharing tariff.
Theorem 2.4 can also be illustrated using Figure 2.4. Note that for normal dis-
tributions, the following holds: E[|x − µ|] = σ√2/pi (Geary, 1935). Hence, σg <
σz < σf implies that the inequalities in equation (2.22) also hold. According to
Theorem 2.4, it follows that Ugc (λ
∗(σz)) > Uzc (λ
∗(σz)) > Ufc (1). Intuitively, the
customer can increase its utility by switching from σz to σg , or more generally by
switching from zX to gX .
2.3 Nash Equilibrium Strategies
In this section we study the Nash equilibria (NE) of the risk-sharing game. Where
necessary, we make the dependence of utilities on both strategies more explicit by
using notation Uc(pir, pic) and Ur(pir, pic), where pir and pic denote the strategies
of the retailer and the customer respectively. NE are pairs of strategies (pi∗r , pi
∗
c ),
such that Uc(pi∗r , pi
∗
c ) ≥ Uc(pi∗r , pic),∀pic and Ur(pi∗r , pi∗c ) ≥ Ur(pir, pi∗c ),∀pir. Let
C∆(σg) ≥ 0, ∀σg ∈ (0, σf ) be an arbitrary cost model for demand response and
C∆(σf ) = 0, i.e., cost without demand response is zero. We assume that the demand
response cost model is known by the retailer.
First, we define the strategies of the two players. For the retailer, the only free
choice is the scalar ϑ that parameterizes the proposed tariff in equation (2.11).
The strategy of the retailer is denoted by pir = ϑ. For the customer, the strategy
pic = (λ, σg) refers to the choice of risk λ and demand response σg . Furthermore,
the strategy includes the credible threat of returning to the flat tariff without any
demand response, pithreatc = (1, σf ), if the utility drops below the reference utility
2 Safe strategy denotes a risk share λ that guarantees a utility that is at least as high as the reference retail
tariff without risk.
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U ′c. The threat is possible due to the action sequence that is indicated in Figure 2.1
and credible since the threat strategy outperforms the protected equilibrium strategy.
Given any C∆(σg) we know from Theorem 2.3 that for any given strategy pir there
always exists a strategy pi∗c that maximizes the expected utility of the customer:
pi∗c = (λ
∗(σ∗g) , σ
∗
g = arg maxσg [U
g
c (λ
∗(σg))]).
Figure 2.5 illustrates the utilities of the two players, which are computed using
the quadratic demand response cost model: C∆(σg) = w|σf − σg|2, for w = 10.
Each curve corresponds to one of the following three retailer strategies: pi∗r = ϑ
∗,
piαr = (ϑ ≥ ϑ∗), piβr = (ϑ < ϑ∗). The utility tuples along each curve correspond to
the customer strategies pic = (λ∗(σg), σg). The curves start from the utility tuple
(U ′c, U
′
r) denoted by the empty circle, where the customer does not assume any
risk, and hence performs no demand response, i.e., pic = (1, σf ). The curves end
where pic = (0, 0) denoted by the filled circles. Note that the strategy pi∗r = ϑ
∗,
which maximizes the utility of the retailer (solid curve), yields Ugc (λ
∗(σ∗g), σ
∗
g) =
Ufc (1, σf ) for the customer. The utility of the customer using demand response (star
on solid curve) becomes equal to the utility without demand response (open circle).
Theorem 2.5. The strategy pair I, (pi∗r , pi∗c = (λ∗, σ∗g)), and the set of pairs II,
(piαr , pi
threat
c ), are the only two types of NE in the risk-sharing game.
Proof. Any positive change ε in the strategy of the retailer, such that ϑ ← ϑ∗ + ε
(e.g., piαr ), will cause the customer to adopt the strategy pi
threat
c since U
g
c (pi
∗
c , ϑ) < U
′
c,
leading both players to the utility pair (U ′c, U
′
r). On the other hand, any negative
change ε (e.g., piβr ) will directly reduce the retailer’s expected utility. Hence, the
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Figure 2.6 Left: The choice ϑ∗ by the retailer depending on the irrationality parameter τ . The
value of ϑ0 corresponds to NE I. Right: The utility pairs starting from the rational NE
pair (star) and ending at the open circle, where the customer acts almost randomly
(the curve would continue in a straight zero-sum line to the upper left). The filled
circle indicates τ∗, which maximizes the utility of the customer.
retailer has no incentive to deviate from I. In addition, the customer strategy is the
best response by definition, and thus the customer has no incentive to deviate either,
making I a NE. Now, consider any strategy pair (piβr , pic). The retailer can gain by
deviating from this strategy pair by increasing ϑ, making sure that no equilibrium
containing piβr exists. Finally, consider any pair (pi
α
r , pi
threat
c ). Since Ur is unaffected
by ϑ given λ∗(piαr ) = 1, providing no incentive to apply demand response, no player
can gain by deviating unilaterally. Hence, each pair of strategies in the set II is a
NE.
We showed the existence of two types of NE within the risk-sharing game, where
(pi∗r , pi
∗
c = (λ
∗, σ∗g)) Pareto dominates (pi
α
r , pi
threat
c ) and therefore is favorable for both
players.
2.3.1 Bounded rational customer
The concept of bounded rationality was previously discussed in Section 1.1.1 and it
assumes that agents, automated or not, do not behave as perfectly rational decision-
makers, bounded by imperfect information and their limited computational capac-
ity (Simon, 1972). The same applies to the economic behavior of customers, which
can also be modeled using the bounded rationality paradigm (McFadden, 1975): cus-
tomers do not always subscribe to the cheapest tariff but the probability of doing so
is high.
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In this section we use the Softmax function (see Section 1.1.1) to model the
decision of the customer with regards to the choice of the risk it is willing to assume
in the risk-sharing tariff setting.
P(pikc ) =
exp(Uc(pi
k
c )/τ)∑
piic
exp(Uc(piic)/τ)
, (2.23)
where P(pikc ) is the probability of the customer to use strategy pikc . We apply this
function to a discrete sampling of the continuous parameter σg to probabilistically
mix between strategies pic = (λ∗(σg), σg), σg ∈ (0, σf ]. Figure 2.6 illustrates the
numerical approximation of the optimal choice of ϑ∗ for the retailer and the utility
tuples under various degrees of irrationality τ . For τ = 10−4, ϑ0 approximates the
value of ϑ∗ computed earlier for the rational customer, since for low τ Softmax
approximates the rational choice. Beyond τ ≈ 10−2, the retailer starts increasing
θ∗ to infinity as the customer becomes random, resulting in the infinite increase in
the utility of the retailer at the cost of the customer. Note that τ∗ = 4.27 · 10−3
maximizes the utility of the customer. At the same time, it results in a higher utility
than the one is obtained by a rational customer in NE since the retailer offers a higher
incentive for demand response if believes to be facing a bounded rational customer.
The above result has several implications for implementing automated tariff
selection algorithms. In particular, the irrationality parameter τ∗ can be seen as in
equilibrium with ϑ∗ suggesting that automated strategies may perform better by
adopting probabilistic Softmax selection algorithms instead of greedy approaches.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we proposed a tariff where the balancing risk can be shared to
incentivize uncertainty reduction on the demand side. First, we defined an extensive-
form two-player game between the retailer and the customer in settings where the
customer has a direct influence on the balancing requirements and costs of the retailer
(see Section 2.2). Within this game-theoretical framework we proposed the risk-
sharing tariff, which is a parameterized two-payment tariff scheme: the customer
first pays a precommitment price for its anticipated demand, while after its actual
demand is observed it pays for any absolute deviation between its anticipated and
observed demand. In the risk-sharing tariff the customer can choose the portion of
the balancing risk it is willing to assume from the retailer and therefore determine
the price for precommitment and imbalances.
We showed that the proposed tariff is acceptable for both the retailer (see Sec-
tion 2.2.2) and the customer (see Section 2.2.4), since the tariff yields benefits for
both players in expectation. In addition, we studied best response strategies that are
computable as presented in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3. We further illustrated how so-
cial welfare is improved (see Figure 2.4) due to the uncertainty reduction on the
demand-side, and we provided arguments (see Theorem 2.4) why the proposed tariff
elicits all freely available demand response even in cases where the ability of the
customer to demand respond is not certain. In Section 2.3 we showed the existence
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of NE within the risk-sharing game and illustrated them with computations. Last, we
argued that bounded rationality can be a valuable concept for the design of tariffs.
More specifically, we showed that the retailer offers higher incentives for demand re-
sponse (through the risk-sharing tariff) in face of a customer that chooses the amount
of risk to assume stochastically (see Section 2.3.1).
Overall, the proposed risk-sharing tariff is a step towards a key motivation of
envisioned smart grid systems: this can be delineated by the active participation
of customers in more elaborate tariff schemes which can enable indirect demand
control, reducing uncertainty on the demand-side.
2.4.1 Future work
Throughout this chapter we have made some simplifying assumptions in order
to show relevant theoretical properties of the proposed risk-sharing tariff scheme.
Relaxing some of these assumptions, the work presented in this chapter further serves
as a basis for future research directions.
First, we assume that prices p and p′ are known in advance and only determined
by nature. The studied setting can be extended to include stochastic prices for the
ahead and balancing markets. We further consider that the demand distribution fX
is known a-priori by the retailer. This may not be a realistic assumption in higher
time resolutions (e.g., the demand of a quarter hour). Future work can investigate
the design of a risk-sharing tariff where the demand distribution is reported by the
customer directly.
Another assumption of our setting is that the expected demand after demand
response should be equal to the initially anticipated demand (see Section 2.2.3).
This may not be applicable in settings where a customer is not able to reduce the
uncertainty of its demand without reducing or increasing its overall demand. Future
work can study mechanisms that also allow the customer to report its expected
demand (after demand response) in addition to the risk share.
Last, we consider settings where one customer has a direct influence on the
balancing requirements of the retailer, and therefore our game-theoretical analysis
considers the demand uncertainty of a single customer. It is of great interest to
consider settings in which multiple customers participate in the risk-sharing tariff,
where incentives are shared among different users that may have different private
costs for demand response.


3 Forecast-Based
Mechanisms for
Demand Response
Preface In this chapter we study mechanisms to incentivize uncertain demand
response in future electricity systems. We assume agents (e.g., EVs) that can respond
(reduce or increase their demand) with some probability if they prepare prior to the
realization of the demand. Previous work studies truthful mechanisms that select a
minimal set of agents to prepare and respond such that a fixed demand reduction
target is achieved with high probability. In this chapter we additionally consider the
balancing responsibility of a retailer under a given demand forecast and imbalance
price: the retailer is responsible to purchase additional reserve capacity at a high
imbalance price to cover any excess in the demand. In this extended setting we
study mechanisms that request only a subset of prepared agents to respond, since
the reduction target depends on the realization of the demand and may not require
all agents to respond. We propose: (i) a sequential mechanism that in each round
embeds a second-price auction and is truthful under some mild assumptions for the
setting, and (ii) a truthful combinatorial mechanism that runs in polynomial time and
uses VCG payments. We show that both mechanisms guarantee non-negative utility
in expectation for both agents and the retailer (mechanism), and can further be used
for simultaneous downward and upward flexibility. Last, we verify our theoretical
findings in an empirical evaluation over a wide range of mechanism parameters.
 This chapter presents work that was published in the proceedings of the Interna-
tional Conference of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) 2019 in
Montreal, Canada (Methenitis et al., 2019b).
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3.1 Introduction
There are two important types of electricity markets that facilitate commerce of
electricity between energy producers and customers: day-ahead and balancing mar-
kets (Conejo et al., 2010). Retailers (aggregators), based on demand forecasts, pro-
cure electricity in day-ahead markets to satisfy the demand of their customers. Imbal-
ances between the procured quantities and the actual (intra-day) demand are moder-
ated in balancing markets, in which the reserve power of high-cost storage units and
conventional fast-ramping generators, e.g., gas-turbines, is traded. As a result, im-
balances result in increasing costs for retailers and they are further associated with
excessive CO2 emissions (Hintermann, 2016). Maintaining balance between supply
and demand is therefore one of the main factors that determine the efficiency of both
existing and envisioned smart grid systems (Palensky and Dietrich, 2011).
To this end, demand-side management assumes that electricity users can alter
their demand or generation behavior given economic incentives (e.g., smart tariffs,
dynamic pricing), and therefore assist in reducing imbalances between supply and
demand (Palensky and Dietrich, 2011). In practice, retailers currently agree upon
long-term contracts to incentivize large-capacity users to reduce their demand if nec-
essary (Kim and Shcherbakova, 2011). The introduction of smaller-scale flexible
users, such as intelligent home appliances, electric vehicles (EVs) and home bat-
teries, can further alleviate retailers from costs related to balancing supply and de-
mand (Kempton and Tomic´, 2005). However, the uncertain availability of such users
requires more flexible contracts, such as short-term bilateral agreements that can be
agreed upon and executed if necessary in a day-to-day manner.
In this chapter we consider the following setting: a retailer based on a demand
forecast procures electricity in the day-ahead market to satisfy the demand of its cus-
tomers. Since the demand is not certain, there is no guarantee that the actual demand
(at the delivery time) is equal to the procured quantity. As a result, any imbalance
between the procured quantity and the demand at the time of delivery should be ad-
justed in the balancing market with a much higher price than the procurement price.
We consider agents that can reduce imbalances, after the realization of the demand
(i.e., when demand is known but not finalized) and before the time of delivery, if
requested by the retailer. Agents decide whether to prepare with some cost before
the realization of the demand; prepared agents are able (with some probability) to
respond if requested after the realization of the demand. Agents’ responses can be
observed and incur extra costs to agents. The following example illustrates an instan-
tiation of the model of agents used in our setting:
Example 3.1. Consider a neighborhood with multiple EVs that are parked and
plugged into charging stations. Some of the vehicles may be fully charged, while
others may be charging. In case of excess demand fully charged vehicles can be
utilized to provide the extra needed electricity out of their battery, while vehicles that
undergo charging can pause their charging. Each vehicle has a preparation cost,
which is the opportunity/planning cost caused by extending its stay in a charging
station. The probability of response refers to the uncertain availability of a vehicle to
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reduce its demand upon request. Last, the response cost is associated to the operating
cost of response, such as the cost of battery degradation.
In this setting we design mechanisms to incentivize demand response for agents
that their availability to reduce/increase their demand if requested is not certain (see
Example 3.1). We additionally consider the balancing responsibility of a retailer un-
der a given demand forecast and imbalance price. More specifically, given the de-
mand forecast, the imbalance price and the characteristics of agents (i.e., preparation
cost, response probability and response cost), we design mechanisms that: (i) elicit
truthful information with regards to the characteristics of agents, (ii) select a sub-
set of agents to prepare, (iii) do not require all prepared agents to respond but only
upon request (i.e., until imbalance is resolved), (iv) determine the order that prepared
agents are asked to respond, (v) compute rewards and penalties for selected agents
in order to incentivize them to prepare and respond (if able) if requested, and (vi)
reduce the expected balancing cost of the retailer and overall increase social welfare.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We study implications in mechanism design that arise by interdependencies be-
tween agents that are requested to respond sequentially and respond stochasti-
cally.
• To select a subset of all available agents and incentivize them to prepare and
respond if requested, we propose a sequential mechanism that in each round
embeds a second-price auction and is truthful under some assumptions for the
setting, and a truthful combinatorial mechanism that runs in polynomial time
and uses VCG payments.
• We show that both mechanisms guarantee non-negative utility in expectation
for both agents and the mechanism, and can further be used for simultaneous
downward and upward flexibility.
• We empirically evaluate the proposed mechanisms over a wide range of param-
eters and find that they achieve up to 16% reduction in the balancing cost of the
retailer and up to 14% increase in social welfare compared to the case when no
demand response is used. Last, we provide an evaluation of related work (Ma
et al., 2016) in our extended setting.
To the best of our knowledge, the work presented in this chapter is the first to
propose mechanisms that connect incentives for uncertain demand response with the
balancing responsibility of the retailer, given the demand forecast of the customers
and the imbalance price for the retailer.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2 we present previous
works that study mechanisms to incentivize demand response and we discuss how
the work presented in this chapter differentiates. In Section 3.3 we formalize our
problem setting. In Section 3.4 we define the general demand response mechanism
that considers rewards and penalties for all selected agents and asks agents to respond
sequentially, we further propose two truthful mechanisms that are based on the
general demand response mechanism. Section 3.5 presents our empirical evaluation
of the proposed mechanism over a wide range of mechanism parameters. Last, in
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Section 3.6 we conclude this chapter and discuss future research directions of this
work.
3.2 RelatedWork
In the closest state-of-the-art work, Ma et al. (2016) propose mechanisms to incen-
tivize reliable demand reduction in electricity grids. The proposed mechanisms, that
are based on greedy allocation and critical value payments (Lehmann et al., 1999),
achieve a fixed demand reduction target with some reliability while minimizing the
number of selected agents (see Section 3.5 for a detailed description). Our work dif-
ferentiates from the aforementioned work in the following ways: (i) Ma et al. (2016)
use a fixed demand reduction target. On the contrary, we propose mechanisms to al-
locate demand response when the demand reduction target is not known and only the
demand forecast (distribution) is used to select agents. (ii) Ma et al. (2016) propose a
two-stage setting: in the first stage, a set of agents is selected, and in the second stage,
all selected agents are asked to respond. In contrast, we consider mechanisms that
request prepared agents to respond until an imbalance between supply and demand
is resolved (or cannot be reduced further), and thus the probability of requesting se-
lected agents to respond is less or equal to one. (iii) Ma et al. (2016) do not consider
the actual need for demand response (fixed demand reduction target). In this chapter,
however, we consider that agents are requested to respond based on the realization
of the demand, which can prevent excessive costs for demand response. Last, (iv)
Ma et al. (2016) evaluate their proposed mechanisms with regards to the resulting
payments to agents. On the contrary, we consider both the expected balancing cost
for the retailer and the social cost of demand response, and thus the overall social
welfare.
The aforementioned work by Ma et al. (2016) considers unit responses by agents
(i.e., each agent can reduce one unit of demand), while a later extension of this work
generalizes to multi-unit responses, uncertainties in preparation costs of agents, as
well as a multi-effort probability of response (Ma et al., 2017). Other related work
studies demand response contracts under uncertainty, where the reserve cost for the
retailer (i.e., cost for not reaching the reduction target) is considered (Haring and
Andersson, 2014; Meir et al., 2017). However, no prior work has studied mechanisms
to incentivize uncertain demand response given the additional information of the
demand forecast, as we do in this chapter.
3.3 Problem Formulation
In this section we outline our problem setting: Section 3.3.1 formulates the balancing
responsibility of the retailer, Section 3.3.2 introduces demand response agents and
Section 3.3.3 illustrates how demand response is used by the retailer.
3.3.1 Retailer’s balancing responsibility
We consider a single retailer of electricity that is the balancing responsible party. The
demand of the retailer’s portfolio of customers is described by the discrete random
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Figure 3.1 Timeline of the model formulation.
variable X . The demand forecast fX(x) = PX(X = x) is the probability mass
function (PMF) of X . We denote with x ∈ ZD0 the realization of the demand, where
D is the upper bound of the support of X .
Consider the timeline in Figure 3.1, similarly to Chapter 2 we consider that the
retailer procures the quantity b ∈ Z+ at unit price p ∈ R+ ahead of the realization of
the demand, during the ahead period, in the day-ahead market. When no demand
response is used, the retailer pays any positive imbalance between the demand
realization x and the procured quantity b at unit price p′ ∈ R+ (imbalance price)
at the time of delivery in the balancing market. We assume that p′ > p, and that the
prices p and p′ are determined by an exogenous process and cannot be influenced
by the retailer (price-taker). We further assume that the procurement quantity b is
predetermined (see Assumption 3.1 in Section 3.4) and we focus on the expected
balancing cost of the retailer:
C¬DR = p′ EX [x− b|x > b], (3.1)
where only positive imbalance from the procured quantity incurs a balancing cost to
the retailer.
In practice, both demand excess (positive imbalance) and shortages (negative
imbalance) result in balancing costs for retailers. However, to align our model with
related work (Ma et al., 2016), we first consider the expected positive imbalance (see
equation 3.1). In Section 3.4.4 we generalize to the case where both positive and
negative imbalances incur balancing cost to the retailer.
Remark 3.1. Our choice for a discrete model, where both the demand x and the
procurement b are discrete variables, is motivated by markets that have trading
volumes that are multiples of a unit quantity (as it is usual in day-ahead and
balancing electricity markets) or markets with discrete items.1
1 Our model can be generalized to continuous variables if we neglect the need for decimal reduction, or if
there is a minimum price to participate in the balancing market.
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Figure 3.2 Demand response model: bars represent prepared agents prior to demand realization.
For demand realization x > b, the retailer requests prepared agents to respond
sequentially (from left to right) until the positive imbalance (x − b) is resolved.
The ordering of the agents is an example ordering with regards to the response
probability.
3.3.2 Demand response agents
We consider agents that are flexible and can reduce or increase their demand and
consequently any positive imbalance between the procured quantity and the realized
demand, after demand realization and before the time of delivery, during the response
period (see Figure 3.1).2
Let A = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} denote the finite set of demand response agents. Let
also di ∈ {−1,+1}, ∀i ∈ A denote the flexibility of agent i, i.e., for di = −1
agent i can reduce its demand by one unit, while for di = +1 agent i can increase
its demand by one unit. We assume unit downward flexibility, i.e., di = −1,∀i ∈ A.
Later in this chapter (see Section 3.4.4) we also consider the case of both downward
and upward unit flexibility where di ∈ {−1,+1}.
We follow previous work to define the timing of demand response and additional
characteristics of agents with regards to their ability to respond (Ma et al., 2016). The
type of agent i, θi, is the triplet (ci, γi, vi). Prior to demand realization and during
the preparation period (see Figure 3.1), agent i decides whether to prepare with
preparation cost ci ≥ 0. After demand realization and during the response period,
if agent i is prepared, it is able with probability γi ∈ (0, 1] to respond. If agent i is
2 Demand response retail market programs take place in short time periods (e.g.,15-min) and are based
on time-ahead “realization” of the demand (Wang et al., 2015), i.e., when demand is very close to the
real value. Real-time imbalances are not handled by demand response agents since this requires time
(notification and response), but instead by automatic generation control or spinning reserves.
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able to respond, it can decide either to respond with response cost vi ≥ 0, or not
without any cost. The decision of agent i to prepare and the ability to respond cannot
be observed, while the response can be observed.
3.3.3 Model of demand response
In this section we discuss how demand response agents can be used by the retailer.
Consider a set of agents that decide to prepare prior to demand realization, and
demand realization x > b, i.e., positive imbalance. During the response period (see
Figure 3.1), the retailer requests prepared agents to respond (reduce their demand)
in some order; each agent that responds reduces the imbalance quantity (x − b) by
one unit. The response of an agent can be observed before the next agent is asked
to respond. If the imbalance is resolved (enough agents have responded), the retailer
stops requesting agents to respond. Otherwise, if imbalance is not resolved (there
are no more prepared agents to respond), the retailer pays the remaining imbalance
quantity with price p′ at the time of delivery.
Example 3.2. Figure 3.2 presents the demand forecast fX(x), the dashed curve
illustrates the survival function SX(x) = PX(X > x). Bars of different color
intensity (darker means higher total cost for demand response) represent prepared
(prior to demand realization) agents starting from the procured quantity of the
retailer b. The height of the bars show the probability that agent i is able to respond,
γi, and bars’ width show the quantity that each agent can reduce its demand. For
demand realization x > b, the retailer requests sequentially (from left to right)
prepared agents to respond until imbalance (x− b) is zero or no more agents can be
requested.
In contrast to related work that does not consider the realization of the de-
mand (Ma et al., 2016, 2017), in the following sections we design mechanisms that
request agents to respond only if there is a positive imbalance; therefore, the proba-
bility that a selected agent is requested to respond is not equal to one but it is influ-
enced by: (i) the demand forecast fX(x), (ii) the order in which is asked to respond,
and (iii) the response probabilities of preceding agents.
3.4 Demand Response MechanismM
In this section we define the general mechanism M in which selected agents are
asked to respond sequentially to reduce a positive imbalance. In Section 3.4.1
we compute the probability that agents are requested to respond, the expected
utility of both agents and the retailer (mechanism), and we analyze dependencies
between agents that arise in our setting. Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 outline our proposed
mechanisms. Last, Section 3.4.4 generalizes our proposed mechanisms to the case
where both positive and negative imbalances incur balancing cost to the retailer.
Recall that p′ is the imbalance price, X is the random variable of the demand,
b is the procurement quantity, and θi is the type of agent i. We define the general
mechanism M(X, b, p′, θˆ) → (si, oi, ri, ti), ∀i ∈ A, in which all available agents
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Figure 3.3 Schematic sequence of agent’s i decisions (preparation and response), stochastic
transitions (the probability of which is placed midway in arrows), and costs
(illustrated on the right side of end nodes). Reward ri is transferred from the
mechanism to agent i in case of response, penalty ti is paid to the mechanism
otherwise.
report their types θˆ = {θˆ0, θˆ1, . . . , θˆn−1} (θˆi is the reported type of agent i) to the
mechanism M during the preparation period (see Figure3.1).
Assumption 3.1. The retailer does not have access to the available flexibility
(reports θˆ) during the ahead period, and thus the procurement quantity b is already
determined before the preparation period.
The quadruplet (si, oi, ri, ti) is the resulting allocation for agent i, where si ∈
{0, 1} denotes the selection of agent i, oi ∈ Zn−10 the order in which agent i may
be requested to respond by the mechanism, ri ≥ 0 the reward that is transferred
from the mechanism to agent i in case agent i responds after is requested by the
mechanism, and ti ≥ 0 the penalty that is paid to the mechanism if agent i does not
respond after request. Payments from and towards the mechanism take place after
the realization of the demand and after observing the response of agents if requested
by the mechanism (contingent payments).
Consider agent i that is selected by the mechanism (si = 1, oi ∈ Zn−10 ) with
reward ri and penalty ti. Figure 3.3 illustrates the general mechanism M , where pii
denotes the probability that agent i is requested to respond by the mechanism (see
Section 3.4.1). With knowledge of ri and ti, agent i decides whether to prepare prior
to the realization of the demand (preparation period). During the response period, the
mechanism asks agent i to respond with probability pii. If agent i is able to respond
(with probability γi), it decides whether to respond during the response period.
3.4 Demand Response MechanismM 59
3.4.1 Request probability & interdependencies
In this section we compute the probability pii with which mechanism M requests
agent i to respond. We further compute the utilities of both agents and the retailer
(mechanism) under mechanismM . Last, we study implications in mechanism design
that arise by dependencies between agents that are requested to respond sequentially.
Probability of response request
To compute the probability pii we consider that agents report their true types θ.
Consider agent i with unit flexibility (recall that di = −1,∀i ∈ A) and type
θi = (ci, γi, vi). We assume w.l.o.g. that si = 1, oi = i, ∀i ∈ A, i.e., all agents are
selected and the order that are requested to respond follows the indexing of agents.
We further assume that all agents prepare and respond if requested (agent i is able to
respond with probability γi). Let ai ∈ {0, 1} denote the observed action of agent i
after request, it is equal to one in case of response and zero otherwise.
pii =

SX(b), i = 0
SX(b+ i) +
i−1∑
k=0
fX
(
b+ k + 1
)
P
( i−1∑
j=0
aj ≤ k
)
, i > 0
(3.2)
is the probability of response request from the mechanism to agent i, where
P(
∑
j aj ≤ k) is the probability that less than or equal to k agents respond from the
agents preceding i, i.e., ∀j < i. For i = 0, pii is equal to the probability that demand
is larger than b, i.e., the first agent in the order is always asked to respond if there is
positive imbalance. For i > 0, equation (3.2) further accounts for failures (inability
to respond) of agents preceding i in case x < (b+ i+ 1).
The quantity
∑
j aj in equation (3.2) is the sum of independent Bernoulli vari-
ables and follows a Poisson binomial distribution (Wang, 1993). The probability
P(
∑
j aj ≤ k) is the cumulative distribution function of a Poisson binomial dis-
tribution for k successes.
P
(∑
j
aj ≤ k
)
=
k∑
l=0
∑
L∈Fl
∏
q∈L
γq
∏
m∈Lc
(1− γm), (3.3)
where for each number of successes l ∈ [0, k], Fl contains all sets of size l in
the powerset of A and Lc is the complementary set of L, i.e., L ∪ Lc = A.
For experiments presented later in this chapter (see Section 3.5), we compute the
probability in equation (3.3) using a closed-form expression based on the discrete
Fourier transform of the characteristic function of the distribution (Hong, 2013).
Utilities under mechanismM
Let CDR denote the expected cost for the mechanism M (expected balancing cost
plus the cost for demand response) under allocation (si, oi, ri, ti),∀i ∈ A. To derive
the cost CDR, we assume that agents report their true types θ and w.l.o.g. that
si = 1, oi = i, ∀i ∈ A, i.e., all agents are selected and the order that are requested
to respond follows the indexing of agents. We further assume that all selected agents
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prepare and respond if requested.
CDR =
∑
i∈A
piiγiri − pii(1− γi)ti
+ p′
D∑
x=b+1
fX(x)
min {x− b− 1, n}∑
k=0
P
(∑
i∈A
ai = k
)
(x− b− k), (3.4)
where the first term is equal to the expected payments towards and from the agents.
The expected payment to agent i is equal to: piiγiri, and the expected income from
agent i: pii(1 − γi)ti. The second term of equation (3.4) computes the expected
balancing cost for x ∈ [b+ 1, D] and k ∈ [0,min{(x− b− 1), n}] (k is the number
of responses) and it considers only the cases in which there is a remaining imbalance
(thus all agents have been requested to respond). Note that, there is no imbalance for
k ≥ (x− b), and k cannot be greater than the number of agents (k ≤ n).
We define the (retailer’s) expected utility of the mechanism UM as the difference
between the expected balancing cost when no demand response is used (see equa-
tion 3.1) and the expected cost for mechanism M (see equation 3.4).
UM = C¬DR − CDR, (3.5)
where the utility of the mechanism depends on the cost CDR that is influenced
by the allocation. Note that C¬DR depends only on the procurement quantity (see
equation 3.1 and Assumption 3.1).
Similarly, given reward ri and penalty ti the expected utility of agent i is:
ui = piiγi(ri − vi)− pii(1− γi)ti − ci, (3.6)
where pii is the probability of response request in equation (3.2). Agent i pays ci to
prepare. If agent i is asked and able to respond, pays vi and gets reward ri. Otherwise,
if agent i is asked and cannot respond, agent i pays ti to the mechanism.
Definition 3.1. A mechanism is called dominant-strategy incentive compatible
(DSIC), or truthful, if no agent can increase its utility by misreporting its type to
the mechanism, and individually rational (IR) if agents get non-negative utility in
expectation (i.e., agents are willing to participate). Furthermore, a mechanism is
called individual rational for the center (CR) if the center’s (mechanism) expected
utility is non-negative (Porter et al., 2008).3
Interdependent tasks with uncertain executions
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the allocation is determined by both the selec-
tion of agent i and the order that the mechanism requests agent i to respond. We
showed that the latter influences the probability of response request to agent i (see
Section 3.4.1) and therefore tasks (each order in the allocation) are interdependent.
The valuation of agent i for a given allocation depends on the probabilities that pre-
3 We adopt the notion of center’s rationality (CR) considering the utility of the mechanism for the retailer;
equivalently, we can say that mechanismM satisfies CR if it is IR for the retailer to adopt mechanismM .
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ceding agents are able to respond. However, there exist no efficient mechanism (in
the class of Groves mechanisms) that satisfies DSIC, IR and CR when there are in-
terdependencies between tasks with uncertain executions (Conitzer and Vidali, 2014;
Porter et al., 2008; Zhao et al., 2016).
Given the above impossibility result, in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 we design mech-
anisms that select agents to perform demand response by removing dependencies
between tasks and satisfy all DSIC, IR and CR properties.
3.4.2 Sequential-task mechanism
In this section we define the sequential mechanism SeqM , which selects agents for
each order in the allocation sequentially.
Minimum acceptable reward
Given the expected utility of agent i in equation (3.6), we define the minimum
acceptable reward for agent i, %i: the minimum reward for which it is rational for
agent i to prepare prior to demand realization (during the preparation period) and
respond if it is able with probability γi during the response period. The minimum
acceptable reward %ˆi (based on report θˆi) that yields positive expected utility for
agent i is:
ri ≥
pii(1− γˆi)ti + cˆi
piiγˆi
+ vˆi , %ˆi, (3.7)
where %ˆi is the lower bound of the reward ri. We further set an upper bound for the
reward ri, it should not be larger or equal to the imbalance price p′ that the retailer
pays in case agent i does not respond (and no other agent responds), ri < p′.
Mechanism SeqM
We define the sequential mechanism SeqM as follows: SeqM (X, b, p′, θˆ, T ) →
(si, oi, ri, ti = T ), ∀i ∈ A, where T ≥ 0 is a fixed penalty. Let A′ denote the
set of available agents (i.e., agents that are not yet selected) and κ the order in
which the mechanism requests an agent to respond. Initially, A′ = A, κ = 0, and
si = 0, ∀i ∈ A. We detail the steps of the mechanism SeqM below:
(1) Collect reports from all available agents, θˆi, ∀i ∈ A′.
(2) Compute %ˆi, ∀i ∈ A′ for oi = κ as in equation (3.7); pii is computed with
regards to previously selected agents as in equation (3.2).
(3) Consider in order κ agent w = arg mini∈A′ %ˆi (lowest %ˆi), and reward rw =
mini6=w∈A′ %ˆi (second lowest %ˆi).
(4) In case that rw < p′, select agent w, i.e., (sw = 1, ow = κ, rw =
mini6=w∈A′ %ˆi, tw = T ), and remove agent w from the set of available agents,
A′ = A′ − w. Then, go to step (1) and increase the order κ by one, κ = κ+ 1.
For rw ≥ p′, stop without selecting agent w (sw = 0).
We consider that SeqM takes place during the preparation period (see Figure 3.1).
At each round, the computed reward and the fixed penalty is communicated to the
selected agent that decides whether to prepare before the demand realization and
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respond if it is requested. After demand realization and in case of positive imbalance,
SeqM requests agents to respond sequentially according to the order that they are
selected until imbalance is zero, or there are no more agents to respond. If agent i is
asked to respond, SeqM pays ri to the agent in case of response, and receives penalty
ti otherwise.
Incentives and truthfulness of SeqM
We proceed to discuss agents’ incentives to report truthfully and participate in SeqM ,
and further show that SeqM can only benefit by selecting agents to perform demand
response.
Assumption 3.2. Agents do not have access to: (i) the reports of other agents
θˆ−i, the number of participating agents, and the distribution of agents’ types (no
communication), (ii) the reward that is communicated to the selected agent after
each round of the mechanism (no price discovery), and (iii) the demand forecast of
the retailer.
Theorem 3.1. Given Assumption 3.2, SeqM is DSIC and IR.
Proof. We first show that the mechanism is IR for the agents. For report θˆi, the
minimum acceptable reward %ˆi as it is computed in equation (3.7) yields zero
expected utility for agent i, ui = 0. Any reward ri ≥ %ˆi yields positive utility ui ≥ 0.
Let %ˆj be the second lowest minimum acceptable reward. It holds by definition that
%ˆj ≥ %ˆi and consequently ui ≥ 0. Therefore, it is rational for selected agent i to
prepare and respond if requested.
We proceed to show that a selected agent cannot improve its utility by misreport-
ing to the mechanism. Given Assumption 3.2 and the definition of SeqM each round
of the mechanism is an isolated Vickrey (second-price) auction (Vickrey, 1961),
since there is no information propagating to the next rounds, i.e., no externalities.4
In each round, agents deterministically choose to report truthfully to the mechanism
since any round can be the last round in which they can obtain positive expected
utility with reward lower than p′.
Given Theorem 3.1, pii is computed in step (2) of SeqM (see Section 3.4.2) based
on truthful reports.
Proposition 3.1. For any fixed penalty T ≥ 0, SeqM is CR.
Proof. Note that rewards are lower than p′ and response is requested only if there is
an imbalance that otherwise has to be paid with price p′. It follows that the utility of
SeqM (see Section 3.4.1) is always non-negative.
3.4.3 Independent-task mechanism
Recall that the probability of response request to agent i, pii, depends on the response
probabilities of preceding agents in the allocation. In this section we design a truthful
combinatorial mechanism by removing dependencies between selected agents.
4 See (Leme et al., 2012) for sequential mechanisms with externalities.
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Mechanism IndM
We define the mechanism IndM , which requests agents to respond as follows:
Definition 3.2. For demand realization x > b, IndM requests all agents up to order
λ = x− b− 1 to respond.
Intuitively, the mechanism IndM asks agents up to a specific order, that corresponds
to the imbalance quantity, to respond. It follows that, the probability that agent i is
asked to respond in equation (3.2) is independent of preceding agents (oj < oi) and
pii = SX(b+ oi).
Similarly to SeqM (see Section 3.4.2), IndM fixes a penalty, ti = T, ∀i ∈ A.
In addition, IndM fixes a reward R, ri = R,∀i ∈ A, which is the reward that
the mechanism pays agent i after response. Mechanism IndM can be written as:
IndM (X, b, p
′, θˆ, R, T ) → (si, oi, ri = R, ti = T, zi), ∀i ∈ A, where zi is a
payment from agent i to the mechanism upon allocation. Each selected agent i gets
reward ri = R if it is requested and responds, and pays penalty ti = T in case of no
response.
Unlike SeqM that may request all selected agents to respond to resolve some
imbalance quantity, failing to respond under IndM yields balancing cost p′ to
the mechanism, since all selected agents have to respond to resolve any positive
imbalance. This means that under IndM , fixing T = p′ “transfers” the balancing
responsibility to selected agents.
Optimal allocation & VCG payments
Given reward R, penalty T , and considering zi = 0, the expected utility of agent i
for order oi and based on the report θˆi is:
uˆi(oi) = piiγˆi(R− vˆi)− pii(1− γˆi)T − cˆi, (3.8)
where pii = SX(b + oi) (see Definition 3.2). We define the optimal allocation oopt
(assignment of each agent to an order) such that:
oopt = arg max
o∈O
∑
i∈A
max
(
0, uˆi(o
opt
i )
)
, (3.9)
where O is the set of all permutations. The term max(0, uˆi(o
opt
i )) ensures that no
agent is selected with negative expected utility, therefore si = 0, if uˆi(o
opt
i ) ≤ 0.
Lemma 3.1. The problem of finding the optimal allocation oopt in equation (3.9)
can be solved in polynomial time O(n3).
Proof. When the probability of response request pii is independent of previously
allocated agents, the optimal allocation problem can be formulated as the linear
assignment problem (LAP), where n agents are assigned n tasks. In our setting each
task stands for an order oi ∈ Zn−10 . It can be solved optimally in polynomial time,
O(n3), by the Hungarian method (Kuhn, 1955) while there exist implementations
that can speed up further the computation of the optimal assignment in LAPs (Date
and Nagi, 2016).
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To simplify notation in the remainder of this section, we define u′i(o
opt
i ) ,
max
(
0, uˆi(o
opt
i )
)
. We use the VCG payment rule to compute the payment of agent
i to the mechanism upon allocation:
zi =
( ∑
j∈A\i
u′j
(
o
opt−i
j
)− ∑
j∈A\i
u′j
(
ooptj
))
, (3.10)
where oopt−i is the optimal allocation without agent i present (Nisan et al., 2007).
Intuitively, zi is equal to the difference between the sum of utilities that agents other
than i get without agent i present, and the sum of utilities they get under its presence
(marginal loss). Note that, agents that are not selected cause zero marginal loss to
other agents.
We consider that IndM takes place during the preparation period (see Figure 3.1),
where each selected agent i pays zi upon allocation. After demand realization, IndM
requests selected agents up to the order λ. Selected agents in the set {j : oj ≤ λ}
are asked to respond, SeqM pays R to agents that respond, and receives penalty T
otherwise.
Theorem 3.2. The mechanism IndM is DSIC and IR.
Proof. First, it follows from Lemma 3.1 that oopt maximizes the sum of agents’
utilities. By definition of the VCG mechanism (Nisan et al., 2007), IndM is DSIC
and IR. Agent imaximizes its utility by reporting truthfully, θˆi = θi, and it is rational
for agent i to prepare and respond if requested under reward R and penalty T .
Proposition 3.2. For any R ≤ p′ and T ≥ 0, IndM is CR.
Proof. For any R ≤ p′ and T ≥ 0, no allocation can yield losses for the mechanism
(see proof of Proposition 3.1).
3.4.4 General exibility mechanisms
In previous sections we have considered a setting where only positive imbalance
from the procured quantity b results in balancing cost for the retailer (see Sec-
tion 3.3.1). In this section we show that mechanisms SeqM and IndM can generalize
in settings where both positive and negative imbalances result in balancing costs.
In addition to the set of downward flexibility agents A (also denoted by A− in
the remainder of this chapter), we consider the set of upward flexibility agents A+,
with reports θˆ+ = {(cˆi, γˆi, vˆi) : ∀i ∈ A+} and di = +1,∀i ∈ A+. Both SeqM and
IndM can be applied on the set A+, independently from the set A−, under the same
imbalance price p′ or a different price for negative imbalances, with only a small
adjustment of the request probability pii. For SeqM , the probability that agent i is
asked to respond pii for i > 0 in equation (3.2) becomes:
pii = FX(b− i− 1) +
i−1∑
k=0
fX
(
b− k − 1)P( i−1∑
j=0
aj ≤ k
)
, (3.11)
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where FX(x) = 1 − SX(x) = PX(X ≤ x). For i = 0, equation (3.2) becomes
pii = FX(b− 1). Similarly, for IndM , pii = FX(b− oi − 1).
Both SeqM and IndM hold their properties (DSIC, IR, and CR) since they are
applied independently on different sets of agents.
3.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we empirically evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanisms
SeqM and IndM . We also provide an evaluation of the mechanisms proposed by Ma
et al. (2016) (in our extended setting), which we detail below:
Fixed-Reward/Penalty Ma et al. Mechanisms Fixed-reward Ma et al.
mechanism fixes a reward R, a reduction target Z and a reliability target τ . For
agent reports θˆ (reports are the same as in Section 3.4), it computes the maximum
penalty that each agent is willing to pay such that the agent retains non-negative
utility (similarly to equation (3.7) that computes the minimum acceptable reward).
Then, the mechanism sorts agents in a decreasing order with regards to their max-
imum willingness to pay, and selects the minimum number of agents such that:
P(
∑
a ≥ Z) ≥ τ , i.e., the probability of reaching the reduction target Z is higher
than the reliability target τ . The mechanism sets penalty (in case of unsuccessful re-
sponse) for each selected agent i that is equal to the smallest willingness to pay from
the set of agents that would have been selected without agent i present. Intuitively,
that is the lowest willingness to pay for agent i to get selected. After allocation, the
mechanism asks all selected agents to respond. Similarly, fixed-penalty Ma et al.
mechanism fixes penalty T and computes the minimum acceptable reward (as in
equation (3.7) for pii = 1) (Ma et al., 2017). Both fixed-reward and fixed-penalty
mechanisms make a deep market assumption, i.e., there are enough agents in the
market (economy) to fulfill the requirements with regards to the reduction target and
the reliability.
Fixed-reward and fixed-penalty Ma et al. mechanisms do not consider the bal-
ancing responsibility of the retailer after the realization of the demand. Hence, the
following sections do not serve as a direct comparison of the mechanisms proposed
in this chapter and the mechanisms proposed by Ma et al. (2016); instead, they focus
on the added value of information considered by our mechanisms (i.e., demand fore-
cast, imbalance price), and the advantage of only requesting agents to respond after
the realization of the demand.
Experimental setup We consider a market with n = 200 agents. Each agent
has preparation cost ci ∼ U [0, p′], response probability γi ∼ U [0.5, 1], and response
cost vi ∼ U [0, p′ − ci], where U [α, β] denotes a uniform distribution from α to
β. Note that ci + vi ≤ p′, i.e., the sum of the costs for preparation and response
is lower or equal to the imbalance price p′, which is a relevant assumption for the
setting. For the demand distribution we use a discretized skew normal distribution
N (µX , σX , αX), where µX = 500, σX = 100, αX = 10 (e.g., see Figure 3.2). The
procurement quantity is set to b = EX [x], and p′ = 0.6. Our results are averaged
over 200 independent runs where the demand distribution is fixed.
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Figure 3.4 Mean and standard deviation of the number and the average reliability of selected
agents. Continuous lines correspond to values on left vertical axes and dotted lines
to right vertical axes. SeqM mechanism (top left), IndM mechanism (bottom row),
and Ma et al. mechanisms (top right).
Mechanism parameters For the mechanism SeqM , we use fixed penalty T ∈
{0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.0} × p′. For IndM , we use R ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9} × p′ and
T ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} × p′. Furthermore, for fixed-reward Ma et al. mechanism, we use
R ∈ {0.4, 0.5, . . . , 2.0} × p′ (for R < 0.4 × p′, negative penalties are induced to
selected agents by the mechanism). For fixed-penalty Ma et al. mechanism, we use
T ∈ {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 2.0} × p′. Last, for both fixed-reward and fixed-penalty Ma et al.
mechanisms, we use reduction target Z ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.0}×EX [x−b|x > b] and
reliability τ = 0.95.
Number of selected agents & average reliability Figure 3.4 shows the
number and the average reliability γ¯ of selected agents under SeqM , IndM , and
Ma et al. mechanisms. The number of selected agents in both Ma et al. mechanisms
is influenced by the reduction target Z and the reliability target τ , and not by the
fixed-reward R and fixed-penalty T . For SeqM and IndM , reward R and penalty T
affect the number of selected agents. For T = 0, SeqM selects approximately 25
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Figure 3.5 Expected utilities of the mechanism UM and the agents UA under all mechanisms
for a wide range of parameters. For all mechanisms, we vary reward R and penalty
T with regards to the imbalance price p′. For Ma et al. mechanisms, the reduction
target Z is shown with regards to the expected imbalance quantity EX [x− b|x > b].
agents, this corresponds to a reduction target Z = 0.6 × EX [x − b|x > b] for Ma
et al. mechanisms. For T = p′, SeqM selects on average 15 agents. The number of
selected agents for IndM is lower than for SeqM since IndM asks agents up to the
quantity of the imbalance to respond (see Definition 3.2); IndM does not count for
possible failures of agents that otherwise would increase the probabilities of response
requests and consequently select more agents. As anticipated, the average reliability
γ¯ is influenced by the reward R and penalty T parameters. For higher penalty T ,
fewer agents with higher reliability are selected by our proposed mechanisms.
Social welfare & balancing cost Figure 3.5 illustrates the utility space of the
mechanism (retailer) UM and the agents UA =
∑
i ui, on the horizontal and the
vertical axis respectively. The star marker shows the case when no demand response
is used, and thus the mechanism pays positive imbalances with price p′. For every
drawn set of agents out of 200 independent runs, we compute the analytical expected
utility under each mechanism based on equation (3.4). For all mechanisms, the solid
color marker shows the point where the utility of agents (UA) is maximum, and
the solid marker with black colored borders shows the point where social welfare
(UM + UA) is maximum. The parameters used for the mechanisms are shown
in parentheses, where target Z is multiplied with the expected positive imbalance
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Figure 3.6 Ratio of expected balancing cost (absolute imbalances case) for the mechanism with
and without the use of demand response (lower is better).
EX [x − b|x > b] and R, T with the imbalance price p′. Transparent markers show
points in the utility space for parameters that are not shown in the figure.
The shaded area illustrates the utility space where either the mechanism, the
agents, or both have negative utility in expectation (when compared to the case of
no demand response). In comparison to Ma et al. mechanisms that only consider
incentives for the agents (satisfy IR for participating agents), both SeqM and IndM
guarantee non-negative expected utility for both agents and the mechanism (both
satisfy IR and CR) since they consider both the demand forecast and the balancing
cost of the mechanism.
Next, we evaluate all mechanisms with regards to the utility of the mechanism
UM and the social welfare (UM + UA). Parallel lines in Figure 3.5 illustrate points
of equal social welfare, the dashed line for the case of no demand respond, and the
dotted line for the maximum social welfare under both our proposed mechanisms
(almost equal): SeqM (T = 0.2) and IndM (T = 0, R = 0.9p′). When compared
to the case of no demand response, the expected social welfare increases by 14% for
SeqM (T = 0.2p′), 13% for IndM (T = 0, R = 0.9p′), 11% for fixed-reward Ma
et al. (Z = 0.6× EX [x− b|x > b], R = 0.4p′), and last, 6% for Ma et al. with fixed
penalty (Z = 0.3 × EX [x − b|x > b], T = 0.1p′). The utility of the mechanism
increases (i.e., expected balancing cost decreases) by: 13% for SeqM (T = 0), 7%
for IndM (T = 0, R = 0.7p′) and 2 ∼ 3% for both fixed-reward and fixed-penalty
Ma et al. mechanisms. Compared to Ma et al. mechanisms in this extended setting,
SeqM and IndM improve both social welfare and the utility of the mechanism since
they request agents to respond only if there is positive imbalance.
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Simultaneous upward & downward exibility Last, we show that both
SeqM and IndM reduce balancing costs substantially for the retailer in the case
where both positive and negative imbalances from the procured quantity incur bal-
ancing cost to the retailer.
We consider that any absolute deviation from the procurement quantity (b =
EX [x]) is balanced with price p′. As described in Section 3.4.4, SeqM and IndM
can be used to allocate both upward and downward flexibility agents. We draw equal
number of both types of agents, |A−| = |A+| = 200. For SeqM , we use T = 0.
For IndM , R = 0.6p′ and T = 0. We keep the distribution of agent types and the
demand distribution same as those of earlier experiments. Figure 3.6 presents the
ratio of the expected balancing cost for SeqM and IndM with and without demand
response (CDR/C¬DR). On average, SeqM (T = 0) mechanism achieves a 16%
reduction in the balancing cost of the mechanism, while IndM (R = 0.6p′, T = 0)
yields 9% reduction.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we studied a highly relevant problem in electricity systems: how to
incentivize uncertain demand response under a given demand forecast and imbal-
ance price. We proposed two mechanisms: a sequential mechanism (SeqM ) that is
truthful under some mild assumptions (see Theorem 3.1), and a truthful combinato-
rial mechanism (IndM ) that runs in polynomial time and uses VCG payments (see
Theorem 3.2). Both mechanisms require only a subset of selected agents to respond,
while they guarantee non-negative utility in expectation for both agents and the re-
tailer (mechanism). The proposed mechanisms can further be used in settings where
both positive and negative imbalances result in balancing cost for the retailer. Last,
we verified the theoretical properties of both mechanisms in an empirical evaluation
over different parameters. Our proposed mechanisms achieved up to 16% reduction
in the balancing cost of the retailer and 14% increase in social welfare compared to
when no demand response is used.
Overall, the proposed mechanisms can be used in practice to utilize the flexibility
of small-scale demand response agents, instead of reserve capacity that is tradition-
ally purchased in balancing markets by retailers, and replace or complement demand
response emergency programs with large capacity customers. The societal impact
of the proposed mechanisms is that less reserve capacity is traded, thus abating the
use of fast-ramping generation that is responsible for excessive CO2 emissions. This
can further contribute to reducing electricity prices for customers and improving the
stability of systems in cases of islanding grids that depend only on local renewable
generation.
3.6.1 Future work
The presented work provides a basis for future extensions, which can be achieved
by relaxing some of the assumptions, or by extending the overall problem setting.
For instance, in Section 3.4 we consider that the procurement decision of the retailer
is taken without considering the reports (for demand response) of agents. It is of
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interest to show how reports for demand response affect the procurement decision of
the retailer.
Furthermore, in Remark 3.1 we delineated our motivation for considering unit
responses. This was based on realistic settings of electricity markets (e.g., ahead and
balancing markets) that have trading volumes that are multiples of a unit quantity,
while the same applies to markets with indivisible goods. A direct extension of
this work is to consider multi-unit demand response. Although our model can be
generalized to continuous variables if we neglect the need for decimal reduction
or there is a minimum price p′ to participate in the balancing market, the derived
mechanisms do not generalize to the case of continuous flexibility.
Assumption 3.2 might also be restrictive for the practical implementation of the
sequential mechanism SeqM . By dropping Assumption 3.2 we have a sequential
setting in which information (externalities) from each round of the mechanism
propagates and consequently affects the strategic decisions of agents in later rounds.
More specifically, the price of anarchy (PoA) in sequential second-price auctions
with externalities can be arbitrarily worse than the optimal (Leme et al., 2012),
sequential first-price or options-based auctions are better-suited in such settings since
they have some performance guarantees.
Last, in this chapter we have considered mechanisms that request agents to
respond only if there is imbalance, and we have studied the implications that arise
by dependencies between agents that are requested to respond sequentially. Future
research can study the design of mechanisms that request random sets of agents to
respond in order to remove dependencies between agents in the allocation.


4SLA Allocation
for Renewable
Electricity Trading
Preface In this chapter we propose to adopt service-level agreements (SLAs) for
electricity trading in systems where supply depends on renewable electricity sources
and therefore delivery cannot be guaranteed. These service-level agreements (SLAs)
comprise the following features: quantity, reliability, and price. First, we define a
characterization of the value degradation of tolerant and critical buyers with regards
to the uncertainty of electricity delivery, generalizing the widely used value of lost
load (VoLL) in our settings. Next, we propose two mechanisms to allocate these
SLAs to buyers using either a sequential second-price auction or the combinatorial
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, and we discuss the settings in which
truthfulness can be obtained in the sequential setting. We empirically compare their
performance and demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms dominate alternative
allocations that use only the VoLL, and vastly improve the efficiency of the studied
system. Overall, this chapter contributes an essential component to the future smart
grid by facilitating distributed energy trading under uncertainty.
 This chapter presents work that was published as an extended abstract in the
proceedings of the International Conference of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems (AAMAS) 2017 in Sao Paulo, Brazil (Methenitis et al., 2017), and presented
at the co-located workshop AMEC/TADA 2017. The full version of this work was
published in Springer-Open Energy Informatics Journal (Methenitis et al., 2018).
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4.1 Introduction
Previous chapters of this thesis propose methods (risk-sharing tariff and mechanisms
to incentivize demand response) to tackle the inherent uncertainty on the demand-
side and therefore alleviate excessive costs related to imbalances between supply
and demand (see Chapters 2 and 3). This chapter focuses instead on the intermittent
nature of renewable electricity supply. Natural sources, such as the sun and wind,
are subject to stochastic availability and non-dispatchable: their output cannot be
regulated to match the demand. In envisioned smart grid systems the increasing
reliance on electricity from natural sources implies higher risks of shortages or
overproduction since such generation is volatile and locally highly correlated. That is
exemplified in microgrids that solely build their electricity supply on local renewable
generation (from prosumers and smaller-scale producers) in islanding scenarios of
the smart grid.
In contrast to conventional centralized systems in which demand is always satis-
fied through reserve electricity generation and balancing markets, future smart grid
systems assume the utilization of local and renewable electricity supply. In such
systems, local exchange (trading) of electricity becomes challenging since delivery
cannot be guaranteed. Current electricity tariffs promise certain delivery, and are thus
not well-suited to trade these uncertain quantities. However, if not traded the elec-
tricity might need to be curtailed, foregoing potential benefits for both supply and
demand sides.
To this end, in this chapter we interpret service-level agreements (SLAs) as a
direct extension of conventional electricity tariffs, which ensure delivery (100%
quality) and a fixed kWh price (0% risk). We build on the definition of SLAs as
agreements between service providers and service users, specifying the service and
its characteristics (Verma, 1999). In contrast to the current straightforward contracts
for electricity, SLAs can be extended to include more features (e.g., delivery time,
reliability, penalty for no delivery) in order to provide the contracting framework for
balancing volatile supply with demand between buyers (e.g., customers participating
in retail tariff schemes) and sellers of electricity (e.g., small-scale producers that base
their generation portfolio on renewable electricity sources). We specifically study
SLAs that comprise the following features:
Quantity The quantity of electricity that is subject to be transferred from the service
provider to the service user.
Reliability The probability of successful delivery of the quantity of electricity that
is specified in the SLA.
Price The price per unit of the transferred quantity.
The SLAs described above provide a fundamental contracting framework for elec-
tricity trading between buyers and sellers in settings where the availability of elec-
tricity is not certain, and buyers’ ability to cope with uncertainty vary. We proceed to
illustrate the concepts discussed so far in the following motivating example:
Example 4.1. A seller holds a prediction of its generation for the next day during
1pm-2pm. The generation is not certain; there is 90% probability that the seller
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generates at least 1 unit and 50% probability for at least 2 units of electricity. There
are two buyers that both have unit demand: the first buyer is a hospital that needs
to perform a task, and the second buyer is an electric vehicle (EV) that needs to
charge its battery. Assuming that there is no other seller in the system we consider,
the two buyers can agree on SLAs of 90% or 50% reliability with the seller for the
unit demand they require. Considering that the importance of the task the hospital
needs to complete is higher than the EV’s, it is socially optimal to assign the most
certain unit of generation to the hospital.
Under the presence of intermittent supply and SLAs that can prioritize the deliv-
ery of electricity to different buyers, it is socially desirable that reliable electricity
is allocated to critical demand; consequently, the risk of load-shedding is assigned
to less critical buyers that in turn perform this task at lower social cost. The widest
adopted concept to measure criticality in the literature as well as in practice is the
value of lost load (VoLL) (Kariuki and Allan, 1996). The VoLL is defined as the esti-
mated amount that customers receiving electricity through contracts would be willing
to pay to avoid a disruption in their electricity service. Revisiting Example 4.1, we
can identify that the VoLL for the hospital is higher than for the EV. In this chap-
ter we define a generalized value function that extends the concept of VoLL in our
setting. We further study the problem of allocating the outlined SLAs (efficiently) to
buyers with different preferences with regards to the uncertainty of electricity deliv-
ery, given a seller with uncertain electricity generation. The seller holds a prediction
of its generation output (distribution), while the process of specifying and allocat-
ing SLAs to buyers participating in such an electricity market can be structured as a
mechanism design problem (Nisan and Ronen, 2001).
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We define a contracting framework through SLAs that enables electricity trad-
ing under uncertain supply.
• We propose a family of exponential functions that characterizes buyers’ varying
degrees of criticality, thus generalizing the value of lost load with costs associ-
ated to the risk of failed delivery.
• We propose two mechanisms to allocate these SLAs to strategic buyers using
either a sequential second-price auction or the combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism.
• We discuss the settings in which truthfulness can be obtained in the sequential
second-price auction.
• Last, we empirically show that the efficiency of the studied system vastly
improves in face of buyers with varying abilities to cope with uncertainty.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.2 we present
related literature. In Section 4.3 we first formulate the problem of electricity trading
under the presence of intermittent supply, we then introduce the structure of the
proposed framework through SLAs, and last, we propose a value function that
determines different types and preferences of buyers. In Section 4.4 we discuss
mechanisms to allocate SLAs to buyers, and we examine incentive compatibility
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issues arising in the studied setting. In Section 4.5 we evaluate our proposed method
through simulations. Last, in Section 4.6 we conclude this chapter and further discuss
interesting research directions.
4.2 RelatedWork
Similarly to product (service) differentiation in power systems engineering and en-
ergy markets (Oren and Smith, 1993; Salah et al., 2017), we propose SLAs that dif-
ferentiate in the reliability of successful delivery. Product differentiation in electricity
trading also includes but is not limited to: (i) deadline-differentiated trading, where
customers agree to defer the service of pre-determined loads in exchange for lower
prices (Bitar and Xu, 2017), (ii) varying probabilities of electricity service interrup-
tions (Chao et al., 1986), (iii) reliability differentiation for trading spinning reserve
capacity (Siddiqi and Baughman, 1995). While all previous works study reliability
differentiation in the electricity service with regards to optimal pricing or schedul-
ing policies, our work is more related to the mechanism design approach proposed
by Bitar and Xu (2017). In contrast to this work, however, we study the problem of
assigning all the available supply to buyers of different levels of criticality and not
the scheduling problem of deferrable loads to match the available supply.
Service-level agreements have been used as a tool for monitoring and coordina-
tion to ensure trustworthiness between different stakeholders, primarily with regards
to business processes (Gustavsson et al., 2011; Hussain et al., 2012), or as nego-
tiation protocols (Amato et al., 2014). In contrast to our work, the discussion re-
mains conceptual, and no quantitative implications on costs or efficiency are given.
Service-level agreements have further been used in resource allocation problems in
computational grids to ensure the optimal allocation of computational resources and
fair satisfaction of the participants through negotiations (Silaghi et al., 2012). In this
work the embedding is not in the energy domain while the focus is on strategic ne-
gotiation rather than the elicitation of truthful reports.
In the closest to ours work, Bitar et al. (2012) study the viability of selling
uncertain quantities of wind generation with variable-reliability. The authors further
explore the connection between uncertainty in the generation and the costs for
reserve capacity, and real-time markets. In a similar problem setting, Dash et al.
(2007) studies task allocation market mechanisms for multiple suppliers of finite or
uncertain capacity. Last, a recent work that considers SLAs for trading uncertain
quantities of wind-generated electricity studies the optimization of electricity flow
between wind electricity generators and smart grid customers using SLAs (Hussain
et al., 2018). We follow a similar idea; however, we focus our attention on the
characterization of the demand with respect to its criticality, as well as the design of
the mechanisms to assign demand through SLAs for electricity trading to strategic
buyers with different preferences.
To the best of our knowledge, the work presented in this chapter is the first that
adapts SLAs for electricity trading under uncertain supply from a mechanism design
perspective, providing a discussion with regards to buyers’ incentives to truthfully
report their preferences followed by an empirical evaluation in illustrative settings.
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4.3 SLA Contracting Framework
In this section we propose an SLA contracting framework, in which buyers (elec-
tricity customers) can participate by purchasing quantities of electricity through con-
tracts of a specific quantity, reliability, and price from a seller that relies its available
supply on renewable electricity generation. This section is structured as follows: in
Section 4.3.1 we outline the problem setting. and in Section 4.3.2 we define the basic
structure of the proposed SLAs. Last, Section 4.3.3 focuses on the characterization
of buyers’ preferences with regards to the reliability of the SLAs.
4.3.1 Problem formulation
Our fundamental problem setting considers a marketplace with a single seller of
electricity and multiple buyers (electricity customers). We further assume that there
is no outside option for buyers, and therefore all demand should be satisfied by
the seller. Such setting may resemble practical scenarios of envisioned smart grid
systems, in which a prosumer may act as a seller that seeks to trade it potential excess
generation (that cannot be privately used or stored) to potential buyers locally. Let B
denote the set of buyers, there are n buyers in the set B, such that B = {1, . . . , n}.
We assume that the seller holds a prediction (probability distribution function)
ahead of the delivery time in the ahead timestep, while its actual generation output
is known at the delivery time in the realization timestep. Let Q denote the random
variable of the available supply, and q ∈ R+ the actual realization of the supply.
The prediction that is known by the seller in the ahead timestep is denoted by fQ(q),
which denotes the probability density function of the random variable Q. We further
consider the cumulative density function of the random variable Q, FQ(q), where
FQ(q) = P(Q ≤ q) =
∫ q
0
fQ(x) dx.
Remark 4.1. Our two-step time model serves as a fundamental model of the day-
ahead auction process in current electricity markets, and it can also be applied at
different horizons. The mechanisms outlined in later sections of this chapter are also
applicable for shorter time-horizons, e.g., hour(s) ahead, that may be required to
facilitate electricity trading in microgrids with flexible power-to-heat demand.
Each buyer i from the set B has a demand for electricity di, which we assume is
fixed and known by the buyer ahead of time, considering hardware assets that induce
a deterministic demand. The mechanisms proposed later in this chapter, based on
the prediction of the available supply in the realization timestep allocate SLAs of
some quantity, reliability and price, to participating buyers. The observed realization
of the supply q determines how much load can be served, and consequently the set
of buyers that are indeed served such that the SLAs are satisfied in expectation with
regards to their reliability.
4.3.2 Service-level agreements
As outlined in the introduction of this chapter (see Section 4.1), an SLA is a triplet
(di, γi, pi), which comprises the quantity di, the reliability γi, and the price pi per
transferred unit of electricity for buyer i ∈ B. For the remainder of this chapter
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Figure 4.1 The reliability function of the seller. The thick line illustrates the reliability function
SQ(q) = P(Q > q) of the random variable Q. The dotted area represents the portion
of demand di of buyer i with reliability γi = SQ(w + di). The gray shaded area
represents already assigned SLAs between the seller and buyers.
we assume buyers with unit-demand, di = 1, ∀i ∈ B. We further assume that
the delivery of the electricity of the assigned SLAs is either successful or not. Let
dˆi ∈ {0, di} denote the transferred quantity to buyer i. We define αi ∈ R+ as the
private value of buyer i per unit of transferred electricity when delivery is assured
(γi = 1).
Remark 4.2. The private value αi resembles the value of lost load (VoLL) since
the binary model of electricity delivery can result either in full demand satisfaction
(valued at αidi) for the buyer or zero.
Considering the probability of electricity delivery (reliability) the expected value of
buyer i with regards to γi is equal to:
vi(γi) = αidiγi. (4.1)
Let SQ(q) denote the reliability function (also known as the survival function) of
the seller. Figure 4.1 illustrates SQ(q). Note that SQ(q) = 1− FQ(q), where FQ(q)
is the cumulative density function of the random variable Q. The reliability function
SQ(q) determines the probability that the available supply exceeds a certain value q.
The dotted area represents an SLA (note that no price pi is determined here) between
the seller and buyer i. The demand of buyer i is equal to di and the reliability of the
specific SLA is γi = SQ(w + di), where w is the demand that is already deducted
by previously allocated SLAs.
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Figure 4.2 The expected value function Vi of a buyer with regards to the reliability γi of an
SLA. At full reliability (γi = 1) the expected value of the SLA by the buyer is equal
to vi which is determined by the private value αi and the demand di. The value of βi
distinguishes different attitudes of buyer i towards the reliability γi. The values used
for the illustration are βi = {−2.5, 0, 2.5}.
Given the assumption of unit-demand buyers, we further consider that the demand
quantity di of buyer i is not comparable to the total demand of the n buyers and the
expected generation of the seller, such that the following holds: SQ(w) ≈ SQ(w+di)
and P(w ≤ q ≤ w + di) ≈ 0. Intuitively, the probability of partial delivery
approximates zero in the unit-demand case, justifying the binary model we use for
the value that successful delivery brings to the buyer (see equation 4.1).
We proceed to elaborate the setting in which buyers may have different prefer-
ences with regards to the probability of being served (reliability), and thus represent
demand loads with different criticalities.
4.3.3 Critical & tolerant buyers
The expected value of buyer i in equation (4.1) is linearly dependent on the reliability
γi of the SLA. Since the system gives raise to risk, we can distinguish between
different attitudes of buyers towards risk, from critical to tolerant, as it is usual in
economics and expected utility theory (Ingersoll, 1987). To this end, we define the
generalized expected value function Vi(γi), where the reliability γi induces the risk
in the form of uncertain delivery of the specified in the SLA quantity of electricity:
Vi(γi) = αidiρi(γi), (4.2)
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where ρi(γi) encompasses the attitude of buyer i with regards to the reliability γi.
Note that for ρi(γi) = γi, Vi(γi) becomes equal to the expected value vi(γi) in
equation (4.1). The generalized expected value function in equation (4.2) needs to
further embrace some common sense properties:
• Buyers have zero value for no reliability, i.e., Vi(0) = 0, ∀i ∈ B.
• Buyers have maximum value for no uncertainty, i.e., Vi(1) = αidi, ∀i ∈ B.
• Buyers have higher value for more certainty in the delivery, i.e., Vi(γi) ≥
Vi(γi − ε),∀ε ∈ R+, ∀i ∈ B (monotonicity).
• Buyers have positive value for any positive reliability, i.e., Vi(γi) > 0,∀γi >
0,∀i ∈ B (buyers’ willingness to participate).
We consider a variation of the exponential utility function proposed by Ingersoll
(1987). In line with the aforementioned properties of V (γi), we define ρi(γi) with
regards to βi ∈ R.
ρi(γi) =
 1− e
−βiγi
1− e−βi , βi 6= 0
γi , βi = 0
(4.3)
This variation of the exponential utility function in equation (4.3) can be substituted
in equation (4.2), yielding the generalized expected value of buyer i with regards
to the reliability γi. βi ∈ R distinguishes the buyer’s type from critical (βi < 0)
to tolerant (βi > 0). Note that for βi = 0, the expected value function Vi(γi)
becomes equal to the expected value in equation (4.1). Figure 4.2 illustrates the
function Vi(γi) for different values of βi. We distinguish buyers with regards to their
attitudes towards reliability:
Critical For βi < 0, the generalized expected value function is convex, representing
a critical (risk-averse) buyer. There is a stiff degradation of the value with
regards to the uncertainty of the delivery for the critical buyer, resulting from
opportunity costs that arise in case of failed delivery.
Tolerant For βi > 0, the generalized expected value function is concave, the buyer
is tolerant (risk-seeking). Lower reliability translates to a rather high expected
value, resulting from opportunity value that arises in case of failed delivery.
Neutral For βi = 0, the generalized expected value becomes identical to equa-
tion (4.1) that is linearly dependent to the reliability, representing a neutral
buyer.
The generalized expected value function outlines a realistic model for capturing
buyers’ preferences describing the graceful or stiff degradation of the VoLL with
regards to the probability of successful delivery. The type of buyer i is characterized
by the tuple (αi, βi). In the context of electricity markets, the same quantity of
electricity may have different value for different customers, which is captured in
our model by αi. In addition, the incurred value of a lost load with regards to the
probability of electricity delivery is determined in our model by βi. The function
Vi(γi) further indicates the expected VoLL of buyer i given the reliability of the
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SLA as follows: E[V oLLi] = Vi(1) − Vi(γi). Last, the generalized expected value
function can be defined in both one-shot and repeated settings, where in the latter
buyers could vary their types with regards to the outcome of their earlier assignments.
Let us now proceed with an instance of a realistic scenario where the value of a
buyer depends on the probability of being served, and thus the opportunity cost or
value that arises in case of failed delivery.
Example 4.2. An EV-taxi is operating its task (transporting people) with a half-full
battery capacity with no urgent need to charge its battery. The EV-taxi can represent
a tolerant buyer since there is value that is gained in case of charging (future
benefits), and opportunity value that is gained in case of not charging (immediate
benefits resulting by not pausing its task). When the capacity of its battery is running
low, the EV-taxi can better be represented by a critical buyer since the value in case
of no delivery (immediate benefits for task continuation) is decreasing relatively to
the value that can be gained by charging and pausing its task.
Given the above example, the generalized value function can distinguish buyers in
terms of opportunity cost or value that could be incurred or gained respectively with
regards to the probability of successful delivery of electricity.
The price pi that is specified in the SLA, and hence the expected utility of buyer i
is determined by the resulting allocation of the mechanism (see Section 4.4). Let Ui
denote the expected utility of buyer i,
Ui = Vi(γi)− dipiγi, (4.4)
where the expected payment that is transferred from buyer i to the seller upon
delivery is subtracted from its expected value.
In the section that follows we discuss how SLAs can be allocated to buyers with
different private values for SLAs of varying reliability.
4.4 Auction-Based SLA Allocation
Auctions are commonly used in competitive electricity markets that take place day-
ahead (Contreras et al., 2001), and they are known to yield efficient allocations even
in cases there is uncertainty about buyers’ valuations (Krishna, 2010). In this section
we consider auctions as the method to allocate SLAs among buyers of varying types
assuming no agency for the seller: the seller serves as the mechanism to allocate
SLAs to participating buyers.
Let A denote an allocation from the set of all feasible allocations A, A ∈ A, as
the triplet of vectors (d,γ,p), where each entry A(i) = (di, γi, pi) is an allocated
SLA between the seller and buyer i. Considering unit-demand buyers, i.e., d = di =
1, ∀i ∈ B, allocation A can be expressed as A = {o1, o2, . . . , on}, where oi ∈ Zn1
denotes the order of an allocated SLA. Given the order oi of the SLA (di, γi, pi)
the reliability γi is given by: γi = S(oid) (see Figure 4.1). Following the definition
of the reliability function, γi ≥ γj , ∀j ∈ B, where oi < oj holds. Intuitively, the
reliability is monotonically decreasing with the order. The set of feasible allocations
A includes all allocations A for which every element appears only once in the set.
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The value of an SLA for buyer i is determined by equation (4.2) with regards to the
reliability γi and consequently the order oi.
We define buyers’ expected social value as the sum of the expected values of the
set of buyers given the allocated SLAs as follows:
∑
i∈B Vi(γi), where γi = S(oid)
is determined according to A. The allocation A further determines the order that
buyers get served, for each buyer ∀i ∈ B, servedi = (q ≥ oid), which follows from
P(servedi) = γi.
4.4.1 Sequential second-price auction
First, we consider a sequential second-price auction (SSPA) (Leme et al., 2012;
Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2012) as the mechanism to allocate SLAs to participating buy-
ers in the ahead timestep for all supply that may become available at the realization
timestep. Items, SLAs in this case, are auctioned off one at a time. Given the assump-
tion of unit-demand buyers, the seller auctions off SLAs of quantity d. We consider
that the seller starts auctioning SLAs of decreasing reliability, such that the first SLA
has reliability of S(d), the second S(2d), and so on. In sequential auctions, the order
in which items are auctioned off affects the auctioneer’s revenue (Elkind and Fatima,
2007). Given the monotonicity property of the generalized value function in equation
(4.2), i.e., buyers always value more higher reliability, SSPA of decreasing reliability
SLAs maximizes the revenue of the seller. In later sections of this chapter we also
evaluate the case where the seller auctions off SLAs of increasing reliability.
A second-price auction (Vickrey, 1961) (also known as Vickrey) is held by the
seller in every round k of the auction, in which an SLA of reliability S(kd) is
auctioned off. Let V ′i (S(kd)) denote the reported value of buyer i with regards to
the reliability S(kd) offered in the k-th round of the sequential auction. Each buyer
i places a sealed bid zi, which is equal to its reported value with regards to the
reliability S(kd). The winner of each round k of the sequential auction is buyer
w ∈ B that submits the highest bid, w = argmaxi zi, and pays to the seller the price
pw that is equal to the second highest bid, pw = maxi 6=w zi. Buyer w is allocated an
SLA of unit quantity d, reliability S(kd), and price pw, and participates no further in
the next rounds of the auction. We assume that there is no price-discovery, and thus
in each round of the auction only buyer w knows the price of the assigned SLA. We
further assume that buyers do not bid higher than their value, i.e., no over-bidding,
and hence, an allocation cannot result in negative utility for the winning buyer.
We establish the setting of the second-price auction in the following assumption:
Assumption 4.1.
i. Buyers do not communicate their preferences to their competition (other par-
ticipating buyers).
ii. Buyers have no knowledge regarding the number and the distribution of buyers
participating in the auction.
iii. Buyers do not know the reliability function of the seller; buyers only know
that the reliability of the next SLA to be auctioned off is lower or equal to the
reliability of the SLA that is being auctioned in the current round.
iv. The reliability function SQ(q) is defined for all demand quantities.
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v. Not all of the demand is guaranteed to be satisfied within an SSPA, since SLAs
may be assigned with zero reliability.
Theorem 4.1. Given Assumption 4.1, each round of the SSPA is an isolated Vick-
rey auction and therefore the mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible
(DSIC).
Proof. Each round of SSPA can be the last round or the round before with value
arbitrarily close to zero and therefore can be treated as an isolated Vickrey auc-
tion (Vickrey, 1961). Buyers’ dominant strategy is to report their true value function,
i.e., V ′i (S(kd)) = Vi(S(kd)),∀i ∈ B.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 exploits the property that no stochastic model can be built
by a buyer regarding follow up rounds of SSPA. Given Assumption 4.1, each round in
which a buyer can wait without participating (bidding low or zero), does not add any
information regarding the distribution of future bids of other buyers. Consequently,
there is no stochastic model which can compute an expectation of future utilities in
case of waiting the next round to bid truthfully. To prove Theorem 4.1, we assume
that buyers are deterministic choosing to participate as this was the last round of the
auction to maximize the likelihood of getting assigned an SLA of high reliability.
Remark 4.3. Assumption 4.1 is necessary to show that each round of the sequential
mechanism is an isolated Vickrey auction and therefore is truthful. However, points
(ii) and (iii) may be strong assumptions in practice (e.g., in repeated settings). We
refer the reader to Section 3.6.1 (Externalities) in which we discuss the practical
implications of such an assumption.
The outlined SSPA mechanism auctions off SLAs of decreasing reliability to
buyers in a sequential fashion. We showed that given the assumptions of the proposed
SSPA mechanism, there is no incentive for a strategic buyer to misreport its value
function, and therefore the proposed sequential mechanism elicits truthful reports.
4.4.2 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
Sequential second-price auctions are suitable mechanisms to allocate SLAs to buyers
since they provide a simple mechanism framework that can be easily implemented
in practical settings of the smart grid. However, the allocation of SLAs may not be
optimal, as assignment depends more on the value αi, and less on the criticality of
buyer i, βi. Consider the following example:
Example 4.3. There are two unit-demand buyers, buyer 1 valuates 90% of suc-
cessful delivery V1(90%) = a and V1(50%) = 3/4a and buyer 2, V2(90%) =
a/2, V2(50%) ≈ 0, using the sequential auction proposed in Section 4.4.1, buyer
1 is assigned the SLA with 90% while buyer 2 is assigned 50%. Assuming zero pay-
ments, the resulting social value of the above assignment is a. However, the socially
optimal allocation would be buyer 2 to be assigned 90% and buyer 1 with 50% re-
sulting in social value of 5/4a.
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Figure 4.3 The value functions Vi of buyers with regards to the reliability γ (top). The expected
values of buyers under the resulting allocation of the sequential second-price auction
(middle). Resulting expected values of buyers under the socially optimal allocation
(bottom). The dashed line illustrates the reliability over allocated SLAs.
Similarly to the above example, Figure 4.3 (top) illustrates the expected value
functions of three buyers of diverse types. In Figure 4.3, middle and bottom bar charts
show two different allocations alongside the assigned reliability and the resulting
expected value of buyers. The dashed line presents the reliability of the allocated
SLAs. In the greedy allocation (middle), each slot is assigned to the buyer who
has the highest bid (SSPA). The allocation that yields the optimal social value is
illustrated in the bottom figure. SSPA myopically allocates SLAs to the highest
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bidder in each round of the auction and thus results in suboptimal (with regards
to the social value) solutions.
Combinatorial auctions are means to derive socially optimal allocations (Cramton
et al., 2007). In a combinatorial auction, the auctioneer computes the allocation
after receiving buyers’ bids for the whole bundle of items. We consider Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) which maximizes social welfare (or equivalently social value
in our setting) (Nisan et al., 2007). Given the vector γ of decreasing reliability of
the available SLAs such that γ = 〈S(d), S(2d), . . . , S(nd)〉, each buyer i submits a
vector of bids zi = 〈V ′i (S(d)), V ′i (S(2d)), . . . , V ′i (S(nd))〉, which comprises the
reported value of buyer i for each reliability. Recall that A ∈ A is a feasible
allocation A = {o1, o2, . . . , on}, where oi denotes the order over the decreasing
reliability SLAs of the allocated buyer. Let Aopt denote the optimal allocation such
that:
Aopt = argmax
A∈A
∑
i∈B
V ′i (A).
We further define A−i ∈ A−i as a feasible allocation for all buyers excluding buyer
i while A−iopt denotes the optimal allocation without buyer i present.
Under the VCG mechanism, the price pi for each buyer is determined by its
marginal contribution:
pi =
∑
j∈B\i
V ′j (A
−i
opt)−
∑
j∈B\i
V ′j (Aopt). (4.5)
The price pi is determined by the difference between the optimal social value that
is achieved when buyer i is excluded from the set B and the sum of the values that
buyers other than i achieve under the optimal allocation Aopt with buyer i present.
Intuitively, each buyer pays the loss incurred to the society by its presence. Under
the VCG mechanism it is a dominant strategy for buyers to report their valuations
truthfully (Nisan et al., 2007).
In most combinatorial problems finding a socially optimal allocation lies in the
class of NP-complete problems. However, we show that finding a socially optimal
SLA allocation for the studied setting can be solved optimally in polynomial time.
Corollary 4.1. The problem of SLA allocation for unit-demand buyers can be solved
optimally in polynomial time O(n3) by the Hungarian method (Kuhn, 1955).
Proof. The unit-demand SLA allocation problem is equivalent to the linear assign-
ment problem (LAP), where n agents have to be assigned n tasks while the number
of tasks is equal to the number of agents. Each task stands for a slot in allocation
A ∈ A.
Corollary 4.1 shows that the optimal allocation of SLAs, which maximizes the social
value of buyers, can be found in polynomial time (i.e., O(n3)). Furthermore, there
exist implementations that can speed up further the computation of the optimal
assignment in LAPs (Date and Nagi, 2016). This makes the VCG mechanism a
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tractable solution for practical applications of our model in the context of the smart
grid.
4.5 Evaluation & Discussion
In this section we evaluate the performance of the studied mechanisms to allocate
SLAs to buyers of different types. Specifically, we evaluate: the VCG mechanism
(see Section 4.4.2), SSPA where the seller auctions off SLAs of decreasing reliability
(SPD) and increasing reliability (SPI) as described in Section 4.4.1.1
To study the efficiency of the proposed mechanisms against baseline allocations,
we consider two mechanisms that use only the value of lost load (VoLL) to compute
an allocation. In both baseline mechanisms a simultaneous second-price auction is
held by the seller in the ahead timestep, in which each buyer i bids its value for
certain delivery (i.e., Vi(1) = αidi).2 In the first baseline mechanism (POB) we
consider only neutral buyers (i.e., no added value or cost is generated as a result of
the uncertainty) and use the value function in equation (4.1). In the second baseline
mechanism (POC) we consider all types of buyers and use the generalized value
function in equation (4.2).
We evaluate and compare all mechanisms with regards to the social value (SV),
and the social welfare (SW). Following equation (4.2), the social value is defined as
the average value of buyers.
SV =
1
|B|
∑
i∈B
Vi(γi) (4.6)
In addition, social welfare is the average of the expected utilities of buyers (see
equation 4.4).
SW =
1
|B|
∑
i∈B
Ui (4.7)
Last, the expected income of the seller (mechanism’s revenue) is equal to the
expected payments of buyers to the seller.
Us =
∑
i∈B
diγipi = |B|(SV − SW ) (4.8)
4.5.1 Diversity in the criticality
First, we analyze the influence of the diversity in criticality β of buyers on the social
value. Recall that αi determines the value of buyer i for certain delivery, and βi
characterizes buyer i in term of the criticality of its demand (with regards to the
uncertainty of electricity delivery). In this first evaluation, we consider that buyers
1 Note that the theoretical property with regards to buyers’ truthfulness in SPD (see Theorem 4.1) also
holds for the SPI mechanism under Assumption 4.1.
2 This is similar to a simultaneous second-price auction that is held by the seller after the realization
timestep where only the available supply is auctioned off, and thus buyers’ bids are equal to their value
for certain delivery.
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Figure 4.4 Social value with regards to the diversity of criticality, for very low values of β-
diversity all buyers approximate neutral attitude towards uncertainty in the delivery.
For higher values of β-diversity buyers have increasingly varying criticality.
have comparable private values αi ∼ U(0.5, 1.0), ∀i ∈ B, which captures buyers
with similar needs with regards to electricity usage (e.g., households). The random
variable of the supply is normally distributed, Q ∼ N (µQ = 20, σQ = 5), while
the total demand exceeds by 20% the expected supply,
∑
i∈B di = 1.2 µQ = |B|,
i.e., there are 24 unit-demand buyers. We consider that βi ∼ U(−D,D), ∀i ∈ B,
where U is the uniform distribution; D ∈ R+ refers to the diversity of β values (β-
Diversity). High values of D result in high probability having extremely critical or
tolerant buyers in the set B.
Figure 4.4 shows the resulting social value for each mechanism with regards to D
(β-Diversity). For D ≈ 0 (buyers approximate the neutral behavior, i.e., β ≈ 0), SPI
results in lower social value than the rest of the evaluated mechanisms (which yield
approximately equal social value) since the likelihood to obtain higher values from
buyers assigned SLAs early (at low reliability) decreases. For D ∈ [101, 102], there
is a clear distinction between the resulting social value under different mechanisms
while VCG results in the highest social value that is obtained in this experiment. In
the same range, SPI results in a significant increase in social value by prioritizing
over tolerant buyers in the allocation.3 We observe the opposite for SPD which is the
result of auctioning off SLAs of decreasing reliability (see Section 4.4.2). In settings
where buyers demonstrate extreme behavior with regards to their criticality (β  0)
the efficiency of the system is vastly affected. More specifically, for high diversity
D (D ≈ 103) the probability of extremely critical buyers is increased and thus the
3 In SPI it is more likely that tolerant buyers are assigned low reliability SLAs, since their value for low
reliability is higher than other types of buyers.
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Figure 4.5 Social value (top) and social welfare (bottom) achieved by different allocation
mechanisms, namely, VCG, SSPA with decreasing reliability sequential auctions
(SPD), increasing reliability sequential auctions (SPI), and two variants of a baseline
method, POB and POC. The social value is computed as the average of all buyers’
values with regards to the ratio of demand over the expected supply. Social welfare is
normalized with respect to the social value obtained by the optimal VCG allocation.
resulting social value drops below the performance of the baseline mechanism POB
under all other mechanisms. POB is not affected by the increasing diversity of β
since it only considers neutral buyers.
In this section we showed how diversity in criticality β affects the resulting
social value under all evaluated mechanisms. Overall, VCG outperforms all other
mechanisms for almost the whole range of D.
4.5.2 Demand over supply ratio
We show that even in the case of large variations in the private value α, VCG mech-
anism results in higher social value with regards to the other evaluated mechanisms.
We use a diverse set of α, where αi ∼ U(0.1, 1.0), ∀i ∈ B, to captures highly irreg-
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ular private values of heterogeneous buyers in electricity systems. In addition, we use
low β-diversity, βi ∼ U(−5,+5), for buyers that do not exhibit extremely tolerant or
critical risk attitude. Figure 4.5 (top) illustrates the resulting social value with regards
to the ratio of the total demand over the expected supply. When the total demand can
be satisfied with high probability (ratio < 0.5), there is no significant difference be-
tween the evaluated mechanisms with regards to the resulting social value. As the
ratio increases, social value is decreasing for all evaluated mechanisms. We can ob-
serve that the social value obtained under VCG is higher than the other mechanisms.
In addition, there is a huge drop in the performance of SPI for ratio higher than one.
The social value under all the other evaluated mechanisms does not vary significantly
from each other.
4.5.3 Social value & social welfare
Last, we show that the social welfare under VCG mechanism approximates the social
value when the total demand is lower or approximately equal to the expected supply.
Figure 4.5 (bottom) presents the resulting social welfare with regards to the ratio
of the total demand over the expected supply under all evaluated mechanisms. The
social welfare is normalized with regards to the social value obtained under the
optimal allocation (under VCG mechanism), SW/SVV CG. Intuitively, this is equal
to the ratio of the social value that remains to buyers, while the rest is transferred
to the mechanism (seller) through payments. Up to ratio ≈ 1, the resulting social
welfare under VCG mechanism is at least 90% of the social value obtained using
the optimal VCG allocation. In addition, the increasing social welfare under SPI
mechanism for ratio > 0.5 is an intuitive result since more low-reliability SLAs
become available when the ratio increases.1 On the contrary, SPD achieves around
15% of the optimal social value; however, it exhibits a more stable (although lower)
performance than SPI. The social welfare under the baseline mechanisms (POB and
POC) approximates zero for high values of demand to expected supply ratio, and
consequently most of the generated social value is transferred through payments to
the mechanism.
In this section we evaluated and illustrated the performance of the studied mecha-
nisms with regards to the resulting social value and social welfare under a wide range
of parameters. The VCG mechanism allocates SLAs in a socially optimal manner
and consequently the social value and welfare of the system is maximized under this
mechanism. Sequential mechanisms, such as the SPD and SPI, result in lower social
value and welfare than VCG, however they have a slight advantage over baseline
mechanisms that use only the VoLL. In addition, SPD and SPI can be easily im-
plemented in practical settings of future smart grid systems since do not have any
computational limitations with regards to scaling issues when compared to VCG.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we proposed a contracting framework and mechanisms to allocate
SLAs for electricity trading under uncertain supply and varying demand criticality
of buyers. More specifically, we adopted SLAs as a direct extension of current
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conventional tariffs for use in electricity markets under uncertain supply, and we
further defined the set of features that SLAs comprise: quantity, reliability, and price
(see Section 4.3.2). We further proposed a generalized value function for buyers with
regards to the criticality of their demand in face of uncertain delivery that generalizes
the concept of the value of lost load (VoLL) with regards to the risk of unsuccessful
delivery (see Section 4.3.3). The allocation of SLAs to buyers of heterogeneous
types was computed using two Vickrey-based mechanisms: a sequential second-
price auction (in which no buyer has an incentive to misreport its value under
certain conditions) and the truthful VCG (see Section 4.4). Last, we evaluated both
mechanisms in an experimental study: we showed that the VCG dominates all other
mechanisms over a wide range of parameters, and vastly improves the efficiency of
the proposed system when compared to baseline allocation mechanisms that only
consider the VoLL (see Section 4.5).
In view of the attained properties and performance, we believe that using SLAs
as we delineated here provides a promising avenue for addressing electricity trading
in future smart grid systems. In particular, VCG allocation of SLAs is computable
in O(n3), making it viable to assign the risk of demand curtailment to buyers that
perform this task at low social cost. The proposed method can therefore be a tractable
solution for peer-to-peer trading to balance local fluctuations in islanding grids or
microgrids.
4.6.1 Future work
The contributions of this chapter can further serve as a broad basis for future
extensions, the most interesting of which are outlined in this section.
Throughout this chapter we have considered no agency for the seller, the seller
acts as the mechanism to allocate uncertain quantities of electricity to buyers of
different preferences. It is of interest to study mechanisms that do not act on behalf
of the seller, but instead they receive the estimated supply of one or multiple sellers
before computing the allocation to buyers. In such mechanisms, one can study the
possibility of using scoring rules to incentivize seller(s) to report their estimated
supply truthfully (Robu et al., 2012; Vinyals et al., 2014).
Other research directions may consider the multi-unit demand case where buyers
have continuous demand for electricity, and enriched SLA features that include time
of delivery, penalty for misreporting the available supply, or unsuccessful delivery.
In addition, future work can study the exact characterization of the value function of
buyers in realistic settings of the future smart grid, e.g., heat pumps that act as buyers
and for whom temperature variations introduce heterogeneous needs for electricity
demand (demand of different criticality).
Last, the studied mechanisms of this chapter were not evaluated with regards to
the seller’s utility but only with regards to the social value and welfare of the buyers.
A direct extension of this work is therefore to consider the seller’s generation cost,
in that case a reserve price auction may be used to ensure a positive expected utility
for the seller.


5Bounded-Rationality
& Retail Markets
Preface In this chapter we investigate the effects of different degrees of rationality
in the economic decision-making of buyers on the competition and prices that buyers
face in retail markets with identical items. Within a fundamental retail market model
that resembles a Bertrand competition, we use the Softmax function to approximate
different degrees of buyers’ rationality. The competition between sellers is modeled
using hierarchical reasoning, in which each seller computes the price to offer to
buyers (best response strategy) with regards to its belief for the competition. In the
main theoretical contribution of this chapter we derive an analytical best response
strategy (price) of a strategic seller given a set of opponent prices and the degree of
buyers’ rationality, and show that there exists an optimal degree of buyers’ rationality
that minimizes the price. We further use evolutionary game theory to empirically
show the effects of perfect rationality, which results in unstable competition and price
dynamics, and thus increasing costs for buyers. In contrast, we show that bounded
rationality in the economic decision-making of buyers leads to smoother dynamics
and higher benefits for buyers.
 The chapter presents work that was published in Springer Computational Eco-
nomics (Methenitis et al., 2019a).
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5.1 Introduction
Classic game theoretical models to study strategic interactions between self-
interested decision-makers (agents) assume the presence of intelligent and rational
agents (Nash, 1950; Nisan et al., 2007; Sutton and Barto, 1998). However, such a
rationality assumption misreckons that participants in the interactions do not usually
have perfect knowledge of the environment within realistic domains (Russell and
Thaler, 1985). Economic markets and consequently economic decisions of human
buyers that participate in these markets is one instance where agents do not exhibit
rational behavior (Conlisk, 1996; Rubinstein, 1998). As it was first discussed in Sec-
tion 1.1.1, bounded rationality is a fundamental concept that considers the imperfect
decision-making of otherwise rational agents due to, e.g., imperfect information (Si-
mon, 1982). Without perfect information, a bounded rational decision-maker may
act rationally over a limited set of choices. For the remainder of this chapter we refer
to rational agents as perfectly rational, while bounded rational agents denotes agents
of lower (unspecified) degree of rationality.
Automated agents already operate in agent-mediated e-commerce (Guttman
et al., 1999; He et al., 2003; Maes et al., 1999), and it is inevitable that in future
economies humans will be replaced by software as a principal agent of economic
decision-making (Marwala and Hurwitz, 2017). In addition, recent advancements in
e-commerce and fields of Artificial Intelligence such as Deep Learning (Goodfellow
et al., 2016) and Automated Negotiation (Baarslag et al., 2017) illustrate the potential
to enhance the abilities of agents in the complex settings of economic markets.
The discrepancy between human decision-makers that are bounded rational due
to information or time limitations, and potential software agents that are perfectly
rational with regards to individual interactions, leaves open the question whether
such change is desirable:
Should the behavior of automated (software) agents be made perfectly
rational?
From a myopic point of view, increasing the level of rationality seems like a straight-
forward conclusion; however, this neglects the impact of changing dynamics over
repeated interactions. Economic markets can instantiate such repeated settings, in
which the behavior of individual decision-makers can change the dynamics and the
overall market behavior. It is therefore of great interest to study the effects that per-
fectly rational decision-makers have on fundamental economic paradigms such as
retail markets.
In this chapter we consider retail markets where sellers compete by offering prices
for identical items to buyers, e.g., electricity markets. Each seller has a private cost
for the items, e.g., procurement or production cost, and an infinite inventory of items.
Sellers offer items to buyers at specific prices simultaneously in order to control
a high market share and increase their profits. Assuming that buyers are perfectly
rational (i.e., they choose the lowest price with probability one), this is known as
the Bertrand competition (see Section 1.1.5). The Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand
competition is the competitive price in the case that sellers have identical private
costs (Bertrand, 1988). At the competitive price equilibrium, each seller sets a price
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equal to its private cost and the market is shared equally among the sellers: given
that sellers have the same private costs, no seller has an incentive to deviate from the
competitive price since a higher price results in zero market share and a lower price
in negative utility for the seller.
The resulting competitive price equilibrium is formed under the following as-
sumptions:
i. Sellers have no model of the competition (i.e., opponent sellers), and thus no
information regarding the competing prices.
ii. Buyers are perfectly rational, i.e., they select the lowest price with probability
one.
However, assumption (i) is not trivial in repeated markets where sellers can observe
opponent prices and therefore model their competition, i.e., opponent modeling (Al-
brecht and Stone, 2018). In addition, assumption (ii) does not hold in practice, un-
less we consider small-scale markets with limited options for buyers and thus perfect
knowledge.
Motivated by the above assumptions, this chapter investigates the effects of
different degrees of buyers’ rationality on the competition and the resulting prices
for buyers in retail markets. This, however, requires modeling of both sides of a retail
market, namely, the buyers and the sellers. First, we use the Softmax function (see
equation 1.2) to model varying degrees of buyers’ rationality. Furthermore, we use k-
level reasoning to model the competition between sellers (Camerer et al., 2004; Stahl
and Wilson, 1995). In k-level reasoning, k denotes the depth of strategic reasoning
of an agent. A 0-level agent has no model of the opponents and therefore cannot
be strategic, i.e., 0-level agent uses a fixed or a random strategy. A k-level agent
reasons with regards to its belief for the reasoning levels of its opponents. According
to the standard assumption of k-level reasoning, a k-level agent believes to be facing
(k − 1)-level agents. In the studied setting, we analyze the best response strategy of
a strategic seller (i.e., the price to offers to buyers) with regards to the prices posted
by the competition. Last, we use evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of
the competition in repeated interactions between sellers for given degrees of buyers’
rationality, which has also been used to simulate producers’ behavior in electricity
markets (Menniti et al., 2008).
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• First, we derive an analytical best response strategy of a strategic seller given a
set of opponent prices and the degree of buyers’ rationality.
• Interestingly, we find that buyers maximize their utility by not being perfectly
rational in their choices.
• We use evolutionary dynamics to study the evolution of competition between
sellers and show an evolutionary advantage of higher-level reasoning sellers
when using the standard assumption of k-level reasoning.
• We extend the standard assumption of k-level reasoning towards a more realistic
belief model for the competition (true distribution over lower reasoning levels),
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and we observe that perfect rationality contributes to monopolistic behavior of
higher-level reasoning sellers and unstable competition dynamics.
• On the contrary to perfect rationality, we show that bounded rationality leads to
smoother competition dynamics and higher benefits for buyers.
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter presents the first study that combines
bounded rationality in the price selection of buyers and opponent modeling for the
sellers (k-level reasoning) within the Bertrand competition model to study the effects
of different degrees of buyers’ rationality on the competition and prices. The main
objective of this chapter is not limited to study the consequences of varying degrees
of buyers’ rationality in retail markets; it also adds fundamental knowledge that can
be used for the design of future agent-based automated markets with commodities
(e.g., future electricity markets), and general competitive multi-agent settings with
heterogeneous agents.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 provides an
overview of the literature that is relevant to the work presented in this chapter. Next,
in Section 5.3 we introduce the market model. In Section 5.4 we derive analytical
best response strategies for strategic sellers with regards to prices offered by the
competition and the degree of buyers’ rationality, we also present experiments to
verify our theoretical findings. In Section 5.5 we introduce concepts from evolution-
ary game theory and use them to show the effects of the degree of buyers’ rationality
in repeated interactions in retail markets. Last, Section 5.6 concludes this chapter
providing a discussion on the insights of our results and further proposing promising
future directions of this research.
5.2 RelatedWork
Bertrand competition and many of its variants are well-studied market models in
the literature (Caragiannis et al., 2017; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Spulber,
1995). For instance, Spulber (1995) studies the Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand
competition and shows that when rivals’ costs are unknown, each seller offers a price
above its marginal cost and has positive expected profit. In another work, Caragiannis
et al. (2017) study markets with multiple sellers that offer identical items to buyers
with different valuations on each seller. The authors model this setting as a two-stage
full-information game and show the price of anarchy and the efficiency of computing
equilibria in this game. In this chapter we study settings within the Bertrand market
model without assuming a full-information setting for sellers: sellers have only a
belief about the competition they face.
As discussed in Section 1.1.5, a similar model to Bertrand in which sellers decide
on the quantity of items to sell without any knowledge of the competition is the
Cournot competition (Allaz and Vila, 1993). Singh and Vives (1984) study the
connection between the Bertrand and the Cournot competition models by analyzing
the duality of prices and quantities in differentiated duopolies. For retail markets
we study in this chapter, the Bertrand model is better suited than the Cournot
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competition, in which sellers can only alter the price for items but not the quantity to
sell (Weber, 2006).
The classical price competition model named after Bertrand (1988) prescribes
that in equilibrium sellers set prices equal to their private costs. However, this
equilibrium outcome is not in line with real-life observations in which buyers are not
rational in their choices over prices, and in which sellers model their competition.
More specifically, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) show that the resulting prices
that sellers offer to buyers further depend on the number of sellers that compete
in the market. This is known as the Bertrand Paradox (Bruttel, 2009; Dufwenberg
and Gneezy, 2000). Aligned with the Bertrand Paradox, we consider buyers that
are bounded rational and use a stochastic model of choosing over prices. Similarly
to related work (Ait Omar et al., 2017; Basov and Danilkina, 2015), we use the
Softmax function to model the stochastic price selection of buyers, while other works
make use of the equivalent multinomial logit function or the alternative Luce choice
axiom (Anas, 1983; McFadden, 1975).
Previous work has also studied the effects of bounded rationality on Bertrand
markets (Ait Omar et al., 2017; Basov and Danilkina, 2015; Zhang et al., 2009).
For instance, Zhang et al. (2009) consider a Bertrand model with bounded rational
sellers and study convergence properties of the competition. In the closest to ours
work, Basov and Danilkina (2015) study price equilibria with regards to the degree
of buyers’ rationality. They propose a model where sellers can choose to educate or
confuse buyers, i.e., increase or decrease their degree of rationality respectively, and
present the effects of these choices. Extending previous results (Basov and Danilk-
ina, 2015), Ait Omar et al. (2017) show that within a Bertrand oligopoly, sellers
can benefit if buyers have lower degree of rationality. Our model substantially dif-
ferentiates from the aforementioned work in the following ways. First, we consider
automated (software) agents in place of human buyers. In this setting, agents of high
computational capacity can reach levels of (almost) perfect rationality, and thus the
degree of buyers’ rationality cannot be manipulated by sellers.
The effects of bounded rational agents have also been studied with regards to
learning agents, as the concept of bounded rationality is associated to the exploration
Vs. exploitation problem in reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998). For
instance, Wunder et al. (2010b) study the effects of the exploration rate of players on
the resulting players’ payoffs in two-player prisoners’ dilemma games. The authors
show that increasing exploration rate (i.e., lowering the frequency of using a greedy
policy) results in higher than in Nash equilibrium payoffs for players.
Last, in this chapter we consider sellers of heterogeneous reasoning levels using
hierarchical reasoning to model competition. Hierarchical (k-level) reasoning has
been also used in other game theoretical domains to model opponents (Hennes et al.,
2012; Hu and Wellman, 2001; Lindner and Sutter, 2013; Wunder et al., 2010a).
Hu and Wellman (2001) use k-level reasoning to learn the strategies of opponent
agents (opponent modeling) in double-auctions. The authors conclude that more
sophisticated modeling (high hierarchical reasoning level) does not guarantee an
improvement in the performance of agents. In contrast to work by Hu and Wellman
(2001), we use k-level reasoning to compute the best response strategy of a reasoning
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seller with regards to lower levels of reasoning. Consequently, higher levels of
reasoning result in higher performance, since lower levels of reasoning function
under limited information with regards to the competition. The work presented
in this chapter is further related to literature that uses hierarchical reasoning to
model varying information levels. More specifically, Hennes et al. (2012) use k-
level reasoning to analyze the competitive advantage of high information access in
markets. They conclude that random traders achieve in expectation higher gains than
traders under partial information, who are in turn exploited by higher information
level traders.
In view of the related work, this chapter fills a gap that connects bounded rational
buyers and iterative reasoning sellers to model market competition dynamics.
5.3 Market Model
In this section we present our basic market setting, we also show how we model
different degrees of buyers’ rationality and the competition between sellers.
We use the Bertrand model to study retail markets where sellers offer identical
items to a finite population of buyers, assuming that sellers have an infinite inventory
of items, and equal private costs (Bertrand, 1988). In practice, e.g., in electricity
retail markets private costs for electricity do not vary significantly. We define ci > 0
as the private cost of seller i, and pi as the price that seller i offers to buyers (pi is
the decision of seller i), p is the vector of prices set by all sellers. Furthermore, p−i
denotes the vector of prices set by sellers other that i. Both the price pi and the prices
of sellers other than i, determine the utility of seller i,
ui = (pi − ci)si(p), (5.1)
where si(p) is the function that maps the vector of prices p to the market share of
seller i, i.e., si : p → [0, 1] ∈ R, such that
∑
i si(p) = 1. Last, we assume that the
price of seller i cannot be lower than its private cost ci, pi ≥ ci, since for any positive
market share, si(p) > 0, pi < ci results in negative utility for seller i.
5.3.1 Degree of buyers’ rationality
In the retail market setting we consider, sellers offer identical items at specific prices
to buyers. Buyers choose the price and consequently the seller to buy the items
from. Assuming that buyers are perfectly rational, they choose the lowest price with
probability one. In practice, however, buyers use a stochastic model for choosing
over the offered prices, i.e., buyers are bounded rational (Rubinstein, 1998).
We use the Softmax function (see equation 1.2) alongside the Bertrand market
model, to study the effects of different degrees of buyers’ rationality. The fraction of
buyers that choose price pi (market share of seller i) is given by:
si(p) =
e−pi/τ∑
j e
−pj/τ ,∀τ ∈ (0,∞), (5.2)
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where τ is the coefficient that exaggerates or diminishes the contrast between differ-
ent prices for the buyers. Note that, in experiments presented later in this chapter we
use the log(τ) range for ease of illustration.
Remark 5.1. Equation (5.2) is identical to the multinomial logit function that is
widely used in the economics literature to model buyers’ stochastic decision-making
when facing different prices (Anas, 1983; McFadden, 1975).
Remark 5.2. Equation (5.2) models the collective degree of buyers’ rationality and
not the individual degrees of rationality within the population of buyers.
The quantity si(p) can also be interpreted as the probability that an individual buyer
out of the buyers’ population chooses price pi. For τ close to zero (τ → 0), buyers
are approximately perfectly rational choosing the lowest price with probability one,
while for high values of τ (τ →∞), buyers choose over prices with equal probability
(uniformly random). The parameter τ can be adjusted to model different degrees of
buyers’ rationality, between (almost) perfect rational buyers and buyers that choose
over prices randomly. Last, we compute the cost for the buyers as follows:∑
i
si(p)× pi, (5.3)
where the cost is equal to the sum of sellers’ prices weighted by the market share of
each seller, i.e., average price for the buyers.
5.3.2 k-level reasoning & competition
In the previous section we described the basic market model and outlined the decision
of buyers over different prices with regards to their collective degree of rationality τ
(see equation 5.2).
The present and following sections discuss how sellers decide the prices to offer
to buyers. The decision of a seller with regards to the price (i.e., strategy) to offer
to buyers is not only influenced by the degree of buyers’ rationality but also by
the prices offered by its competition (other sellers). We consider that sellers model
their competition using k-level reasoning, where k denotes the reasoning level of
a seller (Stahl and Wilson, 1995). This resembles sellers that can have varying
information levels or computational resources. For the remainder of the chapter, Lk
stands for the k-th level of reasoning.
First, we consider L0 sellers. A L0 seller does not model opponent sellers, and
therefore its strategy (price) does not consider opponent prices. For higher levels of
reasoning (k > 0), standard models of k-level reasoning assume the following: A
Lk agent believes to be facing L(k − 1) agents (Arad and Rubinstein, 2012; Hu
and Wellman, 2001). Other models of k-level reasoning modify the aforementioned
assumption as follows: A Lk agent has a belief with regards to the probability of
meeting each of the lower levels (Camerer et al., 2004). Last, in k-level reasoning no
Lk agent believes that it competes against agents of equal or higher reasoning levels.
In this chapter we use both models described above. For generality, we assume
that Lk seller has a belief distribution over lower reasoning levels. Let x denote the
vector of the true distribution over levels of reasoning, where each entry xk denotes
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the probability (frequency) that Lk appears in the population of sellers. We define
λk as the belief distribution of Lk seller with regards to the true distribution x,
λk consists of k entries (the first entry is the frequency of L0 in the population),
λk = 〈λ0, λ1, . . . , λk−1〉. Each entry λzk is the probability of competing against Lz
seller,
∑k−1
z=0 λ
z
k = 1. Note that, L0 does not have a belief for the competition and
for k > 0, sellers of the same reasoning level have identical beliefs with regards to
the competition. Given the belief λk, we proceed to derive the best response strategy
of Lk seller, i.e., the price to offer to buyers that maximizes its utility.
5.4 k-Level Best Response Strategies
In this section we illustrate the best response strategy (price) of Lk seller i given
private cost ci, and belief λk over its competition. For brevity, we omit i from the
notation since Lk is independent of seller i.
5.4.1 Best response strategies in duopolies
We define pi∗k as the best response strategy of Lk; pi
∗
k is the function that maps: (i)
the private cost c, (ii) the belief λk, and (iii) the degree of buyers’ rationality τ ,
to the price p∗k, i.e., pi
∗
k : (c, λk, τ) → p∗k. To simplify notation, we also use p∗k
rather than pi∗k in the remainder of this chapter. Considering a known L0 strategy, p0,
the strategy of Lk agent is computed by iteratively best respond to lower levels of
reasoning. To illustrate this, consider that Lk seller believes that competes against a
L(k − 1) opponent seller. Then, the best response of Lk is given by:
arg max
pk
(pk − c)sk(〈pk, p∗k−1〉),
where p∗k−1 is the best response to p
∗
k−2. Next, by taking into account the belief λk,
p∗k = arg max
pk
k−1∑
z=0
λzk(pk − c)sk(〈pk, p∗z〉), (5.4)
is the best response of Lk seller with regards to the probability of competing against
each of the lower levels z. The Lk best response strategy presented here serves as an
illustration of the iterated best response model. In the following section we derive an
analytical solution for the best response strategy of Lk for any number of opponents
with regards to the opponent prices.
5.4.2 Analytical best response strategies & rationality
Recall that p−i denotes the vector of prices set by sellers other than i. Here, we
assume a known p−i since prices of opponent sellers result out of iterated best
response strategies in k-level reasoning. We make no further assumptions for the
private costs of opponent sellers, note that ci is the private cost of seller i.
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Theorem 5.1. The price p∗i maximizes the utility of seller i given the vector of
opponent prices p−i, the private cost ci, and the degree of buyers’ rationality τ :
p∗i (p−i, ci, τ) = τW
(
e−
ci
τ −1∑
j 6=i e
− pjτ
)
+ ci + τ, (5.5)
where W is the Lambert function, i.e., x = f−1(xex) = W (xex) (Corless et al.,
1996).
Proof. Given seller i, and the vector of opponent prices p−i, the utility of seller i is
equal to:
ui = (pi − ci)
e−pi/τ∑
j e
−pj/τ . (5.6)
To derive the price p∗i , we first use the quotient rule to compute the derivative of the
utility of seller i in equation (5.6) with respect to the price pi:
∂ui
∂pi
=
e−
pi
τ
∑
j 6=i
(
e−
pj
τ × ( ci−piτ + 1)+ e− piτ )(∑
j e
− pjτ
)2 . (5.7)
Equation (5.7) is the derivative of the utility of seller i with respect to the price pi.
By solving equation (5.7) to be equal to zero we get equation (5.5), which is the the
only solution of (∂ui/∂pi) = 0. Given that the only term that affects the sign of
(∂ui/∂pi) is ∑
j 6=i
(
e−
pj
τ ×
(
ci − pi
τ
+ 1
)
+ e−
pi
τ
)
,
it is easy to see that as pi decreases further from p∗i , both the quantity
e−
pj
τ ×
(
ci − pi
τ
+ 1
)
and e−pi/τ increase, and thus (∂ui/∂pi) > 0 for pi < p∗i . Similarly, as pi increases
further than p∗i , both of the above quantities decrease, and thus (∂ui/∂pi) < 0 for
pi > p
∗
i . Hence, p
∗
i is the price that maximizes the function ui.
Theorem 5.1 shows the best response strategy of seller iwith regards to the opponent
prices p−i, the private cost ci, and the degree of buyers’ rationality τ . The above
theorem is relevant for markets where prices are public knowledge, while the degree
of buyers’ rationality τ can be approximated.
We proceed to show some interesting theoretical results that follow from Theo-
rem 5.1 under the following assumption:
Assumption 5.1. We consider a Bertrand duopoly with a reasoning seller i with
private cost ci that observes: (i) the price of the opponent p−i, which we assume is
fixed for all τ , and (ii) the degree of buyers’ rationality τ .
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Intuitively, the above assumption considers a duopoly market in which the opponent
seller can not observe or estimate the degree of buyers’ rationality τ and uses a fixed
price p−i. The competitive price p−i can also resemble the price of an outside option
for buyers, e.g., their private cost for producing the items on their own, that does
not depend on the degree of their rationality τ . In contrast, the reasoning seller can
observe the degree of buyers’ rationality, motivated by the example of a company
with resources for market research.
In the remainder of this section we abbreviate the notation of the best response
function in equation (5.5), p∗i (p−i, ci, τ), where possible. First, by using equa-
tion (5.5) we get the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. Given Assumption 5.1,
p∗i < p−i ⇔ ci < p−i − 2τ. (5.8)
Proof. We use the property of the Lambert function, W (f(x)) = g(x) ⇔ f(x) =
g(x)eg(x), to solve the following inequality,
τW
(
e−
ci
τ −1
e−
p−i
τ
)
+ ci + τ < p−i, (5.9)
which results the inequality in equation (5.8).
The above lemma shows the upper bound for the private cost ci, such that the best
response strategy p∗i is lower than the opponent price p−i, and thus buyers can
benefit. A less intuitive bound for the cost ci than in equation (5.8) can be computed
for more than one opponent price.
We proceed to show that buyers benefit if they are not perfectly rational, i.e.,
τ > 0, under the same setting.
Lemma 5.2. Given Assumption 5.1 and ci < p−i, there exists τ∗ ∈ (0, (p−i−ci)/2),
such that p∗i (τ
∗) ≤ p∗i (τ),∀τ ∈ (0,∞).
Proof. Given that the quantity (p−i − ci) is fixed for all τ , and τ ′ = (p−i − ci)/2,
equation (5.8) implies that p∗i < p−i for τ < τ
′.
Given that equation (5.5) is not defined for τ = 0, we compute the limit as τ tends
to 0,
lim
τ→0
p∗i = ci + lim
τ→0
[
τW
(
e
p−i−ci
τ −1
)
+ τ
]
.
By the L’Hospital’s rule we get that limτ→0 p∗i = ci + (p−i − ci) = p−i. As τ → 0,
p∗i tends to p−i.
Thus, for every ε > 0 sufficiently small, the continuous function p∗i lies below
p−i for every τ that belongs to [ε, τ ′ − ε].
Given the extreme value theorem for continuous functions in compact intervals,
there is a τ∗ ∈ [ε, τ ′ − ε] for which p∗i (τ∗) ≤ p∗i (τ), ∀τ ∈ [ε, τ ′ − ε]. In
addition, we know from equation (5.8) that limε→0 p∗i (τ
′ − ε) = p∗i (τ ′) ≥ p−i,
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Figure 5.1 (Left) Best response strategy (price) of reasoning level Lk with regards to log(τ).
(Right) Buyers’ cost with regards to log(τ).
and limε→0 p∗i (ε) = p−i. By taking ε sufficiently small, and by infτ∈[ε,τ ′] p
∗
i (τ) ≤
infτ∈[τ ′,∞] p∗i (τ), we get that p
∗
i (τ
∗) ≤ p∗i (τ),∀τ ∈ (0,∞).
Theorem 5.2. Given Assumption 5.1 and ci < p−i, the optimal price of the
reasoning seller i, p∗i , is minimum for a degree of buyers’ rationality τ
∗, with τ∗ > 0,
and thus not for perfect rational buyers.
Proof. The theorem directly follows from Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2.
Theorem 5.2 shows that the minimum price of the reasoning seller is obtained for a
degree of rationality τ > 0 (not perfect rationality).
In this section we derived analytical results with regards to the best response price
of a reasoning seller, and the degree of buyers’ rationality that minimize the price of
the reasoning seller. We illustrate these results experimentally in the next section.
5.4.3 Duopoly markets
In line with our assumptions in the previous section, we consider a duopoly mar-
ket where both sellers have identical private costs. We further use the standard as-
sumption of k-level reasoning, namely, a Lk seller believes to be competing against
a L(k − 1) opponent seller, and thus λzk = 1 for z = (k − 1) and λzk = 0 for
z < (k − 1). To derive the price of each Lk seller we use the iterated best response
strategy of Lk similarly to equation (5.4) and the analytical best response price as
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this was derived in equation (5.5). More specifically, the price of Lk is given by:
p∗k(pk−1, ci, τ), where we replace p−i in equation (5.5) with pk−1, i.e., the price of
the (k − 1) reasoning level. For the remainder of this section, we use 3 levels of
reasoning; while our results can be generalized to any number of levels of reason-
ing, levels 0, 1 and 2 exemplify the cases of no, partial and (almost) full information
respectively. Note that the number of possible strategies (levels of reasoning) is dis-
tinct from the number of sellers. Furthermore, L0 is a naive strategy that sells at an
arbitrary fixed profitable price p0, i.e. for L0 seller i, p0 is larger than the private cost
ci.
Figure 5.1 (left) presents the best response strategy (price) of the 3 levels of
reasoning with regards to the logarithm of the degree of buyers’ rationality τ . All
sellers have identical private costs, c = 0.2, for L0 we use p0 = 0.6. Values on
the horizontal axis approximate different degrees of rationality from log(τ) = −3
(almost perfect rationality) to log(τ) = 0 (almost random price selection). For
log(τ) = −3, the best response strategy of Lk is marginally lower than the price of
L(k−1). Given that for log(τ) = −3, buyers are almost perfectly rational, a marginal
decrease in the price of Lk with regards to L(k − 1) results in Lk to attain almost
the full market share. As τ increases, the difference between prices becomes larger
to counterbalance the stochastic selection of buyers over different prices. Intuitively,
sellers choose a lower profit margin in order to achieve a higher market share.
For each reasoning level k for k > 0, there exists τ∗k for which the price p
∗
k
becomes minimum. For instance, for k = 1, 2 the degree of buyers’ rationality that
minimizes the price p∗k is when log(τ
∗
k ) ≈ −1.3. For higher values of τ , buyers
assign more equal probabilities for selecting among different prices. Hence, sellers
of varying levels of reasoning achieve almost equal divisions of the market share
that are only slightly influenced by the prices, and thus prices inflate in face of
maximizing profits.
Utility of sellers & buyers
We proceed to show the influence of the degree of buyers’ rationality τ on the
cost for buyers which we compute as in equation (5.3). Here, we use a uniform
distribution for x, i.e., x0 = x1 = x2 (recall that x is the true distribution over
levels of reasoning). Figure 5.1 (right) presents the cost for buyers with regards to
logarithm of their collective degree of rationality log(τ). For log(τ) = −3, the cost is
marginally lower than the price p0, however, it decreases further as τ becomes larger.
For log(τ) ≈ −1.3, the cost for the buyers is minimum. As τ increases further buyers
choose randomly over prices and thus the cost is increasing since prices inflate.
The results presented throughout this section verify our theoretical findings for
the existence of a degree of rationality (not perfect rationality) for which prices
of reasoning sellers become minimum (see Theorem 5.2). To compute the cost for
buyers we have considered a uniform distribution over levels of reasoning x. In the
following section we show that the distribution x can be influenced by the success
rate of each reasoning level Lk in a repeated setting.
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Figure 5.2 Replicator dynamics over levels of reasoning, for almost perfect buyers’ rationality,
log(τ) = −3. Arrows (direction and magnitude) show the derivative of x, x˙.
5.5 Evolutionary Dynamics
Considering repeated interactions that take place in markets, the frequency with
which each strategy (i.e., reasoning level) appears in the population is influenced
by its success rate (i.e., fitness). In this section we use evolutionary game theory to
study the evolutionary dynamics of reasoning levels in the population of sellers.
Evolutionary game theory is a population-based application of game theory in
repeated settings into which Darwinian competition can be modeled (Newton, 2018;
Smith and Price, 1973; Weibull, 1997). Unlike game theory, it studies the dynamics
of strategy change of a population over time, where strategies are influenced by their
success rate and individuals from the population cannot select a strategy, instead they
are given one.
Recall that x denotes the distribution over reasoning levels (strategies), where
each entry xk denotes the frequency strategy Lk appears in the population. We
further denote with fk the fitness function of Lk that depends on the distribution
over reasoning levels x, fk : x → R. The strategy change x˙ is computed by the
replicator equation (Hofbauer, 1985) as follows:
x˙k = xk [fk(x)− ϕ(x)] , (5.10)
where ϕ(x) is the average fitness of the population.
ϕ(x) =
∑
z
xzfz(x) (5.11)
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Equation (5.10) computes the change in frequency Lk appears in the population
at time t + 1 after interaction at time t. The replicator equation comprises only
the selection process, and therefore the most successful strategies increase their
frequency in the population.
We revisit the duopoly scenario of the previous section (see Section 5.4.3) to
apply the replicator equation. We compute the fitness fk for every possible duopoly
as follows:
fk(x) =
K∑
z=0
xz(p
∗
k − c)sk(< p∗k, p∗z >), (5.12)
where K is the highest reasoning level (here, K = 2). Figure 5.2 presents the
replicator dynamics for the duopoly model of Section 5.4.3. Arrows at each point
of the simplex show the derivative x˙ (direction and magnitude). We observe that
evolution favors the highest reasoning level L2, we can similarly say that L2 has a
competitive advantage.
In this section we used the replicator equation to study the evolution over reason-
ing levels in the duopoly scenario of Section 5.4.3, assuming that a Lk seller believes
to be facing a L(k − 1) opponent seller (standard assumption of k-level reasoning).
We showed that the highest reasoning level has always an evolutionary advantage
since the belief of each type is not influenced by changes in the distribution x. This
result generalizes for any number of reasoning levels.
5.5.1 Dynamic belief of competition
In this section we alter the standard assumption of k-level reasoning to a dynamic
belief model that is influenced by the distribution x.
We extend our setting to an oligopoly market with n sellers and identical private
costs for sellers. We consider that the belief of a Lk seller with regards to opponent
levels of reasoning sellers is the real distribution x for all levels lower than k, such
that λk = 〈x0, x1, . . . , xk−1〉. Note that
∑k−1
z=0 λ
z
k < 1, since xk > 0, i.e., only
lower than k levels of reasoning are included in the belief distribution of Lk. In
addition, for xk close to one (i.e., Lk dominates the population),
∑k−1
z=0 λ
z
k is close
to zero. We define xout = 1 −
∑k−1
z=0 λ
z
k as the probability of facing equal or
higher levels of reasoning opponents. The probability xout can only be computed for
k > 0, since L0 does not have a belief distribution. Hence, the belief of Lk becomes
λk = 〈x0, x1, . . . , xk−1, xout〉. We interpret the probability xout as the probability
of competing with an unknown opponent, e.g., the outside option for buyers. The
opponent price associated with the probability xout is denoted with pout. The price
pout can be set equal to the maximum price buyers are willing to pay to alleviate the
risk of extreme prices set by dominant strategies.
5.5.2 Optimal pricing & generalized replicator dynamics
We use equation (5.5) to approximate the price of each reasoning level p∗k. Lk seller
draws samples (opponent price vectors p−i of length n− 1) with regards to its belief
λk. In our experiments, the Lk best response (optimal price for k-level of reasoning)
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Figure 5.3 Evolution of levels of reasoning and price for almost perfect rationality (top,
log(τ) = −2.7), bounded rationality (middle, log(τ) = −0.7), and random behavior
(bottom, log(τ) = 0). Stack plots at the top show the evolution of distribution x,
and plots at the bottom illustrate the prices set by different levels of reasoning, the
dashed line shows the development of the cost for the buyers.
108 Chapter 5 Bounded-Rationality & Retail Markets
is averaged over 100 sampled opponent price vectors. More samples do not change
the behavior of the simulation in experiments presented later in this chapter.
Furthermore, to include innovation of strategies in the population of sellers,
i.e., new sellers that enter competition or sellers that increase/decrease their level
of reasoning, we use the generalized replicator equation (Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998):
x˙k =
∑
z
[xzfz(x)Qz→k]− ϕ(x)xk, (5.13)
where Qz→k is the transition probability of an individual from the population from
Lz to Lk (i.e., mutation probability), and ϕ(x) the average fitness of the population
(see Equation 5.11). The fitness of Lk, fk(x), is computed as follows:
fk(x) =
1
M
M∑
µ=1
(p∗k − c)sk(〈p∗k, p∗z(1)µ ∼x, . . . , p
∗
z
(n−1)
µ ∼x〉), (5.14)
where each z(j)µ ∼ x are independent samples (i.e., n− 1 opponent prices) from the
true distribution over reasoning levels x, and the fitness is averaged out ofM sampled
opponent price vectors. Considering that the population of sellers is finite, x˙ is not
deterministic for a given x, therefore computing the average fitness improves the
approximation (Kemenade et al., 1998). We useM = 100 for experiments presented
in the remainder of this chapter.
Evolution of reasoning levels
Figure 5.3 illustrates the evolution over levels of reasoning and price with regards
to time t for c = 0.2, p0 = 0.9, pout = 1, and 10 levels of reasoning (from
the lowest L0 to the highest L9, here K = 9). The initial distribution x0 is set
to 〈1, 0, . . . , 0〉, only L0 is present at time t = 0. The mutation probability is set to
0.01, where transition probabilities are uniformly distributed over all different levels,
i.e.,
∑
z 6=kQk→z = 0.01/(number of levels − 1), and Qk→k = 0.99. Stack plots
placed at the top show the evolution of the distribution x over levels of reasoning,
and plots at the bottom show the price evolution for log(τ) ∈ {−2.7,−0.7, 0}. The
bold dashed line shows the average cost for the buyers.
First, we discuss the case of almost perfect rationality, log(τ) = −2.7 (see
Figure 5.3, top). Given the positive mutation probability in equation (5.13), higher
levels (L1 − K) of reasoning “invade” the population of L0. LK best responds
to all lower levels of reasoning, thus it increases its share in x. For t > 50, LK
becomes dominant in the population, at the same time the frequency of reasoning
levels between L0 and LK diminish in the distribution x. In addition, prices as well
as the distribution x are not stable, resulting in price spikes that lead prices higher
than the price p0 (p0 = 0.9). Both price spikes and the instability in the evolution of
the distribution x are caused due to: (i) the low probability for LK to compete with
lower level of reasoning opponents (
∑K−1
j=0 xj ≈ 0.2), and (ii) the high probability
xout to face the outside option price pout. The level of price spikes is subject to the
outside price pout, higher values for pout result in higher spikes further away from
the price p0. During price spikes, L0 benefits due to the high prices of (L1−K) and
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Figure 5.4 (Left) Distribution of reasoning levels x, (right) buyers’ cost. Results are computed
for 10k steps of evolution and 20 independent evolution runs.
increases its share in x. Thereafter, higher levels of reasoning (L1 − K) decrease
their price in face of the increasing share of L0 in x until L0 share decreases again.
This results in chaotic evolutionary dynamics while similar behavior is observed for
log(τ) < −1.7.
We observe smoother evolutionary dynamics and lower average price for buyers
for lower degrees of buyers’ rationality, more specifically, for log(τ) > −1.7.
For instance, for log(τ) = −0.7 (see Figure 5.3, middle), evolution reaches an
equilibrium state at t > 3k, where the distribution x and the prices become stable. On
the contrary to the case of almost perfect rationality (see Figure 5.3, top), the prices
set by higher levels of reasoning (L1 − K) are lower than p0 (p0 = 0.9), and thus
the average cost for the buyers decrease. Note that, the frequency of reasoning levels
betweenL0 andLK is not diminished as in the case of almost perfect rationality. The
lower average price for buyers is a result of sustaining competition between different
levels of reasoning sellers and the smoother dynamics of the evolution.
Last, we show the evolution of the distribution x and the prices when the buyers’
price selection is almost random (see Figure 5.3, bottom). For log(τ) = 0, reasoning
levels (L1 − K) share the distribution x equally, where all reasoning sellers offer
prices that exceed the price of L0, p0, and the price pout, and therefore increase the
cost for buyers.
Overall, higher degrees of buyers’ rationality yield higher average cost for buy-
ers than lower degrees of rationality, e.g., log(τ) = −0.7. Furthermore, unstable
evolutionary dynamics under almost perfect rationality increase prices further due to
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price spikes. In our experiments, we additionally used gradual updates to the prices
in order to study the possibility more stable states can be reached in the evolution
even in the case of perfect rationality. When gradual updates were used, results were
consistent to the results presented here, however, the evolution of the distribution x
was slower.
Competitive advantage & price
We proceed to show how the degree of buyers’ rationality affects the competition in
terms of the evolutionary advantage of higher reasoning levels, the resulting prices
for buyers, and the stability of the competition.
Figure 5.4 (left) illustrates the distribution x over levels of reasoning after 10k
steps (mean of the last 100 steps) of the evolution averaged over 20 independent
runs. LK is the dominant in x for almost all values of τ , i.e., log(τ) < −0.25. For
log(τ) ≈ −0.25, all levels L0 to LK have approximately equal shares in x. This is
due to the almost equal prices reasoning levels set (similarly to the duopoly setting
examined in earlier sections, see Figure 5.1, left). For log(τ) > −0.25, the market is
shared among levels L1 and LK, since all levels of reasoning but L0 offer very high
prices to (almost) random buyers.
We further show the effect of varying degrees of rationality τ on buyers’ cost (see
Figure 5.4, right). The cost is averaged over the last 100 out of 10k steps of evolution
and over 20 independent evolution runs. For low τ , the average cost for buyers is
marginally higher than the cost without the presence of higher than L0 reasoning
levels, p0 = 0.9. This is the result of unstable competition dynamics that cause price
spikes, during which prices become higher than the price of L0 strategy, p0. Recall,
that pout = 1 alleviates the possibility of extreme prices, and thus the cost for buyers
would increase further for higher pout due to the increasing level of price spikes. In
contrast, from log(τ) = −1.7 to log(τ) = −0.2 buyers’ cost drops below the price
p0 = 0.9, this is mainly caused by the smoother behavior of evolution that converges
to stable distributions and alleviate price spikes. In line with our theoretical findings
in Section 5.4, we observe that there is a degree of rationality log(τ∗) ≈ −0.7 that
minimizes the average cost for buyers (shown in the figure by the dashed vertical
line).
In the presented experiments, we demonstrated that lower degrees than perfect
buyers’ rationality decrease the prices sellers offer to buyers during the evolution
of the competition. For almost perfect buyers’ rationality, the highest reasoning level
sellers exploit instances of monopoly situations and increase their prices, while under
bounded buyers’ rationality competition is sustained decreasing prices for buyers. In
the section that follows, we evaluate the stability of the competition with regards to
the degree of buyers’ rationality.
Evolutionary stability
If the dynamics were known in explicit closed form, one could apply analytical no-
tions of stability (e.g., evolutionary stable strategies, asymptotically stable) to an-
alyze equilibrium strategies (Smith, 1972). However, given our implicit dynamics
arising from system simulation (see Section 5.5.2), we need to draw on empirical
means for characterizing the asymptotic behavior of the evolution. In the remainder
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Figure 5.5 Average magnitude of x˙ (solid line, left verical axis) and average Euclidean distance
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Results are computed for 10k steps of evolution and 20 independent evolution runs.
of this section we analyze both the first-order derivative and the distribution trajec-
tory x, and examine how the degree of buyers’ rationality influences the stability of
the evolution.
First, we use the average magnitude (Euclidean norm) of x˙, |x˙|, that is shown
by the solid line in Figure 5.5 (left vertical axis). We compute this over the last
100 out of 10k steps of the evolution while results are averaged over 20 independent
runs. The quantity |x˙| is maximum for almost perfect buyers’ rationality, specifically,
|x˙| > 10−3, ∀ log(τ) < −2. This is in line with our observations in Figure 5.3 (top),
where we showed chaotic behavior in the evolution of x for a low τ value. As τ
increases, steps in the evolution become smaller and consequently |x˙| decreases. For
log(τ∗) ≈ −0.7, which minimizes the average cost for buyers in Figure 5.4 (right),
|x˙| is very low (10−5).
Next, we use the Euclidean distance between x and the average distribution x¯,
|x− x¯|, which is shown by the dashed line in Figure 5.5 (right vertical axis). The
quantities x¯ and |x− x¯| are computed over the last 100 out of 10k steps of evolution,
and averaged over 20 independent runs. Similarly to |x˙|, |x− x¯| decreases as τ
increases, and hence the distribution x stays closer to the average distribution x¯ for
bounded rational buyers.
Our results suggest that imperfect rationality contributes to smoother competition
dynamics, corroborating our observations in Section 5.5.2.
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Figure 5.6 (Left) Optimal degrees of buyers’ rationality τ∗ with regards to the price of L0, p0.
(Right) Buyers’ cost when τ = τ∗ with regards to the price of L0, p0. Results are
computed for 10k steps of evolution and 20 independent evolution runs.
Price of zero reasoning level
So far we have shown the effects of different degrees of buyers’ rationality on the
behavior of retail markets with regards to: the evolution of competition, the resulting
prices for buyers, and the stability of evolutionary dynamics. Here, we show that the
properties shown in previous sections generalize for different prices of L0 strategy,
p0. Figure 5.6 illustrates both the degree of rationality log(τ∗) that minimizes the
cost for buyers (left), and the corresponding cost for the values of log(τ∗) (right).
The cost for buyers is minimum if buyers are not perfectly rational for all values
of p0, however as the difference (p0 − c) becomes larger, log(τ∗) increases (lower
degree of rationality). At the same time, buyers’ cost is relatively lower than p0 as
p0 increases. Intuitively, the margin between the resulting average cost for buyers
(computed for the optimal degree of buyers’ rationality) and the price p0 increase as
the difference (p0 − c) increase.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we illustrated the effects of varying the degree of buyers’ rationality in
retail markets. In the presented experiments we showed that almost perfect rationality
caused spikes in price due to the unstable evolutionary dynamics, and thus increased
the cost for buyers. On the contrary, lower degrees of rationality resulted in lower
cost for buyers, by both sustaining competition between sellers of varying levels
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of reasoning and by increasing the stability of evolutionary dynamics. In line with
related work (Wunder et al., 2010b), we can also conclude that using a stochastic
choice model for decision-making in our setting leads in higher payoffs for the
buyers.
Arriving at this non-trivial conclusion, we have made some simplifying assump-
tions with regards to the market setting and the model of competition between sell-
ers. On the contrary, real-world retail markets involve highly perplexing dynamics
and demonstrate extremely complex behavior, which can not be fully delineated in
fundamental market models. Our results are thus not conclusive but instead seek to
provide insights and add fundamental knowledge that can be used for the design of
future retail markets with commodities that enable market participation by software
agents, and general competitive multi-agent settings with heterogeneous agents.
Overall, in this chapter we studied the effects of varying degrees of buyers’
rationality and sellers’ opponent modeling (using k-level reasoning), in the Bertrand
competition. In Theorem 5.1 we mathematically derived the best response strategy
(price) given a set of opponent prices and the degree of buyers’ rationality. We further
used evolutionary dynamics to show the evolution of competition and prices in both
duopoly and oligopoly scenarios. By replacing the standard assumption of k-level
reasoning with a dynamic belief that depends on the distribution over reasoning
levels, we showed that perfect rationality results in monopolistic behavior of higher
reasoning level sellers, spikes in price, and unstable competition dynamics. The
existence of an optimal degree of rationality stated in Theorem 5.2 and the improved
evolutionary dynamics illustrated in our experiments thus provide a rationale for
agents’ bounded rationality in retail markets, raising the need to revisit design
objectives for software agents in retail markets in light of their wider systematic
impact.
5.6.1 Future work
The work presented in this chapter also serves as a basis for a number of extensions,
some of which we detail in this section.
First, in this chapter we have considered the collective degree of buyers’ rational-
ity (see Remark 5.2). However, when considering the economic decision-making of
an individual buyer given a set of prices, perfect rationality always yields the opti-
mal result. Future extensions of this work may consider finite populations of buyers
that each has a degree of rationality while it is of interest to show the possibility that
individual buyers could converge to the optimal degree of rationality with regard to
the resulting prices.
Throughout this chapter we assume that there is no cost associated with the
reasoning level of sellers. A straightforward extension of this work may consider
an arbitrary cost model for each reasoning level, or compute bounds up to which
it is beneficial for sellers of higher levels of reasoning to enter the retail market
competition.
Future extensions of this work may also consider more elaborate market models
to resemble realistic settings of retail markets and finite population replicator dynam-
ics (Taylor et al., 2004). Finite population models could result in different insights
where the number of sellers can influence the resulting equilibria.

6Conclusions
The rapid development of our societies alongside many technological advancements
in electrification of transportation and heating are expected to increase demand for
electricity significantly in the near future. In order to satisfy this increasing demand
for electricity, natural sources such as the sun and wind are expected to complement
and slowly replace conventional sources of electricity, such as fossil fuel and nuclear
power plants. Future electricity systems will therefore be characterized especially
by:
• The spatial distribution of renewable electricity generation.
• The inherent uncertain and intermittent nature of renewable electricity genera-
tion.
• The increasing active role of consumption and generation (e.g., prosumers,
electric vehicles, smart home appliances).
• Interconnected electricity networks that use sensors and two-way communica-
tion to enable utilization of renewable electricity generation and coordination.
The outlined characteristics of future electricity systems are the main motivations
of the innovative solution paradigm of the smart grid, which enables the transition
from conventional electricity grids to distributed interconnected systems (see Sec-
tion 1.2.3). In the smart grid, centralized control and generation, and passive con-
sumption are replaced by distributed renewable electricity generation, local control
and the actively participating consumers and small-scale producers. For instance, in
the smart grid consumers may adapt their demand behavior based on external sig-
nals (e.g., price), or purchase their electricity directly from generators on their local
network.
However, the seamless integration of renewable electricity generation and the de-
centralized nature of the smart grid pose new and significant challenges towards its
practical implementation. Most of these challenges focus on the design of coordi-
nation protocols (mechanisms) to enable active participation of demand and gener-
ation entities (agents). The collective efficiency and the emergent behavior of such
systems is the result of individual actions by autonomous and self-interested agents
while each agent has its own set of preferences and is interested in maximizing its
own utility rather than optimizing a global metric (e.g., social welfare). As a re-
sult, the ability of agents to actively control their demand or generation loads further
raises strategic considerations and conflict of interest between agents, which can be
analyzed and solved through the analysis of the resulting multi-agent systems.
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In this thesis we focused on two fundamental challenges that are motivated by the
transition in electricity systems:
• The increasing uncertainty on both the demand and supply sides.
• The economic decision-making of agents participating in future electricity
markets
More specifically, uncertainty in the demand and supply raises the need for innova-
tive pricing schemes and economic mechanisms that incentivize favorable changes in
the demand behavior of customers to alleviate risks related to imbalances. Moreover,
the potential participation of automated agents in future electricity markets may have
adverse effects in electricity retail markets.
Throughout this thesis, artificial intelligence and its fields, such as game theory
and mechanism design, provide the theoretical tools for the analysis and the design of
mechanisms that not only take into consideration individuals’ preferences, but also
satisfy theoretical guarantees with regards to the efficiency of multi-agent systems.
Similarly to a large body of scientific literature that is motivated by the transition
in electricity systems and the smart grid (see Section 1.2.4), this thesis focused on
satisfying a key requirement for the efficient operation of the envisioned and current
electricity systems, which is the need for continuous balancing demand and supply.
6.1 Main Contributions
In this section we outline the main contributions of this thesis: Section 6.1.1 present
a brief overview of our contributions, while Sections 6.1.2-6.1.5 provide a more in
depth discussion with regards to the contributions of each technical chapter revisiting
the corresponding research questions.
6.1.1 Overview
The main contributions of this thesis are in the design of economic mechanisms and
the study of agent interactions in fundamental settings within the domain of the smart
grid. These fundamental settings resemble instances of multi-agent systems in cur-
rent or future electricity markets, in which different stakeholders exchange electricity
or demand response services. More specifically, in Chapters 2 and 3 we considered
the balancing responsibility of an electricity retailer and the uncertainty in the de-
mand of its customers. In this setting, Chapter 2 proposed the risk-sharing tariff,
which enables the retailer sharing the balancing responsibility with its customers
incentivizing in such a way uncertainty reduction on the demand-side. Chapter 2 fur-
ther studied the effects of the economic decision-making of customers to the design
phase of such a tariff. In a similar setting, Chapter 3 proposed economic mechanisms
to incentivize small-scale and unreliable agents to provide their demand response
services to the retailer and alleviate excessive costs of the retailer with regards to
balancing supply and demand.
Next, Chapter 4 studied a different scenario of the envisioned smart grid. More
specifically, we considered a setting in which a seller that depends its generation on
a renewable electricity source wishes to sell its potential supply to buyers; however,
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due to the intermittent nature of its supply the seller cannot guarantee electricity
delivery to all the buyers. In such a setting, we proposed a contracting framework
with service-level agreements that enables electricity trading when delivery is not
guaranteed but is subject to the actual output of a renewable electricity source.
Last, the contributions of Chapter 5 are focused on the effects of different eco-
nomic decision-making of buyers in retail markets. In this chapter we showed that the
potential participation of software agents in these markets can have adverse effects
on the competition between sellers, while our results raised some issues concerning
the design of future electricity retail markets where software agents could participate
in high-resolution pricing schemes.
6.1.2 Risk-sharing tari & demand uncertainty reduction
In Chapter 2 we studied the design of a novel electricity tariff to incentivize uncer-
tainty reduction on the demand-side addressing the following research question:
Research Question 1. Can we design electricity tariffs that explicitly incorporate
the balancing responsibility of the retailer and incentivize heterogeneous customers
to reduce the uncertainty of their demand?
To address this question we analyzed an extensive-form two-player game between
a retailer and a customer in a fundamental model of an electricity market. In this set-
ting, the retailer has the balancing responsibility and should therefore balance sup-
ply with the actual demand of the customer. We further considered that the customer
has a direct influence on the balancing requirements of the retailer, and thus any
deviation for the predicted demand causes a balancing cost to the retailer. In this
game-theoretical framework, we proposed the risk-sharing tariff, which is a param-
eterized two-payment tariff scheme where the customer first pays a precommitment
price for the anticipated demand, and after the actual demand is observed pays for
any deviation between the precommitment quantity and the observed demand. The
risk-sharing tariff allows the customer to choose the portion of the balancing risk is
willing to assume from the retailer, which also affects the prices that the customer
faces.
In Chapter 2 we showed that the risk-sharing tariff can contribute to reducing
excessive costs of the retailer connected to balancing supply and demand. The
customer has an economic incentive to reduce the uncertainty of the demand, since a
lower deviation from the anticipated demand also decreases the electricity costs for
the customer. Moreover, we showed that the proposed tariff is acceptable for both the
retailer and the customer, since the risk-sharing tariff yields benefits for both players.
We also illustrated how the overall social welfare can be improved by the reduced
uncertainty in the demand of the customer. Furthermore, we provided arguments
why the proposed tariff elicits all freely available demand response even in cases
where the ability of the customer to reduce the uncertainty of the demand may not
be certain, and we showed the existence of Nash equilibrium strategies in the studied
two-player game.
With regards to the previous research question, in this chapter we showed that
by sharing the risk associated with balancing supply and demand retailers (demand
aggregators) can forward financial risks that come with the inherent uncertainty of
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the demand to customers. Customers can therefore not only reduce the price they
pay for electricity by managing (or planning) better their demand loads, but they can
also contribute to fewer imbalances between supply and demand. Fewer imbalances
between supply and demand can further abate the excessive use of fast-ramping
generators that produce CO2 emissions.
Economic-decisionmaking on tari design Chapter 2 further addressed the
following research question:
Research Question 4b. What are the implications of considering the economic
decision-making of customers when designing tariffs?
The risk-sharing tariff proposed in Chapter 2 is a pricing scheme for electricity
in which the customer chooses the share of balancing risk is willing to assume
by the retailer. This choice determines the resulting price for precommitment and
imbalances for the customer.
In Chapter 2 we demonstrated that the design of such a tariff can be influenced if
we consider the imperfect economic decision-making of the customer. For instance,
we showed that in case the customer does not choose the cheapest option with
probability one, the retailer is enticed to offer higher economic incentives in order
to elicit better equilibrium outcomes. With regards to the above research question,
our results provide a valuable insight for the design of (electricity) tariffs in face of
customers that select to subscribe into different tariffs stochastically.
Overall, the results of Chapter 2 are not only relevant for the design of electricity
tariffs in future electricity markets, but can further be used for pricing models within
variants of the classical newsvendor problem (Petruzzi and Dada, 1999), in which
suppliers have to procure items to satisfy the uncertain demand of their customers.
6.1.3 Demand response mechanisms for unreliable agents
Similarly to Chapter 2, by explicitly modeling the balancing responsibility of a
retailer in an electricity market, in Chapter 3 we studied economic mechanisms to
incentivize uncertain demand response under a given demand forecast and imbalance
price for the retailer. Chapter 3 addressed the following research question:
Research Question 2. Based on the demand forecast of a retailer, can we design
economic mechanisms that incentivize small-scale and unreliable demand response
agents to prepare and reduce imbalances between supply and demand if necessary?
In this chapter we considered the following problem: A retailer of electricity
based on the forecasted demand of its consumers procures a fixed supply in the day-
ahead market to satisfy the demand. Since consumers’ demand is not certain but it
can only be estimated, there is no guarantee that the actual demand is equal to the
procured quantity. Therefore, any imbalance between the procured quantity and the
actual demand of consumers should be adjusted in the balancing market with a much
higher price than the day-ahead price. Following the work by Ma et al. (2016), we
considered the presence of flexible agents that can reduce imbalances (by altering
their demand or generation behavior) when demand is known but not finalized and
before the balancing phase, if requested by the retailer. Agents decide whether to
prepare with some preparation cost before the actual demand is known while the
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availability of prepared agents is not certain when requested to reduce or increase
their demand.
With regards to the technical contributions of this chapter, we proposed two de-
mand response mechanisms: a sequential mechanism that is truthful under some mild
assumptions, and a truthful combinatorial mechanism that runs in polynomial time
and uses Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments. Both mechanisms do not require
all agents to respond but only a subset of them. We showed that both mechanisms
yield positive expected utility for both the agents and the retailer (mechanism), and
can be used in settings where both positive and negative imbalances result in balanc-
ing cost for the retailer. Last, we verified the theoretical properties of both mecha-
nisms in an empirical evaluation over a wide range of parameters, where the proposed
mechanisms achieved up to 16% reduction in the balancing cost of the retailer and
14% increase in social welfare compared to when no demand response is used.
To the best of our knowledge, the research study presented in Chapter 3 is the first
to study the design of mechanisms that select a number of agents to prepare prior
when only the forecast of the demand is known, and then request demand response
agents to alter their demand or generation only if there is an imbalance between
supply and demand (see Section 3.2). The technical contributions of Chapter 3
advance the state-of-the-art by proposing demand response mechanisms that do not
require all prepared demand response agents to respond as previous works do (Ma
et al., 2016, 2017). Doing so in more practical settings that also include the balancing
responsibility of the retailer in electricity markets.
Although our results may be focusing on the advancement and the application of
demand response programs for future electricity markets, they can also be used in
other domains that require many agents to execute interdependent sub-tasks while
agents can fail in each of these sub-tasks. For instance, ride-sharing applications and
distributed communication protocols.
6.1.4 SLAs for renewable electricity trading
Next, in Chapter 4 we investigated the adoption of a contracting framework, through
service-level agreements, to facilitate the allocation of renewable electricity supply
to electricity customers that have demand loads of different criticality, addressing the
following research question:
Research Question 3b. Can service-level agreements provide the contracting
framework for the allocation and trading of uncertain quantities of electricity be-
tween renewable generators and consumers?
On the contrary to Chapters 2 and 3 that considered the balancing responsibility
of a retailer that is directly influenced by the inherent uncertainty of the demand,
Chapter 4 considered a different scenario, in which the uncertainty is on the side
of the supply. This is the case in electricity systems that depend their supply on
local renewable generation. In such settings, on the contrary to current electricity
systems that demand is always satisfied, supply is uncertain and thus the delivery
of electricity cannot be guaranteed. More specifically, we considered the stochastic
output of a renewable electricity generator (seller). In practice, this can be a wind
farm that depends its future electricity output on the availability of wind and therefore
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cannot ensure a specific supply. However, the probability of satisfying some demand
quantity can be inferred by the wind forecast.
Conventional fixed-rate electricity tariffs cannot be used in such settings since the
seller would need to guarantee the delivery of electricity. The main contribution of
Chapter 4 is the adoption of SLAs as a direct extension of conventional tariffs for use
in electricity markets that electricity delivery cannot be guaranteed. The proposed
SLAs comprise the following features: quantity, reliability, and price. In addition, to
allocate these SLAs to buyers we defined a generalized value function for the buyers
with regards to the criticality of their demand in the face of uncertain delivery, further
addressing the following research question:
Research Question 3a. How can we model the utility function of consumers to
include the uncertainty of electricity delivery and consequently the probability of
having their demand satisfied?
The proposed value function generalizes the concept of the value of lost load
(VoLL) with regards to the risk of unsuccessful delivery. To determine the allocation
of SLAs to varying types of buyers, we proposed two mechanisms based on Vickrey
mechanisms: a sequential second-price auction and the VCG, where we showed that
both mechanisms ensure that no buyer has an incentive to misreport its value under
certain conditions. Last, we evaluated the two mechanisms in an experimental study
showing that VCG performance dominates all other allocations over a wide range of
settings, and vastly improves the efficiency of the proposed system when compared
to baseline allocation mechanisms considering only the VoLL.
Overall, the contributions of Chapter 4 illustrate that the adoption of SLAs can
facilitate electricity trading in islanding micro-grids that only depend their electricity
supply on renewables. Our approach can also be seen as a form of demand-side
management, since under this setting some demand loads can only be satisfied
and therefore be active if there is enough supply. The mechanisms and the SLAs
presented in this chapter can also be used in other domains, in which items or services
can be sold while their availability is not certain.
6.1.5 Decision-making of buyers in retail markets
Previous chapters have in common the uncertainty of future electricity systems either
in the demand of consumers, or in the supply of renewable electricity sources, while
their contributions regard economic mechanisms for future electricity marketplaces.
In this section we discuss the contributions of the last technical chapter of this
thesis, Chapter 5, in which we studied the effects of the economic decision-making
of buyers in fundamental retail market settings, addressing the following research
question:
Research Question 4a. What are the effects of representing buyers with autonomous
(economic) decision-making agents in retail markets on the competitive dynamics
and the resulting prices?
The motivations for the above research question stem from future retail markets
within the smart grid, which can enable high-resolution pricing schemes. Whereas
in current electricity markets customers subscribe to electricity tariffs for long time-
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periods (e.g., 1 year), customers participating in future electricity retail markets may
need to change over different tariffs in very short time intervals (e.g., 1-day, 1-hour).
In order to make such short-term decisions, efficient software agents can participate
in place of human customers. To investigate the above research question, Chapter 5
used the Bertrand competition model as a fundamental market setting. In this market
model, we modeled the collective degree of buyers’ rationality using the multinomial
logit function to represent the different economic behavior of buyers. In addition,
we considered the competition setting between sellers that participate in this retail
market using k-level reasoning: each seller computes the price to offer to buyers with
regards to its belief over the competition.
One of the main contributions of this chapter is the mathematical analysis of the
best response strategy of a strategic seller with regards to the competition, and the de-
gree of buyers’ rationality. In Chapter 5 we further used evolutionary game theory to
analyze repeated interactions that take place in markets between the competing sell-
ers, and we illustrated the evolution of competition and prices in both duopoly and
oligopoly scenarios for different degrees of buyers’ rationality. In our main finding,
we showed that perfect rationality results in monopolistic behavior of higher reason-
ing level sellers, spikes in price, and unstable competition dynamics. On the contrary,
we observed stable evolutionary dynamics in the competition that resulted in lower
prices for buyers, when buyers’ choose over prices using a stochastic choice-model
(bounded rational buyers). Overall, the contributions of Chapter 5 provide a ratio-
nale for agents’ bounded rationality in retail markets, since the stability of current
real-world retail markets may also be the result of the stochastic decision-making of
human buyers. Our results and insights further raise the need to revisit design objec-
tives for software agents in retail markets in light of their wider systematic impacts.
6.2 Concluding Remarks
The efficiency of envisioned smart grid systems will be determined by the collec-
tive behavior of many autonomous and self-interested stakeholders. In such systems,
economic mechanisms will enable electricity trading, demand response programs,
and other services in order to facilitate the introduction and the utilization of renew-
able electricity sources. These economic mechanisms should satisfy theoretical and
efficiency guarantees since strategic behavior of users can potentially jeopardize the
efficiency of such systems or lead to power outages. Game theory and mechanism
design provide the theoretical tools to analyze such situations that may arise in the
envisioned systems, and provide solutions that do not depend on deterministic or
centralized solutions that may not consider the preferences of individual users.
This thesis proposed economic mechanisms and analyzed agent-based interac-
tions within fundamental models that comprise strategic situations motivated by the
transition in electricity systems. The contributions of this thesis comprise state-of-
the-art mechanisms that:
• Incentivize uncertainty reduction in the demand-side via electricity tariffs that
can share the balancing responsibility of retailers to the customers.
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• Facilitate demand response programs for smaller-scale flexible users of future
electricity systems.
• Enable electricity trading between consumers and producers in settings where
supply is uncertain and therefore producers cannot guarantee delivery to con-
sumers.
An additional contribution was the analysis of fundamental retail market behavior
with regards to the economic decision-making of buyers that yielded crucial insights
on the design of future (electricity) retail markets.
The methods proposed in this thesis, or future extensions that can be based
on the broad-basis of our contributions, may comprise significant components of
future smart grid systems since they can be used in practical scenarios of future
smart grid networks. However, the results and contributions of this thesis are not
only related to the domain of the smart grid and, more general, future electricity
systems. Our insights may further be used in other application domains, for instance,
e-commerce, transportation, industrial informatics, since the studied models of this
thesis also comprise fundamental problems that are relevant to the fields of artificial
intelligence, mechanism design, game theory, and economics.
6.2.1 Future research directions
In this section we conclude this thesis discussing some general research directions
in the domain of the smart grid. In addition, we refer the reader to the end of each
technical chapter for a more elaborate discussion with regards to interesting future
work that can be based on the broad basis of our technical contributions.
Distributedmechanismdesign Throughout this thesis we proposed economic
mechanisms (see Chapters 3 and 4) and pricing schemes (see Chapter 2) under the
presence of a central authority, such as an electricity retailer or a seller with renew-
able electricity generation. Our contributions aim to assist future electricity systems,
that although highly distributed in nature, require some form of centralized mecha-
nisms to solve allocation problems on a local-level. Especially in small-scale markets
such centralized protocols may suffer from trust issues, or require legal frameworks
in order to ensure that the objectives of these mechanisms are not in conflict with the
ones of the users. In addition, users may not be willing to share their preferences and
characteristics to centralized authorities. To this end, distributed mechanism design
provides a promising avenue for the design of distributed protocols that could be
adopted on a local-level and ensure trustworthiness between the users participating
in future electricity systems (Feigenbaum and Shenker, 2002). Moreover, blockchain
is an emerging technology that can facilitate (peer-to-peer) trading of electricity and
demand response services without the need for central mediators where users’ re-
ports propagate to (Mengelkamp et al., 2018).
Cooperation & fairness In this thesis we studied fundamental problems of
future smart grid systems that comprise non-cooperative settings in which each agent
(player) tries to maximize its own utility. However, future electricity systems may
not always involve strategic considerations for the users; for instance, in electricity
cooperatives (i.e., these can be micro-grid systems that connect to the main grid via
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a single point of common coupling) different users may share common goals with
regards to the collective efficiency of the systems they co-exist in. To this end, we
believe that the design of cooperative mechanisms is of equal importance towards the
practical implementations of the smart grid, whereas non-cooperative mechanisms
may heavily influence the efficiency of such systems in face of ensuring truthful
participation. Promising research directions also include the dynamic formation
of agent coalitions that can facilitate simpler coordination mechanisms to satisfy
balancing requirements (Loni and Parand, 2017). Another important aspect that is
often overlooked in the design of economic mechanisms for electricity markets is
fairness. Although hard to be defined, fairness should be an important evaluation
metric of economic mechanisms for the exchange of services in the smart grid and
markets with commodities (Hekkelman and La Poutré, 2019; Vuppala et al., 2011).
Automated consumer participation & preference elicitation Last, future
research may also focus on the interconnection between systems’ operators and
users in the smart grid. For instance, economic mechanisms proposed in this thesis
require users reporting their private information with regards to their future demand
behavior. This requirement may not be practical in future electricity markets that
may function in higher time-resolutions than current markets, where long-term
contracts for electricity supply are typically in place. It is of interest to study
methods to elicit users’ long-term preferences with regards to their electricity usage
or other private information without the need users have to frequently report to
mechanisms (Baarslag and Gerding, 2015).
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